GitHub alerted me about a vulnerability that my repo sourced from this template has: "Potential actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-275)" #705
The tj-actions/verify-changed-files action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
Details
The verify-changed-files workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as; and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside arunblock. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such asGITHUB_TOKENif triggered on other events thanpull_request. For example onpush`.
Proof of Concept
Submit a pull request to the repository with a new file injecting a command. For example $(whoami).txt would be a valid filename.
Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the List all changed files tracked and untracked files step.
- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files
run: |
echo "Changed files: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}"
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
A new safe_output input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.
A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files
env:
CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}
run: |
echo "Changed files: $CHANGED_FILES"
Description
Summary
The
tj-actions/verify-changed-files
action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.Details
The
verify-changed-files
workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution.This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as
;
and` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a
runblock. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as
GITHUB_TOKENif triggered on other events than
pull_request. For example on
push`.Proof of Concept
$(whoami).txt
would be a valid filename.List all changed files tracked and untracked files
step.Example output:
Impact
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
A new
safe_output
input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
Resources
References