Poisoning the well...

[ghost]

What if a group of malicious actors form a network, obtain items, then perpetrate mayhem? Wouldn't that discredit the system?

Should there be a better way for a CA to verify the new network?

• Some number of known actors are included in the new network that will vouch for the rest of the network?
• CA verifies the new network through some other means: do these people participate in some venue? What demographic are they part of? Do they have a CCW?

[tsgsjeremy]

I was hoping someone would bring this up. And you provide your own solutions.

In the SSL model a CA is responsible FOR everyone that they certify and responsible TO whoever certified them. So if that method is applied to the networks, all new networks would need to be vetted by a current CA in good standing.

With Jon's suggestion of a 5 member minimum, it should be difficult for that many people to pass the screening and for a network. But even so, mistakes are sure to happen. That's why transparency is important. And if YOUR network certifies a network of bad actors, then YOU and everyone in your network should face consequences. And the other networks you have certified should be put on probation until re-certified by another CA. That would give all members an incentive to be pro-active.

[ghost]

OK ... what about a different scenario: Say the CA refuses to recognize any new networks and legitimate networks couldn't be added?

Could a group of usurpers keep anyone from getting licensed?

[tsgsjeremy]

FYI - Jon and I differ on the structure of the networks so I'm answering based on my proposals.

There would have to be a Start of Authority (SOA) for the networks. A national governing body which is ultimately responsible for all licensed networks and shooters. And from which all lower level CA's are ultimately trusted. In my proposal I suggested this body be elected from members of lower level CA's by popular vote amongst all members and serve 5 year terms. With appropriate appeal and impeachment mechanisms in place. So while it might be possible to have a coup and cessation of certifications for a period of time, that would be limited.

Also, lower level CA's would be empowered to certify new networks. So in order to completely stop the propagation of new networks, the usurpers would have to compromise all CA's.

[ghost]

"So while it might be possible to have a coup and cessation of certifications for a period of time, that would be limited."

So, we're kinda back to the whole "due process" issue that people have against no-fly lists?

[jonstokes]

@pepperonigun I've actually thought about this a bit, and I get at it a little bit in the FAQ question about the terrorist cell.

My answer is twofold.

1. I'm not sure if I included this in the proposal (am in a rush so haven't checked), but there would be an initial background check anytime someone joins a network for the first time. This could be in the course of forming a new network, or joining an existing network.
2. A cell of 5 bad actors under this regime could indeed come together and join a network, then perpetrate mayhem.

Now, here's where the goals I set out at the beginning kick in. The above two things still represent an improvement on the status quo. Here's how.

First, everyone gets a background check prior to licensing, which is basically just the status quo (then licensure in good standing substitutes for further background checks, because if you did something that would cause you to fail a background check you'd lose your license and your network would be disbanded).

Second, my working assumption is that it would be very very difficult to put together a cell of 5 bad apples intent on mayhem where not a single one of those actors is on a watch list somewhere. If just one is on a watch list, then the minute that person joins a network red flags go up on the rest of the network, and all of them get a ton of behind-the-scenes scrutiny from the feds, who are now thinking that maybe they've just identified an entire terrorist cell that's trying to form a new network for a attack. This is an improvement on the status quo, because the feds now have more info than they did before.

Finally, in the case of not a terrorist cell but a gang of some sort, those guys are part of a broader social network, and initially they would indeed be able to form up in 5-person networks to cause mayhem, but over the long run the pool of eligible shooter network members in the larger gang community would dry up, and they'd all end up unlicensed.

[tsgsjeremy]

So, we're kinda back to the whole "due process" issue that people have against no-fly lists?

Only if the networks and/or SOA are government entities. Due process doesn't apply to private organizations.

[RX-79G]

Gang members have a large support structure of clients, family, girlfriends and hangers-on. Gang members already have illegally obtained weapons. What does any of this have to do with gang members? Their "social network" is broader and deeper than anything non-criminals can set up.

[tsgsjeremy]

The networks aren't independent. The networks are networked based on a hierarchy of trust. A network of gang members would have to be certified by an existing trusted network. The certification isn't permanent. The network would need to be regularly re-certified. And the network could be de-certified at any time - like if one of the members commits a gun crime.

As a possible side benefit, I'm hoping we can use contract law to structure certification agreements and member licenses to require forfeiture of guns by bad actors under certain conditions. If so it would deter criminal organizations from trying to join or form a network. If they do join and are discovered this would provide a legal way to get the guns out of their hands and off the street. Yes, I know "they're criminals and won't follow the law." If they conveniently "lose" their weapons they can be sued for breach of contract so its either give up the guns or give up $$.

[RX-79G]

Convicted felons already can't own or use guns. Are you using some different definition of "criminal" when you talk about confiscating the guns they already can't have?

[tsgsjeremy]

A criminal wouldn't be allowed to join a network. I was merging a thought from the other thread where bad actors (but not yet "criminals") might try to infiltrate a network. Similar in kind to a straw purchaser. Those members who joined so they could act on behalf of criminals would be liable. I realize I wasn't clear.

[RX-79G]

They already are liable, because the downside to a trust network is that anyone impacted by the trust or failure to receive trust can sue the network. It is another one of the primary objections I made (I guess Jon didn't post that one), was that there aren't civil repurcussions to invalidating an SSL, but the civil repurcussions of saying someone can't buy a gun then them being killed, or saying to trust someone who later kills their wife - are too much for anyone to want to bear.