codecov[bot]
commented
5 months ago Codecov Report
All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests :white_check_mark:
Project coverage is 88.89%. Comparing base (
cf9e8eb) to head (d74809c).
Additional details and impacted files
```diff @@ Coverage Diff @@ ## main #164 +/- ## ========================================== + Coverage 88.86% 88.89% +0.03% ========================================== Files 247 247 Lines 19619 19619 Branches 2038 2038 ========================================== + Hits 17435 17441 +6 + Misses 1605 1595 -10 - Partials 579 583 +4 ``` | [Flag](https://app.codecov.io/gh/jwmcglynn/donner/pull/164/flags?src=pr&el=flags&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=Jeff+McGlynn) | Coverage Δ | | |---|---|---| | [unittests](https://app.codecov.io/gh/jwmcglynn/donner/pull/164/flags?src=pr&el=flag&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=Jeff+McGlynn) | `88.89% <ø> (+0.03%)` | :arrow_up: | Flags with carried forward coverage won't be shown. [Click here](https://docs.codecov.io/docs/carryforward-flags?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=Jeff+McGlynn#carryforward-flags-in-the-pull-request-comment) to find out more.:umbrella: View full report in Codecov by Sentry.
:loudspeaker: Have feedback on the report? Share it here.
This PR contains the following updates:
==2.2.1->==2.2.2GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2024-37891
When using urllib3's proxy support with
ProxyManager, theProxy-Authorizationheader is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.However, when sending HTTP requests without using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the
Proxy-Authorizationheader even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat theProxy-AuthorizationHTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects.Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the
Proxy-Authorizationheader during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the
Proxy-Authorizationheader, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.Affected usages
We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:
Proxy-Authorizationheader without using urllib3's built-in proxy support.Remediation
Proxy-Authorizationheader with urllib3'sProxyManager.redirects=Falsewhen sending requests.Proxy-Authorizationheader.Release Notes
urllib3/urllib3 (urllib3)
### [`v2.2.2`](https://togithub.com/urllib3/urllib3/blob/HEAD/CHANGES.rst#222-2024-06-17) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/urllib3/urllib3/compare/2.2.1...2.2.2) \================== - Added the `Proxy-Authorization` header to the list of headers to strip from requests when redirecting to a different host. As before, different headers can be set via `Retry.remove_headers_on_redirect`. - Allowed passing negative integers as `amt` to read methods of `http.client.HTTPResponse` as an alternative to `None`. (`#3122Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
â™» Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.