currently each message a client sends uses a randomly selected path that obeys the stratified topology. this increases the probability that a "bad path" will be selected, that is, a path that is compromised by an adversary. Perhaps there's a way to use the new designs in the [MIRANDA] paper that can help avoid compromised mixes in path selection. Alternatively, clients could select recommended "cascades" from the Directory Authority, just like in [ANONPOP] and use them for a while.
[MIRANDA] Leibowitz, H., Piotrowska, A., Danezis, G., Herzberg, A., 2017,
"No right to ramain silent: Isolating Malicious Mixes"
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1000.pdf.
currently each message a client sends uses a randomly selected path that obeys the stratified topology. this increases the probability that a "bad path" will be selected, that is, a path that is compromised by an adversary. Perhaps there's a way to use the new designs in the [MIRANDA] paper that can help avoid compromised mixes in path selection. Alternatively, clients could select recommended "cascades" from the Directory Authority, just like in [ANONPOP] and use them for a while.
[MIRANDA] Leibowitz, H., Piotrowska, A., Danezis, G., Herzberg, A., 2017, "No right to ramain silent: Isolating Malicious Mixes" https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1000.pdf.
[ANONPOP] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/489.pdf