Dilithium-2 offers a CoreSVP hardness of ~118 bits of security which is a little lower than it should. The Kyber submission refines the CoreSVP cost by using sieving cost simulations and claims that the gate and memory cost is ~2^150 and ~2^90 approximately which they argue is better than AES. I think it would be worth to call out the CoreSVP hardness and the refined estimate for Dilithium-2 in the Sec Considerations section.
Depending on what gets standardized, this will be of value in the end. In the end, there will only be one Dilithium algorithm, the one specified by NIST with or without the Dilithium-2 parameter.
Dilithium-2 offers a CoreSVP hardness of ~118 bits of security which is a little lower than it should. The Kyber submission refines the CoreSVP cost by using sieving cost simulations and claims that the gate and memory cost is ~2^150 and ~2^90 approximately which they argue is better than AES. I think it would be worth to call out the CoreSVP hardness and the refined estimate for Dilithium-2 in the Sec Considerations section.