objective is to rationalize the need of 2-phase prepare commit transactions on the child chain (or other mitigations, like the expiration time proposed by @davidknott in last plasma call).
assumptions: child chain works without any signed confirmations(as in MVP spec):
Deposit not credited Attack
alice deposits funds into plasma contract
Validator creates UTXO in next plasma block
Validator censors all future transactions by Alice to spend the UTXO
Alice initiates exit from plasma
=> all good?
Frustration Attack
Alice sends tx with output to Bob
Validator withholds tx
Alice gets frustrated and initiated exit with value of tx
Validator includes tx in next block and challenges Alice's exit
Block Withholding Attack
Validator constructs a block with invalid txns (0 input, or wrong sigs)
Validator submits block hash
Aalidator starts exit of funds
=> no-one can challenge validator, because block data missing
objective is to rationalize the need of 2-phase prepare commit transactions on the child chain (or other mitigations, like the expiration time proposed by @davidknott in last plasma call).
assumptions: child chain works without any signed confirmations(as in MVP spec):
Deposit not credited Attack
Frustration Attack
Block Withholding Attack
Double Spend by Exit Attack
Valueless UTXO Attack