Open zaolin opened 8 years ago
Do we need more than a good root of trust as to the state of the ROM bootblock and the payload that we're going to launch? The changes that I've made to coreboot (https://github.com/osresearch/coreboot/commit/033623b2d2e9d080e70136f6708f8467174b7a2c and others) are fairly minimal and allow most of the policy to be set in the Linux payload instead.
Normally yes. If you measure also blobs which are executed parts of the sb and cpu via intel txt then you get a better sealing for more hardware parts. So the attacker can't change for example cpu and sb. I want to make tpm spec for the measurements and do the integration into coreboot. TCPA ACPI log is also very useful if you want to pre-calculate changes after updates etc..
Timothy Pearson is also needing this for his TALOS workstation stuff. See https://www.crowdsupply.com/raptor-computing-systems/talos-secure-workstation
@zaolin more criticisms around https://github.com/coreboot/coreboot/commit/c79e96b4eb310db9d44e36e2dff072c01469c380 ?
Hey,
in order to get the maximum sealing against the platform it would be useful to have a well documented and feature complete trusted boot in coreboot. I started to refactor the tpm stack and implement the missing features. Take a look at https://review.coreboot.org/#/q/status:open+tpm