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Apple qlmanage - heap overflow in SceneKit::daeElement::setElementName #467

Closed GoogleCodeExporter closed 8 years ago

GoogleCodeExporter commented 8 years ago 
There is a heap overflow in daeElement::setElementName(). The 
vulnerable method uses a fixed size (128 bytes) heap-allocated buffer to 
copy the name of an arbitrary element. By setting the name of the element
to something larger the buffer is overflown.

The vulnerable code does something like this:
if (element_name) {
  if (!this->name) {
    this->name = new char[128];
  }
  strcpy(this->name, element_name);
}

The element_name is supplied by the user and can be more than 128
characters long.

Steps to reproduce (Note: you need to enable libgmalloc):
a) $ lldb
b) (lldb) target create /usr/bin/qlmanage
   Current executable set to '/usr/bin/qlmanage' (x86_64).
c) (lldb) env DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/usr/lib/libgmalloc.dylib
d) (lldb) process launch -- -p setElementNameOOB.dae
    Process 4460 stopped
    * thread #3: tid = 0x5fdc, 0x00007fff92fbf108 libsystem_c.dylib`strcpy + 104, queue = 'com.apple.root.default-qos', stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0x123445409000)
        frame #0: 0x00007fff92fbf108 libsystem_c.dylib`strcpy + 104
    libsystem_c.dylib`strcpy:
    ->  0x7fff92fbf108 <+104>: movdqu xmmword ptr [rdi + rcx + 0x10], xmm1
        0x7fff92fbf10e <+110>: add    rcx, 0x10
        0x7fff92fbf112 <+114>: movdqa xmm1, xmmword ptr [rsi + rcx + 0x10]
        0x7fff92fbf118 <+120>: pxor   xmm0, xmm0
e) (lldb) bt
    * thread #3: tid = 0x5fdc, 0x00007fff92fbf108 libsystem_c.dylib`strcpy + 104, queue = 'com.apple.root.default-qos', stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0x123445409000)
      * frame #0: 0x00007fff92fbf108 libsystem_c.dylib`strcpy + 104
        frame #1: 0x0000000137c4eb4f SceneKit`daeMetaElement::create(char const*) + 199
        frame #2: 0x0000000137c4bf80 SceneKit`daeIOPluginCommon::beginReadElement(daeElement*, char const*, std::__1::vector<std::__1::pair<char const*, char const*>, std::__1::allocator<std::__1::pair<char const*, char const*> > > const&, int) + 80
        frame #3: 0x0000000137c5aaf3 SceneKit`daeLIBXMLPlugin::readElement(_xmlTextReader*, daeElement*, int&) + 369
        frame #4: 0x0000000137c5ac51 SceneKit`daeLIBXMLPlugin::readElement(_xmlTextReader*, daeElement*, int&) + 719
        frame #5: 0x0000000137c5ac51 SceneKit`daeLIBXMLPlugin::readElement(_xmlTextReader*, daeElement*, int&) + 719
        frame #6: 0x0000000137c5ac51 SceneKit`daeLIBXMLPlugin::readElement(_xmlTextReader*, daeElement*, int&) + 719
        frame #7: 0x0000000137c5ac51 SceneKit`daeLIBXMLPlugin::readElement(_xmlTextReader*, daeElement*, int&) + 719
        frame #8: 0x0000000137c5a8cf SceneKit`daeLIBXMLPlugin::read(_xmlTextReader*) + 109
        frame #9: 0x0000000137c5a914 SceneKit`daeLIBXMLPlugin::readFromMemory(char const*, daeURI const&) + 54
        frame #10: 0x0000000137c4bd1d SceneKit`daeIOPluginCommon::read(daeURI const&, char const*) + 167
    frame #11: 0x0000000137c3eb77 SceneKit`DAE::openCommon(daeURI const&, char const*) + 55

This bug has been tested on:
$ sw_vers 
ProductName:  Mac OS X
ProductVersion: 10.10.3
BuildVersion: 14D136

$ qlmanage --version
QuickLook framework: v5.0 (675.42)

Attached are two files:
1) setElementNameOOB.dae - the POC dae file.
2) setElementNameOOB_dae.crashlog.txt - the CrashWrangler log.

Original issue reported on code.google.com by candr...@google.com on 26 Jun 2015 at 10:17

Attachments:

GoogleCodeExporter commented 8 years ago 
Attack vector:
This bug can be triggered by any application that uses the QuickLook framework 
to generate a preview/thumbnail of DAE (COLLADA) files. For example, loading 
the supplied POC in Preview or selecting the file in Finder and hitting <space> 
will trigger the bug.

--

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. If 90 days elapse without 
a broadly available patch, then the bug report will automatically become 
visible to the public.

Original comment by candr...@google.com on 26 Jun 2015 at 10:33

GoogleCodeExporter commented 8 years ago

Original comment by candr...@google.com on 17 Sep 2015 at 8:04

GoogleCodeExporter commented 8 years ago

Original comment by candr...@google.com on 21 Sep 2015 at 10:03

GoogleCodeExporter commented 8 years ago

Original comment by haw...@google.com on 23 Sep 2015 at 4:39