madnuttah
commented
1 year ago Hello there, please show your current unbound.conf(s). Redact your secrets, thanks!
Edit: to quickly overcome this, disable DNSSEC.
Closed zilexa closed 1 year ago
madnuttah
commented
1 year ago Hello there, please show your current unbound.conf(s). Redact your secrets, thanks!
Edit: to quickly overcome this, disable DNSSEC.
zilexa
commented
1 year ago My unbound.conf: https://github.com/zilexa/Homeserver/blob/master/docker/networking/unbound/unbound.conf
My compose:
##______________________ AdGuard Home [PRIVACY/Blocker]
dns-adguard:
container_name: dns-adguard
image: adguard/adguardhome
restart: always
network_mode: host
volumes:
- $DOCKERDIR/networking/adguardhome/conf:/opt/adguardhome/conf
##____________________ Unbound [PRIVACY/dns]
dns-unbound:
container_name: dns-unbound
image: madnuttah/unbound:latest
hostname: unbound
restart: always
network_mode: host
volumes:
- $DOCKERDIR/networking/unbound/unbound.conf:/usr/local/unbound/unbound.conf:rw
- $DOCKERDIR/networking/unbound/root.hints:/usr/local/unbound/root.hints:rw
- $DOCKERDIR/networking/unbound/unbound.log:/usr/local/unbound/log.d/unbound.log:rw
networks:
unbound:
driver: bridge
ipam:
config:
- subnet: 172.20.0.0/24
gateway: 172.20.0.1You are using root.hints, please download from Internic Named Root and replace the existing file. You need to restart unbound afterwards.
zilexa
commented
1 year ago I have roots.hint already:
- $DOCKERDIR/networking/unbound/root.hints:/usr/local/unbound/root.hints:rwthis is the Internic Named Root file. I downloaded it last week, checked, its identical to the current one. Even though they are identical I deleted my file, downloaded the file from Internic, renamed to root.hints. No difference.
zilexa
commented
1 year ago I removed the container completely and emptied the logfile. Still see issues:
May 09 17:57:39 unbound[1:0] notice: init module 0: validator
May 09 17:57:39 unbound[1:0] notice: init module 1: iterator
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: start of service (unbound 1.17.1).
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <f.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor .
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <h.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor .
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <i.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor .
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <unifi.Menhir. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor .
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <. DNSKEY IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <b.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <k.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <a.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <j.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <d.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <m.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <e.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <l.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <g.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:40 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <c.root-servers.net. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:43 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <unifi.Menhir. AAAA IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:57:52 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <google.com. A IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trust
May 09 17:58:16 unbound[1:0] info: validation failure <unifi.Menhir. AAAA IN>: key for validation . is marked as invalid because of a previous validation failure <. NS IN>: no signatures from 193.0.14.129 for trust anchor . while building chain of trustAlso there is a timezone difference, I am 2 hours ahead of the time listed in the log. Probably this is not important.
madnuttah
commented
1 year ago DNSSEC validation depends on correct time settings, please try to fix that first.
zilexa
commented
1 year ago Took a guess and timezone is fixed now:
dns-unbound:
container_name: dns-unbound
image: madnuttah/unbound:latest
hostname: unbound
restart: always
network_mode: host
environment:
TZ: Europe/Amsterdam
volumes:
- $DOCKERDIR/networking/unbound/unbound.conf:/usr/local/unbound/unbound.conf:rw
- $DOCKERDIR/networking/unbound/root.hints:/usr/local/unbound/root.hints:rw
- $DOCKERDIR/networking/unbound/unbound.log:/usr/local/unbound/log.d/unbound.log:rwRemoved the container completely, just in case. I still see the same errors, but the timestamp now matches my own time..
madnuttah
commented
1 year ago Somthing's fishy with your config. I can't see where you defined your local zone, there's lots of stuff stripped away. I guess it's better to optimize after you got it running properly, so stick with defaults and adapt afterwards please.
I suggest to start over with a fresh config, may from NLnetLabs directly and to set just a few parameters to get where you want.
Anyway, here's more to check:
Please verify the config with unbound-checkconf in the running container. You can access it with docker exec -ti unbound sh
Other than that, please try to run the following command in the unbound container:
/usr/local/unbound/unbound.d/sbin/unbound-anchor -a /usr/local/unbound/iana.d/root.key
If you put -v or -vvvv behind the commands, they're more verbose.
zilexa
commented
1 year ago That command worked successfully. I unfortunately spend too much time on this already. I tried simply copying the contents of the split config files into 1 conf file, but it didn't work. Then I tried to simply use the unbound.conf from Pi-Hole.net, because I want a recursive DNS server. https://docs.pi-hole.net/guides/dns/unbound/
But adapted it slightly to ensure the essential files can be found in the container (the first part of your config):
server:
module-config: "validator iterator"
username: "_unbound"
directory: "/usr/local/unbound"
chroot: "/usr/local/unbound"
do-daemonize: no
tls-cert-bundle: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
root-hints: "/usr/local/unbound/root.hints"
auto-trust-anchor-file: "/usr/local/unbound/iana.d/root.key"
trust-anchor-signaling: yes
# If no logfile is specified, syslog is used
logfile: "/usr/local/unbound/log.d/unbound.log"
verbosity: 2
interface: 0.0.0.0@5335
port: 5335
do-ip4: yes
do-udp: yes
do-tcp: yes
# May be set to yes if you have IPv6 connectivity
do-ip6: no
# You want to leave this to no unless you have *native* IPv6. With 6to4 and
# Terredo tunnels your web browser should favor IPv4 for the same reasons
prefer-ip6: no
# Use this only when you downloaded the list of primary root servers!
# If you use the default dns-root-data package, unbound will find it automatically
#root-hints: "/usr/local/unbound/root.hints"
# Trust glue only if it is within the server's authority
harden-glue: yes
# Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the zone becomes BOGUS
harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
# Don't use Capitalization randomization as it known to cause DNSSEC issues sometimes
# see https://discourse.pi-hole.net/t/unbound-stubby-or-dnscrypt-proxy/9378 for further details
use-caps-for-id: no
# Reduce EDNS reassembly buffer size.
# IP fragmentation is unreliable on the Internet today, and can cause
# transmission failures when large DNS messages are sent via UDP. Even
# when fragmentation does work, it may not be secure; it is theoretically
# possible to spoof parts of a fragmented DNS message, without easy
# detection at the receiving end. Recently, there was an excellent study
# >>> Defragmenting DNS - Determining the optimal maximum UDP response size for DNS <<<
# by Axel Koolhaas, and Tjeerd Slokker (https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/36/contributions/776/)
# in collaboration with NLnet Labs explored DNS using real world data from the
# the RIPE Atlas probes and the researchers suggested different values for
# IPv4 and IPv6 and in different scenarios. They advise that servers should
# be configured to limit DNS messages sent over UDP to a size that will not
# trigger fragmentation on typical network links. DNS servers can switch
# from UDP to TCP when a DNS response is too big to fit in this limited
# buffer size. This value has also been suggested in DNS Flag Day 2020.
edns-buffer-size: 1232
# Perform prefetching of close to expired message cache entries
# This only applies to domains that have been frequently queried
prefetch: yes
# One thread should be sufficient, can be increased on beefy machines. In reality for most users running on small networks or on a single machine, it should be unnecessary to seek performance enhancement by increasing num-threads above 1.
num-threads: 1
# Ensure kernel buffer is large enough to not lose messages in traffic spikes
#so-rcvbuf: 1m
# Ensure privacy of local IP ranges
private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
private-address: fd00::/8
private-address: fe80::/10The container starts and log shows zero errors! Looks all fine, but still, no client can resolve DNS:
Test performed inside container:
/ # /usr/local/unbound/unbound.d/sbin/unbound-anchor -a /usr/local/unbound/iana.d/root.key -vvv
/usr/local/unbound/iana.d/root.key has content
success: the anchor is okTests performed outside container, but on host (note I use network_mode: host in my compose file):
dig fail01.dnssec.works @192.168.88.2 -p 5335
; <<>> DiG 9.18.13 <<>> fail01.dnssec.works @192.168.88.2 -p 5335
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: REFUSED, id: 64635
;; flags: qr rd ad; QUERY: 0, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available
;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 192.168.88.2#5335(192.168.88.2) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Wed May 10 12:26:25 CEST 2023
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 12192.168.88.2 is the LAN IP address of my host server running Docker. The above times out with @127.0.0.1.
Another test:
dig dnssec.works @127.0.0.1 -p 5335
; <<>> DiG 9.18.13 <<>> dnssec.works @127.0.0.1 -p 5335
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: SERVFAIL, id: 51472
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1232
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;dnssec.works. IN A
;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#5335(127.0.0.1) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Wed May 10 12:27:29 CEST 2023
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 41
~ dig dnssec.works @192.168.88.2 -p 5335
; <<>> DiG 9.18.13 <<>> dnssec.works @192.168.88.2 -p 5335
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: REFUSED, id: 16118
;; flags: qr rd ad; QUERY: 0, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available
;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 192.168.88.2#5335(192.168.88.2) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Wed May 10 12:27:36 CEST 2023
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 12I have configured 192.168.88.2:5335 in AdGuard Home, also tried with 127.0.0.1:5335 makes no difference. When I switch to 1.1.1.1 in AdGuard Home, clients can resolve DNS just fine, confirming there is no issue with Adguard Home.
I think this is just too difficult for me. No client can resolve a site, I did a few tests in browser, that show the following log.
[1683714067] unbound[1:0] notice: init module 0: validator
[1683714067] unbound[1:0] notice: init module 1: iterator
[1683714067] unbound[1:0] info: start of service (unbound 1.17.1).
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving nu.nl. A IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: priming . IN NS
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: priming . IN NS
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.203.230.10#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.33.4.12#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.7.83.42#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.5.5.241#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.41.0.4#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.7.91.13#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 193.0.14.129#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.58.128.30#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 202.12.27.33#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.9.14.201#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.36.148.17#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.112.36.4#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response REC_LAME: recursive but not authoritative server
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: mark as REC_LAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 193.0.14.129#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: priming successful for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: priming successful for . NS IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for nu.nl. A IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.7.91.13#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for nu.nl. A IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 193.0.14.129#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: prime trust anchor
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.5.5.241#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.203.230.10#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: validate keys with anchor(DS): sec_status_bogus
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: prime trust anchor
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.7.91.13#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was NXDOMAIN ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.112.36.4#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: validate keys with anchor(DS): sec_status_bogus
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: prime trust anchor
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 202.12.27.33#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: validate keys with anchor(DS): sec_status_bogus
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: prime trust anchor
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.36.148.17#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was NXDOMAIN ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.33.4.12#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: prime trust anchor
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.7.91.13#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: validate keys with anchor(DS): sec_status_bogus
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: validate keys with anchor(DS): sec_status_bogus
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: prime trust anchor
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: prime trust anchor
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.33.4.12#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was NXDOMAIN ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 193.0.14.129#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: validate keys with anchor(DS): sec_status_bogus
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: validate keys with anchor(DS): sec_status_bogus
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: prime trust anchor
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: generate keytag query _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: prime trust anchor
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for _ta-4f66. NULL IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.41.0.4#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was NXDOMAIN ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.36.148.17#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: validate keys with anchor(DS): sec_status_bogus
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: validate keys with anchor(DS): sec_status_bogus
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: failed to prime trust anchor -- DNSKEY rrset is not secure . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: Could not establish a chain of trust to keys for . DNSKEY IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 202.12.27.33#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was CNAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 193.0.14.129#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was CNAME
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.33.4.12#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: resolving unifi.Menhir. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for unifi.Menhir. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 202.12.27.33#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was NXDOMAIN ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.203.230.10#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.33.4.12#53
[1683714155] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.112.36.4#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.203.230.10#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.203.230.10#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.112.36.4#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.9.14.201#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 193.0.14.129#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was CNAME
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.58.128.30#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was CNAME
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.41.0.4#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.112.36.4#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.203.230.10#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 202.12.27.33#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.112.36.4#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.5.5.241#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.58.128.30#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.41.0.4#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was CNAME
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was CNAME
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.58.128.30#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: resolving ssl.gstatic.com. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: resolving ssl.gstatic.com. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for ssl.gstatic.com. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.9.14.201#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for ssl.gstatic.com. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.5.5.241#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 202.12.27.33#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.41.0.4#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.7.91.13#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. A IN
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.58.128.30#53
[1683714156] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for ssl.gstatic.com. A IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.203.230.10#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for ssl.gstatic.com. AAAA IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.112.36.4#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.nu.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 193.0.14.129#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for ssl.gstatic.com. A IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.9.14.201#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for ssl.gstatic.com. AAAA IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.58.128.30#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for ssl.gstatic.com. AAAA IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.58.128.30#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: resolving manjaro.org. A IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: resolving manjaro.org. AAAA IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for manjaro.org. A IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for manjaro.org. AAAA IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.58.128.30#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for manjaro.org. A IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.36.148.17#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for manjaro.org. AAAA IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 193.0.14.129#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: response for manjaro.org. AAAA IN
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.41.0.4#53
[1683714157] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714159] unbound[1:0] info: resolving unifi.Menhir. A IN
[1683714159] unbound[1:0] info: response for unifi.Menhir. A IN
[1683714159] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.33.4.12#53
[1683714159] unbound[1:0] info: query response was NXDOMAIN ANSWER
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: resolving marktplaats.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: resolving marktplaats.nl. A IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: response for marktplaats.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: response for marktplaats.nl. A IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.41.0.4#53
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: response for marktplaats.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.33.4.12#53
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.marktplaats.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.marktplaats.nl. A IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.marktplaats.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.7.83.42#53
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.marktplaats.nl. A IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 192.203.230.10#53
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.marktplaats.nl. AAAA IN
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.7.83.42#53
[1683714160] unbound[1:0] info: query response was nodata ANSWER
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.manjaro.org. AAAA IN
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: resolving www.manjaro.org. A IN
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.manjaro.org. AAAA IN
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.9.14.201#53
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.manjaro.org. A IN
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 199.7.83.42#53
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWER
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: response for www.manjaro.org. AAAA IN
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: reply from <.> 198.97.190.53#53
[1683714162] unbound[1:0] info: query response was ANSWERStrangely, I still had the terminal window of the container open, and just ran the anchor test again (minutes after the above test):
/ # /usr/local/unbound/unbound.d/sbin/unbound-anchor -a /usr/local/unbound/iana.d/root.key -vvv
/usr/local/unbound/iana.d/root.key has content
fail: the anchor is NOT ok and could not be fixedMakes no sense to me.
madnuttah
commented
1 year ago Could you try to download the root.key manually to see if there's a difference? We'll get this working for you as well, don't throw the towel yet!
Please use my designated folders to exclude this as a culprit, especially the files in iana.d. Just use the folders to start with, we can try to tackle other issues later.
This amends the root.hints for now for testing and uses the root servers directly. Step by step.
Don't forget, you need to set your local domain(s) in the conf as private:
#
# Example configuration file.
#
# See unbound.conf(5) man page, version @version@.
#
# this is a comment.
# Use this anywhere in the file to include other text into this file.
#include: "otherfile.conf"
include: "/usr/local/unbound/conf.d/*.conf"
include: "/usr/local/unbound/zones.d/*.conf"
# Use this anywhere in the file to include other text, that explicitly starts a
# clause, into this file. Text after this directive needs to start a clause.
#include-toplevel: "otherfile.conf"
# The server clause sets the main parameters.
server:
# whitespace is not necessary, but looks cleaner.
# verbosity number, 0 is least verbose. 1 is default.
verbosity: 1
# print statistics to the log (for every thread) every N seconds.
# Set to "" or 0 to disable. Default is disabled.
# statistics-interval: 0
# enable shm for stats, default no. if you enable also enable
# statistics-interval, every time it also writes stats to the
# shared memory segment keyed with shm-key.
# shm-enable: no
# shm for stats uses this key, and key+1 for the shared mem segment.
# shm-key: 11777
# enable cumulative statistics, without clearing them after printing.
# statistics-cumulative: no
# enable extended statistics (query types, answer codes, status)
# printed from unbound-control. Default off, because of speed.
# extended-statistics: no
# Inhibits selected extended statistics (qtype, qclass, qopcode, rcode,
# rpz-actions) from printing if their value is 0.
# Default on.
# statistics-inhibit-zero: yes
# number of threads to create. 1 disables threading.
num-threads: 1
# specify the interfaces to answer queries from by ip-address.
# The default is to listen to localhost (127.0.0.1 and ::1).
# specify 0.0.0.0 and ::0 to bind to all available interfaces.
# specify every interface[@port] on a new 'interface:' labelled line.
# The listen interfaces are not changed on reload, only on restart.
# interface: 192.0.2.153
# interface: 192.0.2.154
# interface: 192.0.2.154@5003
# interface: 2001:DB8::5
# interface: eth0@5003
interface: 127.0.0.1@53
interface: 0.0.0.0@5335
# enable this feature to copy the source address of queries to reply.
# Socket options are not supported on all platforms. experimental.
# interface-automatic: no
# instead of the default port, open additional ports separated by
# spaces when interface-automatic is enabled, by listing them here.
# interface-automatic-ports: ""
# port to answer queries from
# port: 5335
# specify the interfaces to send outgoing queries to authoritative
# server from by ip-address. If none, the default (all) interface
# is used. Specify every interface on a 'outgoing-interface:' line.
# outgoing-interface: 192.0.2.153
# outgoing-interface: 2001:DB8::5
# outgoing-interface: 2001:DB8::6
# Specify a netblock to use remainder 64 bits as random bits for
# upstream queries. Uses freebind option (Linux).
# outgoing-interface: 2001:DB8::/64
# Also (Linux:) ip -6 addr add 2001:db8::/64 dev lo
# And: ip -6 route add local 2001:db8::/64 dev lo
# And set prefer-ip6: yes to use the ip6 randomness from a netblock.
# Set this to yes to prefer ipv6 upstream servers over ipv4.
prefer-ip6: no
# Prefer ipv4 upstream servers, even if ipv6 is available.
prefer-ip4: yes
# number of ports to allocate per thread, determines the size of the
# port range that can be open simultaneously. About double the
# num-queries-per-thread, or, use as many as the OS will allow you.
outgoing-range: 4096
# permit Unbound to use this port number or port range for
# making outgoing queries, using an outgoing interface.
outgoing-port-permit: 32768
# deny Unbound the use this of port number or port range for
# making outgoing queries, using an outgoing interface.
# Use this to make sure Unbound does not grab a UDP port that some
# other server on this computer needs. The default is to avoid
# IANA-assigned port numbers.
# If multiple outgoing-port-permit and outgoing-port-avoid options
# are present, they are processed in order.
# outgoing-port-avoid: "3200-3208"
# number of outgoing simultaneous tcp buffers to hold per thread.
# outgoing-num-tcp: 10
# number of incoming simultaneous tcp buffers to hold per thread.
# incoming-num-tcp: 10
# buffer size for UDP port 53 incoming (SO_RCVBUF socket option).
# 0 is system default. Use 4m to catch query spikes for busy servers.
# so-rcvbuf: 0
# buffer size for UDP port 53 outgoing (SO_SNDBUF socket option).
# 0 is system default. Use 4m to handle spikes on very busy servers.
# so-sndbuf: 0
# use SO_REUSEPORT to distribute queries over threads.
# at extreme load it could be better to turn it off to distribute even.
# so-reuseport: yes
# use IP_TRANSPARENT so the interface: addresses can be non-local
# and you can config non-existing IPs that are going to work later on
# (uses IP_BINDANY on FreeBSD).
# ip-transparent: no
# use IP_FREEBIND so the interface: addresses can be non-local
# and you can bind to nonexisting IPs and interfaces that are down.
# Linux only. On Linux you also have ip-transparent that is similar.
# ip-freebind: no
# the value of the Differentiated Services Codepoint (DSCP)
# in the differentiated services field (DS) of the outgoing
# IP packets
# ip-dscp: 0
# EDNS reassembly buffer to advertise to UDP peers (the actual buffer
# is set with msg-buffer-size).
# edns-buffer-size: 1232
# Maximum UDP response size (not applied to TCP response).
# Suggested values are 512 to 4096. Default is 1232. 65536 disables it.
# max-udp-size: 1232
# max memory to use for stream(tcp and tls) waiting result buffers.
# stream-wait-size: 4m
# buffer size for handling DNS data. No messages larger than this
# size can be sent or received, by UDP or TCP. In bytes.
# msg-buffer-size: 65552
# the amount of memory to use for the message cache.
# plain value in bytes or you can append k, m or G. default is "4Mb".
msg-cache-size: 4m
# the number of slabs to use for the message cache.
# the number of slabs must be a power of 2.
# more slabs reduce lock contention, but fragment memory usage.
msg-cache-slabs: 4
# the number of queries that a thread gets to service.
num-queries-per-thread: 4096
# if very busy, 50% queries run to completion, 50% get timeout in msec
# jostle-timeout: 200
# msec to wait before close of port on timeout UDP. 0 disables.
# delay-close: 0
# perform connect for UDP sockets to mitigate ICMP side channel.
udp-connect: yes
# The number of retries, per upstream nameserver in a delegation, when
# a throwaway response (also timeouts) is received.
# outbound-msg-retry: 5
# Hard limit on the number of outgoing queries Unbound will make while
# resolving a name, making sure large NS sets do not loop.
# It resets on query restarts (e.g., CNAME) and referrals.
# max-sent-count: 32
# Hard limit on the number of times Unbound is allowed to restart a
# query upon encountering a CNAME record.
# max-query-restarts: 11
# msec for waiting for an unknown server to reply. Increase if you
# are behind a slow satellite link, to eg. 1128.
# unknown-server-time-limit: 376
# the amount of memory to use for the RRset cache.
# plain value in bytes or you can append k, m or G. default is "4Mb".
rrset-cache-size: 4m
# the number of slabs to use for the RRset cache.
# the number of slabs must be a power of 2.
# more slabs reduce lock contention, but fragment memory usage.
rrset-cache-slabs: 4
# the time to live (TTL) value lower bound, in seconds. Default 0.
# If more than an hour could easily give trouble due to stale data.
cache-min-ttl: 0
# the time to live (TTL) value cap for RRsets and messages in the
# cache. Items are not cached for longer. In seconds.
cache-max-ttl: 86400
# the time to live (TTL) value cap for negative responses in the cache
# cache-max-negative-ttl: 3600
# the time to live (TTL) value for cached roundtrip times, lameness and
# EDNS version information for hosts. In seconds.
# infra-host-ttl: 900
# minimum wait time for responses, increase if uplink is long. In msec.
# infra-cache-min-rtt: 50
# maximum wait time for responses. In msec.
# infra-cache-max-rtt: 120000
# enable to make server probe down hosts more frequently.
# infra-keep-probing: no
# the number of slabs to use for the Infrastructure cache.
# the number of slabs must be a power of 2.
# more slabs reduce lock contention, but fragment memory usage.
infra-cache-slabs: 4
# the maximum number of hosts that are cached (roundtrip, EDNS, lame).
# infra-cache-numhosts: 10000
# define a number of tags here, use with local-zone, access-control,
# interface-*.
# repeat the define-tag statement to add additional tags.
# define-tag: "tag1 tag2 tag3"
# Enable IPv4, "yes" or "no".
do-ip4: yes
# Enable IPv6, "yes" or "no".
do-ip6: no
# Enable UDP, "yes" or "no".
do-udp: yes
# Enable TCP, "yes" or "no".
do-tcp: yes
# upstream connections use TCP only (and no UDP), "yes" or "no"
# useful for tunneling scenarios, default no.
# tcp-upstream: no
# upstream connections also use UDP (even if do-udp is no).
# useful if if you want UDP upstream, but don't provide UDP downstream.
# udp-upstream-without-downstream: no
# Maximum segment size (MSS) of TCP socket on which the server
# responds to queries. Default is 0, system default MSS.
# tcp-mss: 0
# Maximum segment size (MSS) of TCP socket for outgoing queries.
# Default is 0, system default MSS.
# outgoing-tcp-mss: 0
# Idle TCP timeout, connection closed in milliseconds
# tcp-idle-timeout: 30000
# Enable EDNS TCP keepalive option.
# edns-tcp-keepalive: no
# Timeout for EDNS TCP keepalive, in msec.
# edns-tcp-keepalive-timeout: 120000
# Use systemd socket activation for UDP, TCP, and control sockets.
use-systemd: no
# Detach from the terminal, run in background, "yes" or "no".
# Set the value to "no" when Unbound runs as systemd service.
do-daemonize: no
# control which clients are allowed to make (recursive) queries
# to this server. Specify classless netblocks with /size and action.
# By default everything is refused, except for localhost.
# Choose deny (drop message), refuse (polite error reply),
# allow (recursive ok), allow_setrd (recursive ok, rd bit is forced on),
# allow_snoop (recursive and nonrecursive ok)
# deny_non_local (drop queries unless can be answered from local-data)
# refuse_non_local (like deny_non_local but polite error reply).
# access-control: 127.0.0.0/8 allow
# access-control: ::1 allow
# access-control: ::ffff:127.0.0.1 allow
access-control: 0.0.0.0/0 allow
access-control: 127.0.0.0/8 allow
# tag access-control with list of tags (in "" with spaces between)
# Clients using this access control element use localzones that
# are tagged with one of these tags.
# access-control-tag: 192.0.2.0/24 "tag2 tag3"
# set action for particular tag for given access control element.
# if you have multiple tag values, the tag used to lookup the action
# is the first tag match between access-control-tag and local-zone-tag
# where "first" comes from the order of the define-tag values.
# access-control-tag-action: 192.0.2.0/24 tag3 refuse
# set redirect data for particular tag for access control element
# access-control-tag-data: 192.0.2.0/24 tag2 "A 127.0.0.1"
# Set view for access control element
# access-control-view: 192.0.2.0/24 viewname
# Similar to 'access-control:' but for interfaces.
# Control which listening interfaces are allowed to accept (recursive)
# queries for this server.
# The specified interfaces should be the same as the ones specified in
# 'interface:' followed by the action.
# The actions are the same as 'access-control:' above.
# By default all the interfaces configured are refused.
# Note: any 'access-control*:' setting overrides all 'interface-*:'
# settings for targeted clients.
# interface-action: 192.0.2.153 allow
# interface-action: 192.0.2.154 allow
# interface-action: 192.0.2.154@5003 allow
# interface-action: 2001:DB8::5 allow
# interface-action: eth0@5003 allow
# Similar to 'access-control-tag:' but for interfaces.
# Tag interfaces with a list of tags (in "" with spaces between).
# Interfaces using these tags use localzones that are tagged with one
# of these tags.
# The specified interfaces should be the same as the ones specified in
# 'interface:' followed by the list of tags.
# Note: any 'access-control*:' setting overrides all 'interface-*:'
# settings for targeted clients.
# interface-tag: eth0@5003 "tag2 tag3"
# Similar to 'access-control-tag-action:' but for interfaces.
# Set action for particular tag for a given interface element.
# If you have multiple tag values, the tag used to lookup the action
# is the first tag match between interface-tag and local-zone-tag
# where "first" comes from the order of the define-tag values.
# The specified interfaces should be the same as the ones specified in
# 'interface:' followed by the tag and action.
# Note: any 'access-control*:' setting overrides all 'interface-*:'
# settings for targeted clients.
# interface-tag-action: eth0@5003 tag3 refuse
# Similar to 'access-control-tag-data:' but for interfaces.
# Set redirect data for a particular tag for an interface element.
# The specified interfaces should be the same as the ones specified in
# 'interface:' followed by the tag and the redirect data.
# Note: any 'access-control*:' setting overrides all 'interface-*:'
# settings for targeted clients.
# interface-tag-data: eth0@5003 tag2 "A 127.0.0.1"
# Similar to 'access-control-view:' but for interfaces.
# Set view for an interface element.
# The specified interfaces should be the same as the ones specified in
# 'interface:' followed by the view name.
# Note: any 'access-control*:' setting overrides all 'interface-*:'
# settings for targeted clients.
# interface-view: eth0@5003 viewname
# if given, a chroot(2) is done to the given directory.
# i.e. you can chroot to the working directory, for example,
# for extra security, but make sure all files are in that directory.
#
# If chroot is enabled, you should pass the configfile (from the
# commandline) as a full path from the original root. After the
# chroot has been performed the now defunct portion of the config
# file path is removed to be able to reread the config after a reload.
#
# All other file paths (working dir, logfile, roothints, and
# key files) can be specified in several ways:
# o as an absolute path relative to the new root.
# o as a relative path to the working directory.
# o as an absolute path relative to the original root.
# In the last case the path is adjusted to remove the unused portion.
#
# The pid file can be absolute and outside of the chroot, it is
# written just prior to performing the chroot and dropping permissions.
#
# Additionally, Unbound may need to access /dev/urandom (for entropy).
# How to do this is specific to your OS.
#
# If you give "" no chroot is performed. The path must not end in a /.
# chroot: "@UNBOUND_CHROOT_DIR@"
chroot: "/usr/local/unbound"
# if given, user privileges are dropped (after binding port),
# and the given username is assumed. Default is user "unbound".
# If you give "" no privileges are dropped.
# username: "@UNBOUND_USERNAME@"
username: "_unbound"
# the working directory. The relative files in this config are
# relative to this directory. If you give "" the working directory
# is not changed.
# If you give a server: directory: dir before include: file statements
# then those includes can be relative to the working directory.
# directory: "@UNBOUND_RUN_DIR@"
directory: "/usr/local/unbound/"
# the log file, "" means log to stderr.
# Use of this option sets use-syslog to "no".
# logfile: ""
logfile: "/usr/local/unbound/log.d/unbound.log"
# Log to syslog(3) if yes. The log facility LOG_DAEMON is used to
# log to. If yes, it overrides the logfile.
use-syslog: no
# Log identity to report. if empty, defaults to the name of argv[0]
# (usually "unbound").
# log-identity: ""
# print UTC timestamp in ascii to logfile, default is epoch in seconds.
log-time-ascii: yes
# print one line with time, IP, name, type, class for every query.
# log-queries: no
# print one line per reply, with time, IP, name, type, class, rcode,
# timetoresolve, fromcache and responsesize.
# log-replies: no
# log with tag 'query' and 'reply' instead of 'info' for
# filtering log-queries and log-replies from the log.
# log-tag-queryreply: no
# log the local-zone actions, like local-zone type inform is enabled
# also for the other local zone types.
# log-local-actions: no
# print log lines that say why queries return SERVFAIL to clients.
log-servfail: yes
# the pid file. Can be an absolute path outside of chroot/work dir.
# pidfile: "@UNBOUND_PIDFILE@"
pidfile: "/usr/local/unbound/unbound.d/unbound.pid"
# file to read root hints from.
# get one from https://www.internic.net/domain/named.cache
# root-hints: ""
#root-hints: "/usr/local/unbound/iana.d/root.hints"
# enable to not answer id.server and hostname.bind queries.
hide-identity: yes
# enable to not answer version.server and version.bind queries.
hide-version: yes
# enable to not answer trustanchor.unbound queries.
hide-trustanchor: yes
# enable to not set the User-Agent HTTP header.
# hide-http-user-agent: no
# the identity to report. Leave "" or default to return hostname.
# identity: ""
# the version to report. Leave "" or default to return package version.
# version: ""
# NSID identity (hex string, or "ascii_somestring"). default disabled.
# nsid: "aabbccdd"
# User-Agent HTTP header to use. Leave "" or default to use package name
# and version.
# http-user-agent: ""
# the target fetch policy.
# series of integers describing the policy per dependency depth.
# The number of values in the list determines the maximum dependency
# depth the recursor will pursue before giving up. Each integer means:
# -1 : fetch all targets opportunistically,
# 0: fetch on demand,
# positive value: fetch that many targets opportunistically.
# Enclose the list of numbers between quotes ("").
# target-fetch-policy: "3 2 1 0 0"
# Harden against very small EDNS buffer sizes.
harden-short-bufsize: yes
# Harden against unseemly large queries.
harden-large-queries: yes
# Harden against out of zone rrsets, to avoid spoofing attempts.
harden-glue: yes
# Harden against receiving dnssec-stripped data. If you turn it
# off, failing to validate dnskey data for a trustanchor will
# trigger insecure mode for that zone (like without a trustanchor).
# Default on, which insists on dnssec data for trust-anchored zones.
harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
# Harden against queries that fall under dnssec-signed nxdomain names.
harden-below-nxdomain: yes
# Harden the referral path by performing additional queries for
# infrastructure data. Validates the replies (if possible).
# Default off, because the lookups burden the server. Experimental
# implementation of draft-wijngaards-dnsext-resolver-side-mitigation.
# harden-referral-path: yes
# Harden against algorithm downgrade when multiple algorithms are
# advertised in the DS record. If no, allows the weakest algorithm
# to validate the zone.
harden-algo-downgrade: yes
# Harden against unknown records in the authority section and the
# additional section.
# harden-unknown-additional: no
# Sent minimum amount of information to upstream servers to enhance
# privacy. Only sent minimum required labels of the QNAME and set QTYPE
# to A when possible.
qname-minimisation: yes
# QNAME minimisation in strict mode. Do not fall-back to sending full
# QNAME to potentially broken nameservers. A lot of domains will not be
# resolvable when this option in enabled.
# This option only has effect when qname-minimisation is enabled.
# qname-minimisation-strict: no
# Aggressive NSEC uses the DNSSEC NSEC chain to synthesize NXDOMAIN
# and other denials, using information from previous NXDOMAINs answers.
aggressive-nsec: yes
# Use 0x20-encoded random bits in the query to foil spoof attempts.
# This feature is an experimental implementation of draft dns-0x20.
use-caps-for-id: no
# Domains (and domains in them) without support for dns-0x20 and
# the fallback fails because they keep sending different answers.
# caps-exempt: "licdn.com"
# caps-exempt: "senderbase.org"
# Enforce privacy of these addresses. Strips them away from answers.
# It may cause DNSSEC validation to additionally mark it as bogus.
# Protects against 'DNS Rebinding' (uses browser as network proxy).
# Only 'private-domain' and 'local-data' names are allowed to have
# these private addresses. No default.
private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
private-address: fd00::/8
private-address: fe80::/10
private-address: ::ffff:0:0/96
# Allow the domain (and its subdomains) to contain private addresses.
# local-data statements are allowed to contain private addresses too.
private-domain: "Menhir"
# If nonzero, unwanted replies are not only reported in statistics,
# but also a running total is kept per thread. If it reaches the
# threshold, a warning is printed and a defensive action is taken,
# the cache is cleared to flush potential poison out of it.
# A suggested value is 10000000, the default is 0 (turned off).
# unwanted-reply-threshold: 0
# Do not query the following addresses. No DNS queries are sent there.
# List one address per entry. List classless netblocks with /size,
# do-not-query-address: 127.0.0.1/8
# do-not-query-address: ::1
# if yes, the above default do-not-query-address entries are present.
# if no, localhost can be queried (for testing and debugging).
do-not-query-localhost: no
# if yes, perform prefetching of almost expired message cache entries.
# prefetch: no
# if yes, perform key lookups adjacent to normal lookups.
# prefetch-key: no
# deny queries of type ANY with an empty response.
deny-any: yes
# if yes, Unbound rotates RRSet order in response.
rrset-roundrobin: yes
# if yes, Unbound doesn't insert authority/additional sections
# into response messages when those sections are not required.
minimal-responses: yes
# true to disable DNSSEC lameness check in iterator.
disable-dnssec-lame-check: no
# module configuration of the server. A string with identifiers
# separated by spaces. Syntax: "[dns64] [validator] iterator"
# most modules have to be listed at the beginning of the line,
# except cachedb(just before iterator), and python (at the beginning,
# or, just before the iterator).
module-config: "validator iterator"
# File with trusted keys, kept uptodate using RFC5011 probes,
# initial file like trust-anchor-file, then it stores metadata.
# Use several entries, one per domain name, to track multiple zones.
#
# If you want to perform DNSSEC validation, run unbound-anchor before
# you start Unbound (i.e. in the system boot scripts).
# And then enable the auto-trust-anchor-file config item.
# Please note usage of unbound-anchor root anchor is at your own risk
# and under the terms of our LICENSE (see that file in the source).
# auto-trust-anchor-file: "@UNBOUND_ROOTKEY_FILE@"
auto-trust-anchor-file: "/usr/local/unbound/iana.d/root.key"
# trust anchor signaling sends a RFC8145 key tag query after priming.
trust-anchor-signaling: yes
# Root key trust anchor sentinel (draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel)
root-key-sentinel: yes
# File with trusted keys for validation. Specify more than one file
# with several entries, one file per entry.
# Zone file format, with DS and DNSKEY entries.
# Note this gets out of date, use auto-trust-anchor-file please.
# trust-anchor-file: ""
# Trusted key for validation. DS or DNSKEY. specify the RR on a
# single line, surrounded by "". TTL is ignored. class is IN default.
# Note this gets out of date, use auto-trust-anchor-file please.
# (These examples are from August 2007 and may not be valid anymore).
# trust-anchor: "nlnetlabs.nl. DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQPzzTWMz8qSWIQlfRnPckx2BiVmkVN6LPupO3mbz7FhLSnm26n6iG9N Lby97Ji453aWZY3M5/xJBSOS2vWtco2t8C0+xeO1bc/d6ZTy32DHchpW 6rDH1vp86Ll+ha0tmwyy9QP7y2bVw5zSbFCrefk8qCUBgfHm9bHzMG1U BYtEIQ=="
# trust-anchor: "jelte.nlnetlabs.nl. DS 42860 5 1 14D739EB566D2B1A5E216A0BA4D17FA9B038BE4A"
# File with trusted keys for validation. Specify more than one file
# with several entries, one file per entry. Like trust-anchor-file
# but has a different file format. Format is BIND-9 style format,
# the trusted-keys { name flag proto algo "key"; }; clauses are read.
# you need external update procedures to track changes in keys.
# trusted-keys-file: ""
# Ignore chain of trust. Domain is treated as insecure.
# domain-insecure: "example.com"
# Override the date for validation with a specific fixed date.
# Do not set this unless you are debugging signature inception
# and expiration. "" or "0" turns the feature off. -1 ignores date.
# val-override-date: ""
# The time to live for bogus data, rrsets and messages. This avoids
# some of the revalidation, until the time interval expires. in secs.
# val-bogus-ttl: 60
# The signature inception and expiration dates are allowed to be off
# by 10% of the signature lifetime (expir-incep) from our local clock.
# This leeway is capped with a minimum and a maximum. In seconds.
# val-sig-skew-min: 3600
# val-sig-skew-max: 86400
# The maximum number the validator should restart validation with
# another authority in case of failed validation.
val-max-restart: 5
# Should additional section of secure message also be kept clean of
# unsecure data. Useful to shield the users of this validator from
# potential bogus data in the additional section. All unsigned data
# in the additional section is removed from secure messages.
val-clean-additional: yes
# Turn permissive mode on to permit bogus messages. Thus, messages
# for which security checks failed will be returned to clients,
# instead of SERVFAIL. It still performs the security checks, which
# result in interesting log files and possibly the AD bit in
# replies if the message is found secure. The default is off.
val-permissive-mode: no
# Ignore the CD flag in incoming queries and refuse them bogus data.
# Enable it if the only clients of Unbound are legacy servers (w2008)
# that set CD but cannot validate themselves.
ignore-cd-flag: no
# Serve expired responses from cache, with serve-expired-reply-ttl in
# the response, and then attempt to fetch the data afresh.
serve-expired: no
#
# Limit serving of expired responses to configured seconds after
# expiration. 0 disables the limit.
# serve-expired-ttl: 0
#
# Set the TTL of expired records to the serve-expired-ttl value after a
# failed attempt to retrieve the record from upstream. This makes sure
# that the expired records will be served as long as there are queries
# for it.
# serve-expired-ttl-reset: no
#
# TTL value to use when replying with expired data.
# serve-expired-reply-ttl: 30
#
# Time in milliseconds before replying to the client with expired data.
# This essentially enables the serve-stale behavior as specified in
# RFC 8767 that first tries to resolve before
# immediately responding with expired data. 0 disables this behavior.
# A recommended value is 1800.
# serve-expired-client-timeout: 0
# Return the original TTL as received from the upstream name server rather
# than the decrementing TTL as stored in the cache. Enabling this feature
# does not impact cache expiry, it only changes the TTL Unbound embeds in
# responses to queries. Note that enabling this feature implicitly disables
# enforcement of the configured minimum and maximum TTL.
# serve-original-ttl: no
# Have the validator log failed validations for your diagnosis.
# 0: off. 1: A line per failed user query. 2: With reason and bad IP.
val-log-level: 2
# It is possible to configure NSEC3 maximum iteration counts per
# keysize. Keep this table very short, as linear search is done.
# A message with an NSEC3 with larger count is marked insecure.
# List in ascending order the keysize and count values.
# val-nsec3-keysize-iterations: "1024 150 2048 150 4096 150"
# if enabled, ZONEMD verification failures do not block the zone.
zonemd-permissive-mode: no
# instruct the auto-trust-anchor-file probing to add anchors after ttl.
# add-holddown: 2592000 # 30 days
# instruct the auto-trust-anchor-file probing to del anchors after ttl.
# del-holddown: 2592000 # 30 days
# auto-trust-anchor-file probing removes missing anchors after ttl.
# If the value 0 is given, missing anchors are not removed.
# keep-missing: 31622400 # 366 days
# debug option that allows very small holddown times for key rollover,
# otherwise the RFC mandates probe intervals must be at least 1 hour.
# permit-small-holddown: no
# the amount of memory to use for the key cache.
# plain value in bytes or you can append k, m or G. default is "4Mb".
key-cache-size: 4m
# the number of slabs to use for the key cache.
# the number of slabs must be a power of 2.
# more slabs reduce lock contention, but fragment memory usage.
key-cache-slabs: 4
# the amount of memory to use for the negative cache.
# plain value in bytes or you can append k, m or G. default is "1Mb".
neg-cache-size: 1m
# By default, for a number of zones a small default 'nothing here'
# reply is built-in. Query traffic is thus blocked. If you
# wish to serve such zone you can unblock them by uncommenting one
# of the nodefault statements below.
# You may also have to use domain-insecure: zone to make DNSSEC work,
# unless you have your own trust anchors for this zone.
# local-zone: "localhost." nodefault
# local-zone: "127.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "home.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "onion." nodefault
# local-zone: "test." nodefault
# local-zone: "invalid." nodefault
# local-zone: "10.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "16.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "17.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "18.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "19.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "20.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "21.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "22.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "23.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "24.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "25.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "26.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "27.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "28.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "29.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "30.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "31.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "168.192.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "0.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "254.169.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "2.0.192.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "100.51.198.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "113.0.203.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "255.255.255.255.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "d.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "8.e.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "9.e.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "a.e.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "b.e.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# And for 64.100.in-addr.arpa. to 127.100.in-addr.arpa.
# Add example.com into ipset
# local-zone: "example.com" ipset
# If Unbound is running service for the local host then it is useful
# to perform lan-wide lookups to the upstream, and unblock the
# long list of local-zones above. If this Unbound is a dns server
# for a network of computers, disabled is better and stops information
# leakage of local lan information.
unblock-lan-zones: no
# The insecure-lan-zones option disables validation for
# these zones, as if they were all listed as domain-insecure.
insecure-lan-zones: no
# a number of locally served zones can be configured.
# local-zone: <zone> <type>
# local-data: "<resource record string>"
# o deny serves local data (if any), else, drops queries.
# o refuse serves local data (if any), else, replies with error.
# o static serves local data, else, nxdomain or nodata answer.
# o transparent gives local data, but resolves normally for other names
# o redirect serves the zone data for any subdomain in the zone.
# o nodefault can be used to normally resolve AS112 zones.
# o typetransparent resolves normally for other types and other names
# o inform acts like transparent, but logs client IP address
# o inform_deny drops queries and logs client IP address
# o inform_redirect redirects queries and logs client IP address
# o always_transparent, always_refuse, always_nxdomain, always_nodata,
# always_deny resolve in that way but ignore local data for
# that name
# o block_a resolves all records normally but returns
# NODATA for A queries and ignores local data for that name
# o always_null returns 0.0.0.0 or ::0 for any name in the zone.
# o noview breaks out of that view towards global local-zones.
#
# defaults are localhost address, reverse for 127.0.0.1 and ::1
# and nxdomain for AS112 zones. If you configure one of these zones
# the default content is omitted, or you can omit it with 'nodefault'.
#
# If you configure local-data without specifying local-zone, by
# default a transparent local-zone is created for the data.
#
# You can add locally served data with
# local-zone: "local." static
# local-data: "mycomputer.local. IN A 192.0.2.51"
# local-data: 'mytext.local TXT "content of text record"'
#
# You can override certain queries with
# local-data: "adserver.example.com A 127.0.0.1"
#
# You can redirect a domain to a fixed address with
# (this makes example.com, www.example.com, etc, all go to 192.0.2.3)
# local-zone: "example.com" redirect
# local-data: "example.com A 192.0.2.3"
#
# Shorthand to make PTR records, "IPv4 name" or "IPv6 name".
# You can also add PTR records using local-data directly, but then
# you need to do the reverse notation yourself.
# local-data-ptr: "192.0.2.3 www.example.com"
# tag a localzone with a list of tag names (in "" with spaces between)
# local-zone-tag: "example.com" "tag2 tag3"
# add a netblock specific override to a localzone, with zone type
# local-zone-override: "example.com" 192.0.2.0/24 refuse
# service clients over TLS (on the TCP sockets) with plain DNS inside
# the TLS stream, and over HTTPS using HTTP/2 as specified in RFC8484.
# Give the certificate to use and private key.
# default is "" (disabled). requires restart to take effect.
# tls-service-key: "path/to/privatekeyfile.key"
# tls-service-pem: "path/to/publiccertfile.pem"
# tls-port: 853
# https-port: 443
# cipher setting for TLSv1.2
# tls-ciphers: "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
# cipher setting for TLSv1.3
# tls-ciphersuites: "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256"
# Pad responses to padded queries received over TLS
# pad-responses: yes
# Padded responses will be padded to the closest multiple of this size.
# pad-responses-block-size: 468
# Use the SNI extension for TLS connections. Default is yes.
# Changing the value requires a reload.
# tls-use-sni: yes
# Add the secret file for TLS Session Ticket.
# Secret file must be 80 bytes of random data.
# First key use to encrypt and decrypt TLS session tickets.
# Other keys use to decrypt only.
# requires restart to take effect.
# tls-session-ticket-keys: "path/to/secret_file1"
# tls-session-ticket-keys: "path/to/secret_file2"
# request upstream over TLS (with plain DNS inside the TLS stream).
# Default is no. Can be turned on and off with unbound-control.
# tls-upstream: no
# Certificates used to authenticate connections made upstream.
# tls-cert-bundle: ""
# Add system certs to the cert bundle, from the Windows Cert Store
# tls-win-cert: no
# and on other systems, the default openssl certificates
# tls-system-cert: no
# Pad queries over TLS upstreams
# pad-queries: yes
# Padded queries will be padded to the closest multiple of this size.
# pad-queries-block-size: 128
# Also serve tls on these port numbers (eg. 443, ...), by listing
# tls-additional-port: portno for each of the port numbers.
# HTTP endpoint to provide DNS-over-HTTPS service on.
# http-endpoint: "/dns-query"
# HTTP/2 SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS value to use.
# http-max-streams: 100
# Maximum number of bytes used for all HTTP/2 query buffers.
# http-query-buffer-size: 4m
# Maximum number of bytes used for all HTTP/2 response buffers.
# http-response-buffer-size: 4m
# Set TCP_NODELAY socket option on sockets used for DNS-over-HTTPS
# service.
# http-nodelay: yes
# Disable TLS for DNS-over-HTTP downstream service.
# http-notls-downstream: no
# The interfaces that use these listed port numbers will support and
# expect PROXYv2. For UDP and TCP/TLS interfaces.
# proxy-protocol-port: portno for each of the port numbers.
# DNS64 prefix. Must be specified when DNS64 is use.
# Enable dns64 in module-config. Used to synthesize IPv6 from IPv4.
# dns64-prefix: 64:ff9b::0/96
# DNS64 ignore AAAA records for these domains and use A instead.
# dns64-ignore-aaaa: "example.com"
# ratelimit for uncached, new queries, this limits recursion effort.
# ratelimiting is experimental, and may help against randomqueryflood.
# if 0(default) it is disabled, otherwise state qps allowed per zone.
# ratelimit: 0
# ratelimits are tracked in a cache, size in bytes of cache (or k,m).
# ratelimit-size: 4m
# ratelimit cache slabs, reduces lock contention if equal to cpucount.
# ratelimit-slabs: 4
# 0 blocks when ratelimited, otherwise let 1/xth traffic through
# ratelimit-factor: 10
# Aggressive rate limit when the limit is reached and until demand has
# decreased in a 2 second rate window.
# ratelimit-backoff: no
# override the ratelimit for a specific domain name.
# give this setting multiple times to have multiple overrides.
# ratelimit-for-domain: example.com 1000
# override the ratelimits for all domains below a domain name
# can give this multiple times, the name closest to the zone is used.
# ratelimit-below-domain: com 1000
# global query ratelimit for all ip addresses.
# feature is experimental.
# if 0(default) it is disabled, otherwise states qps allowed per ip address
# ip-ratelimit: 0
# ip ratelimits are tracked in a cache, size in bytes of cache (or k,m).
# ip-ratelimit-size: 4m
# ip ratelimit cache slabs, reduces lock contention if equal to cpucount.
# ip-ratelimit-slabs: 4
# 0 blocks when ip is ratelimited, otherwise let 1/xth traffic through
# ip-ratelimit-factor: 10
# Aggressive rate limit when the limit is reached and until demand has
# decreased in a 2 second rate window.
# ip-ratelimit-backoff: no
# Limit the number of connections simultaneous from a netblock
# tcp-connection-limit: 192.0.2.0/24 12
# select from the fastest servers this many times out of 1000. 0 means
# the fast server select is disabled. prefetches are not sped up.
# fast-server-permil: 0
# the number of servers that will be used in the fast server selection.
# fast-server-num: 3
# Enable to attach Extended DNS Error codes (RFC8914) to responses.
# ede: no
# Enable to attach an Extended DNS Error (RFC8914) Code 3 - Stale
# Answer as EDNS0 option to expired responses.
# Note that the ede option above needs to be enabled for this to work.
# ede-serve-expired: no
# Specific options for ipsecmod. Unbound needs to be configured with
# --enable-ipsecmod for these to take effect.
#
# Enable or disable ipsecmod (it still needs to be defined in
# module-config above). Can be used when ipsecmod needs to be
# enabled/disabled via remote-control(below).
# ipsecmod-enabled: yes
#
# Path to executable external hook. It must be defined when ipsecmod is
# listed in module-config (above).
# ipsecmod-hook: "./my_executable"
#
# When enabled Unbound will reply with SERVFAIL if the return value of
# the ipsecmod-hook is not 0.
# ipsecmod-strict: no
#
# Maximum time to live (TTL) for cached A/AAAA records with IPSECKEY.
# ipsecmod-max-ttl: 3600
#
# Reply with A/AAAA even if the relevant IPSECKEY is bogus. Mainly used for
# testing.
# ipsecmod-ignore-bogus: no
#
# Domains for which ipsecmod will be triggered. If not defined (default)
# all domains are treated as being allowed.
# ipsecmod-allow: "example.com"
# ipsecmod-allow: "nlnetlabs.nl"
# Timeout for REUSE entries in milliseconds.
# tcp-reuse-timeout: 60000
# Max number of queries on a reuse connection.
# max-reuse-tcp-queries: 200
# Timeout in milliseconds for TCP queries to auth servers.
# tcp-auth-query-timeout: 3000
# Python config section. To enable:
# o use --with-pythonmodule to configure before compiling.
# o list python in the module-config string (above) to enable.
# It can be at the start, it gets validated results, or just before
# the iterator and process before DNSSEC validation.
# o and give a python-script to run.
python:
# Script file to load
# python-script: "@UNBOUND_SHARE_DIR@/ubmodule-tst.py"
# Dynamic library config section. To enable:
# o use --with-dynlibmodule to configure before compiling.
# o list dynlib in the module-config string (above) to enable.
# It can be placed anywhere, the dynlib module is only a very thin wrapper
# to load modules dynamically.
# o and give a dynlib-file to run. If more than one dynlib entry is listed in
# the module-config then you need one dynlib-file per instance.
dynlib:
# Script file to load
# dynlib-file: "@UNBOUND_SHARE_DIR@/dynlib.so"
# Remote control config section.
remote-control:
# Enable remote control with unbound-control(8) here.
# set up the keys and certificates with unbound-control-setup.
# control-enable: no
# what interfaces are listened to for remote control.
# give 0.0.0.0 and ::0 to listen to all interfaces.
# set to an absolute path to use a unix local name pipe, certificates
# are not used for that, so key and cert files need not be present.
# control-interface: 127.0.0.1
# control-interface: ::1
# port number for remote control operations.
# control-port: 8953
# for localhost, you can disable use of TLS by setting this to "no"
# For local sockets this option is ignored, and TLS is not used.
# control-use-cert: "yes"
# Unbound server key file.
# server-key-file: "@UNBOUND_RUN_DIR@/unbound_server.key"
# Unbound server certificate file.
# server-cert-file: "@UNBOUND_RUN_DIR@/unbound_server.pem"
# unbound-control key file.
# control-key-file: "@UNBOUND_RUN_DIR@/unbound_control.key"
# unbound-control certificate file.
# control-cert-file: "@UNBOUND_RUN_DIR@/unbound_control.pem"
# Stub zones.
# Create entries like below, to make all queries for 'example.com' and
# 'example.org' go to the given list of nameservers. list zero or more
# nameservers by hostname or by ipaddress. If you set stub-prime to yes,
# the list is treated as priming hints (default is no).
# With stub-first yes, it attempts without the stub if it fails.
# Consider adding domain-insecure: name and local-zone: name nodefault
# to the server: section if the stub is a locally served zone.
# stub-zone:
# name: "example.com"
# stub-addr: 192.0.2.68
# stub-prime: no
# stub-first: no
# stub-tcp-upstream: no
# stub-tls-upstream: no
# stub-no-cache: no
# stub-zone:
# name: "example.org"
# stub-host: ns.example.com.
# Forward zones
# Create entries like below, to make all queries for 'example.com' and
# 'example.org' go to the given list of servers. These servers have to handle
# recursion to other nameservers. List zero or more nameservers by hostname
# or by ipaddress. Use an entry with name "." to forward all queries.
# If you enable forward-first, it attempts without the forward if it fails.
# forward-zone:
# name: "example.com"
# forward-addr: 192.0.2.68
# forward-addr: 192.0.2.73@5355 # forward to port 5355.
# forward-first: no
# forward-tcp-upstream: no
# forward-tls-upstream: no
# forward-no-cache: no
# forward-zone:
# name: "example.org"
# forward-host: fwd.example.com
# Authority zones
# The data for these zones is kept locally, from a file or downloaded.
# The data can be served to downstream clients, or used instead of the
# upstream (which saves a lookup to the upstream). The first example
# has a copy of the root for local usage. The second serves example.org
# authoritatively. zonefile: reads from file (and writes to it if you also
# download it), primary: fetches with AXFR and IXFR, or url to zonefile.
# With allow-notify: you can give additional (apart from primaries and urls)
# sources of notifies.
auth-zone:
name: "."
primary: 199.9.14.201 # b.root-servers.net
primary: 192.33.4.12 # c.root-servers.net
primary: 199.7.91.13 # d.root-servers.net
primary: 192.5.5.241 # f.root-servers.net
primary: 192.112.36.4 # g.root-servers.net
primary: 193.0.14.129 # k.root-servers.net
primary: 192.0.47.132 # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
primary: 192.0.32.132 # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org
primary: 2001:500:200::b # b.root-servers.net
primary: 2001:500:2::c # c.root-servers.net
primary: 2001:500:2d::d # d.root-servers.net
primary: 2001:500:2f::f # f.root-servers.net
primary: 2001:500:12::d0d # g.root-servers.net
primary: 2001:7fd::1 # k.root-servers.net
primary: 2620:0:2830:202::132 # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
primary: 2620:0:2d0:202::132 # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org
#url: "https://www.internic.net/domain/root.zone"
fallback-enabled: yes
for-downstream: no
for-upstream: yes
zonemd-check: yes
zonemd-reject-absence: no
zonefile: "/usr/local/unbound/iana.d/root.zone"
# auth-zone:
# name: "example.org"
# for-downstream: yes
# for-upstream: yes
# zonemd-check: no
# zonemd-reject-absence: no
# zonefile: "example.org.zone"
# Views
# Create named views. Name must be unique. Map views to requests using
# the access-control-view option. Views can contain zero or more local-zone
# and local-data options. Options from matching views will override global
# options. Global options will be used if no matching view is found.
# With view-first yes, it will try to answer using the global local-zone and
# local-data elements if there is no view specific match.
# view:
# name: "viewname"
# local-zone: "example.com" redirect
# local-data: "example.com A 192.0.2.3"
# local-data-ptr: "192.0.2.3 www.example.com"
# view-first: no
# view:
# name: "anotherview"
# local-zone: "example.com" refuse
# DNSCrypt
# To enable, use --enable-dnscrypt to configure before compiling.
# Caveats:
# 1. the keys/certs cannot be produced by Unbound. You can use dnscrypt-wrapper
# for this: https://github.com/cofyc/dnscrypt-wrapper/blob/master/README.md#usage
# 2. dnscrypt channel attaches to an interface. you MUST set interfaces to
# listen on `dnscrypt-port` with the follo0wing snippet:
# server:
# interface: 0.0.0.0@443
# interface: ::0@443
#
# Finally, `dnscrypt` config has its own section.
# dnscrypt:
# dnscrypt-enable: yes
# dnscrypt-port: 443
# dnscrypt-provider: 2.dnscrypt-cert.example.com.
# dnscrypt-secret-key: /path/unbound-conf/keys1/1.key
# dnscrypt-secret-key: /path/unbound-conf/keys2/1.key
# dnscrypt-provider-cert: /path/unbound-conf/keys1/1.cert
# dnscrypt-provider-cert: /path/unbound-conf/keys2/1.cert
# CacheDB
# External backend DB as auxiliary cache.
# To enable, use --enable-cachedb to configure before compiling.
# Specify the backend name
# (default is "testframe", which has no use other than for debugging and
# testing) and backend-specific options. The 'cachedb' module must be
# included in module-config, just before the iterator module.
# cachedb:
# backend: "testframe"
# # secret seed string to calculate hashed keys
# secret-seed: "default"
#
# # For "redis" backend:
# # (to enable, use --with-libhiredis to configure before compiling)
# # redis server's IP address or host name
# redis-server-host: 127.0.0.1
# # redis server's TCP port
# redis-server-port: 6379
# # if the server uses a unix socket, set its path, or "" when not used.
# # redis-server-path: "/var/lib/redis/redis-server.sock"
# # if the server uses an AUTH password, specify here, or "" when not used.
# # redis-server-password: ""
# # timeout (in ms) for communication with the redis server
# redis-timeout: 100
# # set timeout on redis records based on DNS response TTL
# redis-expire-records: no
# IPSet
# Add specify domain into set via ipset.
# To enable:
# o use --enable-ipset to configure before compiling;
# o Unbound then needs to run as root user.
# ipset:
# # set name for ip v4 addresses
# name-v4: "list-v4"
# # set name for ip v6 addresses
# name-v6: "list-v6"
#
# Dnstap logging support, if compiled in by using --enable-dnstap to configure.
# To enable, set the dnstap-enable to yes and also some of
# dnstap-log-..-messages to yes. And select an upstream log destination, by
# socket path, TCP or TLS destination.
# dnstap:
# dnstap-enable: no
# # if set to yes frame streams will be used in bidirectional mode
# dnstap-bidirectional: yes
# dnstap-socket-path: "@DNSTAP_SOCKET_PATH@"
# # if "" use the unix socket in dnstap-socket-path, otherwise,
# # set it to "IPaddress[@port]" of the destination.
# dnstap-ip: ""
# # if set to yes if you want to use TLS to dnstap-ip, no for TCP.
# dnstap-tls: yes
# # name for authenticating the upstream server. or "" disabled.
# dnstap-tls-server-name: ""
# # if "", it uses the cert bundle from the main Unbound config.
# dnstap-tls-cert-bundle: ""
# # key file for client authentication, or "" disabled.
# dnstap-tls-client-key-file: ""
# # cert file for client authentication, or "" disabled.
# dnstap-tls-client-cert-file: ""
# dnstap-send-identity: no
# dnstap-send-version: no
# # if "" it uses the hostname.
# dnstap-identity: ""
# # if "" it uses the package version.
# dnstap-version: ""
# dnstap-log-resolver-query-messages: no
# dnstap-log-resolver-response-messages: no
# dnstap-log-client-query-messages: no
# dnstap-log-client-response-messages: no
# dnstap-log-forwarder-query-messages: no
# dnstap-log-forwarder-response-messages: no
# Response Policy Zones
# RPZ policies. Applied in order of configuration. QNAME, Response IP
# Address, nsdname, nsip and clientip triggers are supported. Supported
# actions are: NXDOMAIN, NODATA, PASSTHRU, DROP, Local Data, tcp-only
# and drop. Policies can be loaded from a file, or using zone
# transfer, or using HTTP. The respip module needs to be added
# to the module-config, e.g.: module-config: "respip validator iterator".
# rpz:
# name: "rpz.example.com"
# zonefile: "rpz.example.com"
# primary: 192.0.2.0
# allow-notify: 192.0.2.0/32
# url: http://www.example.com/rpz.example.org.zone
# rpz-action-override: cname
# rpz-cname-override: www.example.org
# rpz-log: yes
# rpz-log-name: "example policy"
# rpz-signal-nxdomain-ra: no
# for-downstream: no
# tags: "example"And set your local-zones as well:
# By default, for a number of zones a small default 'nothing here'
# reply is built-in. Query traffic is thus blocked. If you
# wish to serve such zone you can unblock them by uncommenting one
# of the nodefault statements below.
# You may also have to use domain-insecure: zone to make DNSSEC work,
# unless you have your own trust anchors for this zone.
local-zone: "localhost." nodefault
local-zone: "127.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
local-zone: "127.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
local-zone: "168.192.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
...Thanks for your support. For now (as I do need internet) I went back to my old setup (Klutchell image) with his config from his github in a folder on the host, mounted into the container and changed port to 5335 (his image by default uses his config with port 53, which would conflict with AdGuard):
# https://linux.die.net/man/5/unbound.conf
# https://docs.pi-hole.net/guides/unbound/
server:
# Enable or disable whether the unbound server forks into the background
# as a daemon. Default is yes.
do-daemonize: no
# If given, after binding the port the user privileges are dropped.
# Default is "unbound". If you give username: "" no user change is performed.
username: "unbound"
# No need to chroot as this container has been stripped of all other binaries.
chroot: ""
# If "" is given, logging goes to stderr, or nowhere once daemonized.
logfile: ""
# The process id is written to the file. Not required since we are running
# in a container with one process.
pidfile: ""
# The verbosity number, level 0 means no verbosity, only errors.
# Level 1 gives operational information.
# Level 2 gives detailed operational information.
# Level 3 gives query level information, output per query.
# Level 4 gives algorithm level information.
# Level 5 logs client identification for cache misses.
# Default is level 1. The verbosity can also be increased from the commandline.
verbosity: 1
# Listen on all ipv4 interfaces, answer queries from the local subnet.
interface: 0.0.0.0
# The port number, default 53, on which the server responds to queries.
port: 5335
do-ip4: yes
do-udp: yes
do-tcp: yes
# You want to leave this to no unless you have *native* IPv6. With 6to4 and
# Terredo tunnels your web browser should favor IPv4 for the same reasons
prefer-ip6: no
# Trust glue only if it is within the server's authority
harden-glue: yes
# Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the zone becomes BOGUS
harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
# Don't use Capitalization randomization as it known to cause DNSSEC issues sometimes
# see https://discourse.pi-hole.net/t/unbound-stubby-or-dnscrypt-proxy/9378 for further details
use-caps-for-id: no
# Reduce EDNS reassembly buffer size (see also https://docs.pi-hole.net/guides/dns/unbound/ )
# IP fragmentation is unreliable on the Internet today, and can cause
# transmission failures when large DNS messages are sent via UDP. Even
# when fragmentation does work, it may not be secure; it is theoretically
# possible to spoof parts of a fragmented DNS message, without easy
# detection at the receiving end. Recently, there was an excellent study
# >>> Defragmenting DNS - Determining the optimal maximum UDP response size for DNS <<<
# by Axel Koolhaas, and Tjeerd Slokker (https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/36/contributions/776/)
# in collaboration with NLnet Labs explored DNS using real world data from the
# the RIPE Atlas probes and the researchers suggested different values for
# IPv4 and IPv6 and in different scenarios. They advise that servers should
# be configured to limit DNS messages sent over UDP to a size that will not
# trigger fragmentation on typical network links. DNS servers can switch
# from UDP to TCP when a DNS response is too big to fit in this limited
# buffer size. This value has also been suggested in DNS Flag Day 2020.
edns-buffer-size: 1232
# Perform prefetching of close to expired message cache entries
# This only applies to domains that have been frequently queried
prefetch: yes
# Fetch DS records earlier (DNSSEC): more cpu usage, less latency
prefetch-key: yes
# One thread should be sufficient, can be increased on beefy machines.
# In reality for most users running on small networks or on a single machine,
# it should be unnecessary to seek performance enhancement by increasing num-threads above 1.
num-threads: 1
# Ensure kernel buffer is large enough to not lose messages in traffic spikes
# (requires CAP_NET_ADMIN or privileged)
# so-rcvbuf: 1m
# Increase cache size to utilize more RAM
msg-cache-size: 64m
rrset-cache-size: 128m
# This attempts to reduce latency by serving the outdated record before
# updating it instead of the other way around
# Default: cache-min-ttl: 0
serve-expired: yes
# The netblock is given as an IP4 or IP6 address with /size appended for a
# classless network block. The action can be deny, refuse, allow or allow_snoop.
access-control: 127.0.0.1/32 allow
access-control: 192.168.0.0/16 allow
access-control: 172.16.0.0/12 allow
access-control: 10.0.0.0/8 allow
# Ensure privacy of local IP ranges
private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
private-address: fd00::/8
private-address: fe80::/10
# Read the root hints from this file. Default is nothing, using built in
# hints for the IN class. The file has the format of zone files, with root
# nameserver names and addresses only. The default may become outdated,
# when servers change, therefore it is good practice to use a root-hints
# file. get one from https://www.internic.net/domain/named.root
root-hints: /etc/unbound/root.hints
# File with trust anchor for one zone, which is tracked with RFC5011 probes.
# The probes are several times per month, thus the machine must be online frequently.
# The initial file can be one with contents as described in trust-anchor-file.
# The file is written to when the anchor is updated, so the unbound user must
# have write permission.
auto-trust-anchor-file: /etc/unbound/root.key
# Number of ports to open. This number of file descriptors can be opened per thread.
# Must be at least 1. Default depends on compile options. Larger numbers need extra
# resources from the operating system. For performance a very large value is best,
# use libevent to make this possible.
outgoing-range: 8192
# The number of queries that every thread will service simultaneously. If more queries
# arrive that need servicing, and no queries can be jostled out (see jostle-timeout),
# then the queries are dropped. This forces the client to resend after a timeout;
# allowing the server time to work on the existing queries. Default depends on
# compile options, 512 or 1024.
num-queries-per-thread: 4096
# If null or "", no file is used. Set it to the certificate bun-
# dle file, for example "/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt". These
# certificates are used for authenticating connections made to
# outside peers. For example auth-zone urls, and also DNS over
# TLS connections. It is read at start up before permission drop
# and chroot.
tls-cert-bundle: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
# Allow custom configuration to override the settings above
#include-toplevel: /etc/unbound/custom.conf.d/*.confThis 'just' works. Not sure why I did not get his config working with your image (I did change the paths to files).
I am still interested in getting yours to work as well though, using your setup/config files, just have not much time for the trial and error at the moment. Will pick it up at a later time.
madnuttah
commented
1 year ago That's sad to hear but absolutely relateable. Get back to me if you'll give it another shot.
Unbound is running fine, but I do notice the following errors in log. Does this require attention, or should I ignore?
For example those last 2 I recognize, those are the ad filters enabled in my AdGuard Home (which uses Unbound as DNS upstream).