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🚨 [security] Update all of rails: 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5 (minor) #111

Closed depfu[bot] closed 3 years ago

depfu[bot] commented 3 years ago

🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!


Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ rails (5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo

Release Notes

5.2.4.4

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4

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Commits

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↗️ actioncable (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ actionmailer (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ actionpack (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Possible Strong Parameters Bypass in ActionPack

There is a strong parameters bypass vector in ActionPack.

Versions Affected: rails <= 6.0.3
Not affected: rails < 4.0.0
Fixed Versions: rails >= 5.2.4.3, rails >= 6.0.3.1

Impact

In some cases user supplied information can be inadvertently leaked from
Strong Parameters. Specifically the return value of each, or each_value,
or each_pair will return the underlying "untrusted" hash of data that was
read from the parameters. Applications that use this return value may be
inadvertently use untrusted user input.

Impacted code will look something like this:

def update
  # Attacker has included the parameter: `{ is_admin: true }`
  User.update(clean_up_params)
end

def clean_up_params
   params.each { |k, v|  SomeModel.check(v) if k == :name }
end

Note the mistaken use of each in the clean_up_params method in the above
example.

Workarounds

Do not use the return values of each, each_value, or each_pair in your
application.

🚨 Ability to forge per-form CSRF tokens given a global CSRF token

It is possible to possible to, given a global CSRF token such as the one
present in the authenticity_token meta tag, forge a per-form CSRF token for
any action for that session.

Versions Affected: rails < 5.2.5, rails < 6.0.4
Not affected: Applications without existing HTML injection vulnerabilities.
Fixed Versions: rails >= 5.2.4.3, rails >= 6.0.3.1

Impact

Given the ability to extract the global CSRF token, an attacker would be able to
construct a per-form CSRF token for that session.

Workarounds

This is a low-severity security issue. As such, no workaround is necessarily
until such time as the application can be upgraded.

Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ actionview (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Potential XSS vulnerability in Action View

There is a potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Action
View's translation helpers. Views that allow the user to control the
default (not found) value of the t and translate helpers could be
susceptible to XSS attacks.

Impact

When an HTML-unsafe string is passed as the default for a missing
translation key named html or ending in _html,
the default string is incorrectly marked as HTML-safe and not escaped.
Vulnerable code may look like the following examples:

<%# The welcome_html translation is not defined for the current locale: %>
<%= t("welcome_html", default: untrusted_user_controlled_string) %>

<%# Neither the title.html translation nor the missing.html translation is defined for the current locale: %>
<%= t("title.html", default: [:"missing.html", untrusted_user_controlled_string]) %>

Workarounds

Impacted users who can’t upgrade to a patched Rails version can avoid
this issue by manually escaping default translations with the
html_escape helper (aliased as h):

<%= t("welcome_html", default: h(untrusted_user_controlled_string)) %>

🚨 CSRF Vulnerability in rails-ujs

There is an vulnerability in rails-ujs that allows attackers to send
CSRF tokens to wrong domains.

Versions Affected: rails <= 6.0.3
Not affected: Applications which don't use rails-ujs.
Fixed Versions: rails >= 5.2.4.3, rails >= 6.0.3.1

Impact

This is a regression of CVE-2015-1840.

In the scenario where an attacker might be able to control the href attribute of an anchor tag or
the action attribute of a form tag that will trigger a POST action, the attacker can set the
href or action to a cross-origin URL, and the CSRF token will be sent.

Workarounds

To work around this problem, change code that allows users to control the href attribute of an anchor
tag or the action attribute of a form tag to filter the user parameters.

For example, code like this:

link_to params

to code like this:

link_to filtered_params

def filtered_params
  # Filter just the parameters that you trust
end

🚨 Possible XSS vulnerability in ActionView

There is a possible XSS vulnerability in ActionView's JavaScript literal
escape helpers. Views that use the j or escape_javascript methods
may be susceptible to XSS attacks.

Versions Affected: All.
Not affected: None.
Fixed Versions: 6.0.2.2, 5.2.4.2

Impact

There is a possible XSS vulnerability in the j and escape_javascript
methods in ActionView. These methods are used for escaping JavaScript string
literals. Impacted code will look something like this:

<script>let a = `<%= j unknown_input %>`</script>

or

<script>let a = `<%= escape_javascript unknown_input %>`</script>

Releases

The 6.0.2.2 and 5.2.4.2 releases are available at the normal locations.

Workarounds

For those that can't upgrade, the following monkey patch may be used:

ActionView::Helpers::JavaScriptHelper::JS_ESCAPE_MAP.merge!(
  {
    "`" => "\\`",
    "$" => "\\$"
  }
)

module ActionView::Helpers::JavaScriptHelper
  alias :old_ej :escape_javascript
  alias :old_j :j

  def escape_javascript(javascript)
    javascript = javascript.to_s
    if javascript.empty?
      result = ""
    else
      result = javascript.gsub(/(\\|<\/|\r\n|\342\200\250|\342\200\251|[\n\r"']|[`]|[$])/u, JS_ESCAPE_MAP)
    end
    javascript.html_safe? ? result.html_safe : result
  end

  alias :j :escape_javascript
end
Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ activejob (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

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Commits

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↗️ activemodel (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

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Commits

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↗️ activerecord (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Possible DoS Vulnerability in Active Record PostgreSQL adapter

There is a possible DoS vulnerability in the PostgreSQL adapter in Active
Record. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2021-22880.

Versions Affected: >= 4.2.0
Not affected: < 4.2.0
Fixed Versions: 6.1.2.1, 6.0.3.5, 5.2.4.5

Impact

Carefully crafted input can cause the input validation in the "money" type of
the PostgreSQL adapter in Active Record to spend too much time in a regular
expression, resulting in the potential for a DoS attack.

This only impacts Rails applications that are using PostgreSQL along with
money type columns that take user input.

Workarounds

In the case a patch can't be applied, the following monkey patch can be used
in an initializer:

module ActiveRecord
  module ConnectionAdapters
    module PostgreSQL
      module OID # :nodoc:
        class Money < Type::Decimal # :nodoc:
          def cast_value(value)
            return value unless ::String === value

            value = value.sub(/^\((.+)\)$/, '-\1') # (4)
            case value
            when /^-?\D*+[\d,]+\.\d{2}$/  # (1)
              value.gsub!(/[^-\d.]/, "")
            when /^-?\D*+[\d.]+,\d{2}$/  # (2)
              value.gsub!(/[^-\d,]/, "").sub!(/,/, ".")
            end

            super(value)
          end
        end
      end
    end
  end
end
Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

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Commits

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↗️ activestorage (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Circumvention of file size limits in ActiveStorage

There is a vulnerability in ActiveStorage's S3 adapter that allows the Content-Length of a
direct file upload to be modified by an end user.

Versions Affected: rails < 5.2.4.2, rails < 6.0.3.1
Not affected: Applications that do not use the direct upload functionality of the ActiveStorage S3 adapter.
Fixed Versions: rails >= 5.2.4.3, rails >= 6.0.3.1

Impact

Utilizing this vulnerability, an attacker can control the Content-Length of an S3 direct upload URL without receiving a
new signature from the server. This could be used to bypass controls in place on the server to limit upload size.

Workarounds

This is a low-severity security issue. As such, no workaround is necessarily
until such time as the application can be upgraded.

Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

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Commits

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↗️ activesupport (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Potentially unintended unmarshalling of user-provided objects in MemCacheStore and RedisCacheStore

There is potentially unexpected behaviour in the MemCacheStore and RedisCacheStore where, when
untrusted user input is written to the cache store using the raw: true parameter, re-reading the result
from the cache can evaluate the user input as a Marshalled object instead of plain text. Vulnerable code looks like:

data = cache.fetch("demo", raw: true) { untrusted_string }

Versions Affected: rails < 5.2.5, rails < 6.0.4
Not affected: Applications not using MemCacheStore or RedisCacheStore. Applications that do not use the raw option when storing untrusted user input.
Fixed Versions: rails >= 5.2.4.3, rails >= 6.0.3.1

Impact

Unmarshalling of untrusted user input can have impact up to and including RCE. At a minimum,
this vulnerability allows an attacker to inject untrusted Ruby objects into a web application.

In addition to upgrading to the latest versions of Rails, developers should ensure that whenever
they are calling Rails.cache.fetch they are using consistent values of the raw parameter for both
reading and writing, especially in the case of the RedisCacheStore which does not, prior to these changes,
detect if data was serialized using the raw option upon deserialization.

Workarounds

It is recommended that application developers apply the suggested patch or upgrade to the latest release as
soon as possible. If this is not possible, we recommend ensuring that all user-provided strings cached using
the raw argument should be double-checked to ensure that they conform to the expected format.

Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ builder (indirect, 3.2.3 → 3.2.4) · Repo · Changelog

↗️ concurrent-ruby (indirect, 1.1.5 → 1.1.8) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.1.8 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

1.1.7 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

1.1.6 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ crass (indirect, 1.0.5 → 1.0.6) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.0.6

More info than we can show here.

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Commits

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↗️ erubi (indirect, 1.9.0 → 1.10.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.10.0 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

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Commits

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↗️ i18n (indirect, 1.7.0 → 1.8.8) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.8.8

More info than we can show here.

1.8.7

More info than we can show here.

1.8.6

More info than we can show here.

1.8.4

More info than we can show here.

1.8.3

More info than we can show here.

1.8.2

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Commits

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↗️ loofah (indirect, 2.3.1 → 2.9.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.9.0

More info than we can show here.

2.8.0

More info than we can show here.

2.7.0

More info than we can show here.

2.6.0 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

2.5.0 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

2.4.0

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Commits

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↗️ mimemagic (indirect, 0.3.3 → 0.3.5) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

0.3.5 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

0.3.4 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ mini_portile2 (indirect, 2.4.0 → 2.5.0) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.5.0

More info than we can show here.

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Commits

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↗️ minitest (indirect, 5.13.0 → 5.14.3) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

5.14.3 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.14.2 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.14.0 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ nio4r (indirect, 2.5.2 → 2.5.5) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

2.5.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

2.5.3 (from changelog)

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Commits

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↗️ nokogiri (indirect, 1.10.5 → 1.11.1) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Nokogiri::XML::Schema trusts input by default, exposing risk of an XXE vulnerability

Description

In Nokogiri versions <= 1.11.0.rc3, XML Schemas parsed by Nokogiri::XML::Schema
are trusted by default, allowing external resources to be accessed over the
network, potentially enabling XXE or SSRF attacks.

This behavior is counter to
the security policy followed by Nokogiri maintainers, which is to treat all input
as untrusted by default whenever possible.

Please note that this security
fix was pushed into a new minor version, 1.11.x, rather than a patch release to
the 1.10.x branch, because it is a breaking change for some schemas and the risk
was assessed to be "Low Severity".

Affected Versions

Nokogiri <= 1.10.10 as well as prereleases 1.11.0.rc1, 1.11.0.rc2, and 1.11.0.rc3

Mitigation

There are no known workarounds for affected versions. Upgrade to Nokogiri
1.11.0.rc4 or later.

If, after upgrading to 1.11.0.rc4 or later, you wish
to re-enable network access for resolution of external resources (i.e., return to
the previous behavior):

  1. Ensure the input is trusted. Do not enable this option
    for untrusted input.
  2. When invoking the Nokogiri::XML::Schema constructor,
    pass as the second parameter an instance of Nokogiri::XML::ParseOptions with the
    NONET flag turned off.

So if your previous code was:

# in v1.11.0.rc3 and earlier, this call allows resources to be accessed over the network
# but in v1.11.0.rc4 and later, this call will disallow network access for external resources
schema = Nokogiri::XML::Schema.new(schema)

# in v1.11.0.rc4 and later, the following is equivalent to the code above
# (the second parameter is optional, and this demonstrates its default value)
schema = Nokogiri::XML::Schema.new(schema, Nokogiri::XML::ParseOptions::DEFAULT_SCHEMA)

Then you can add the second parameter to indicate that the input is trusted by changing it to:

# in v1.11.0.rc3 and earlier, this would raise an ArgumentError
# but in v1.11.0.rc4 and later, this allows resources to be accessed over the network
schema = Nokogiri::XML::Schema.new(trusted_schema, Nokogiri::XML::ParseOptions.new.nononet)

🚨 xmlStringLenDecodeEntities in parser.c in libxml2 2.9.10 has an infinite loop in a certain end-of-file situation.

Pulled in upstream patch from libxml that addresses CVE-2020-7595. Full details are available in #1992. Note that this patch is not yet (as of 2020-02-10) in an upstream release of libxml.

Release Notes

1.11.1

More info than we can show here.

1.11.0

More info than we can show here.

1.10.10

More info than we can show here.

1.10.9

More info than we can show here.

1.10.8

More info than we can show here.

1.10.7

More info than we can show here.

1.10.6

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Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ rack (indirect, 2.1.1 → 2.2.3) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Percent-encoded cookies can be used to overwrite existing prefixed cookie names

It is possible to forge a secure or host-only cookie prefix in Rack using
an arbitrary cookie write by using URL encoding (percent-encoding) on the
name of the cookie. This could result in an application that is dependent on
this prefix to determine if a cookie is safe to process being manipulated
into processing an insecure or cross-origin request.
This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2020-8184.

Versions Affected: rack < 2.2.3, rack < 2.1.4
Not affected: Applications which do not rely on __Host- and __Secure- prefixes to determine if a cookie is safe to process
Fixed Versions: rack >= 2.2.3, rack >= 2.1.4

Impact

An attacker may be able to trick a vulnerable application into processing an
insecure (non-SSL) or cross-origin request if they can gain the ability to write
arbitrary cookies that are sent to the application.

Workarounds

If your application is impacted but you cannot upgrade to the released versions or apply
the provided patch, this issue can be temporarily addressed by adding the following workaround:

module Rack
  module Utils
    module_function def parse_cookies_header(header)
      return {} unless header
      header.split(/[;] */n).each_with_object({}) do |cookie, cookies|
        next if cookie.empty?
        key, value = cookie.split('=', 2)
        cookies[key] = (unescape(value) rescue value) unless cookies.key?(key)
      end
    end
  end
end

🚨 Percent-encoded cookies can be used to overwrite existing prefixed cookie names

It is possible to forge a secure or host-only cookie prefix in Rack using
an arbitrary cookie write by using URL encoding (percent-encoding) on the
name of the cookie. This could result in an application that is dependent on
this prefix to determine if a cookie is safe to process being manipulated
into processing an insecure or cross-origin request.
This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2020-8184.

Versions Affected: rack < 2.2.3, rack < 2.1.4
Not affected: Applications which do not rely on __Host- and __Secure- prefixes to determine if a cookie is safe to process
Fixed Versions: rack >= 2.2.3, rack >= 2.1.4

Impact

An attacker may be able to trick a vulnerable application into processing an
insecure (non-SSL) or cross-origin request if they can gain the ability to write
arbitrary cookies that are sent to the application.

Workarounds

If your application is impacted but you cannot upgrade to the released versions or apply
the provided patch, this issue can be temporarily addressed by adding the following workaround:

module Rack
  module Utils
    module_function def parse_cookies_header(header)
      return {} unless header
      header.split(/[;] */n).each_with_object({}) do |cookie, cookies|
        next if cookie.empty?
        key, value = cookie.split('=', 2)
        cookies[key] = (unescape(value) rescue value) unless cookies.key?(key)
      end
    end
  end
end

🚨 Directory traversal in Rack::Directory app bundled with Rack

There was a possible directory traversal vulnerability in the Rack::Directory app
that is bundled with Rack.

Versions Affected: rack < 2.2.0
Not affected: Applications that do not use Rack::Directory.
Fixed Versions: 2.1.3, >= 2.2.0

Impact

If certain directories exist in a director that is managed by
Rack::Directory, an attacker could, using this vulnerability, read the
contents of files on the server that were outside of the root specified in the
Rack::Directory initializer.

Workarounds

Until such time as the patch is applied or their Rack version is upgraded,
we recommend that developers do not use Rack::Directory in their
applications.

🚨 Directory traversal in Rack::Directory app bundled with Rack

There was a possible directory traversal vulnerability in the Rack::Directory app
that is bundled with Rack.

Versions Affected: rack < 2.2.0
Not affected: Applications that do not use Rack::Directory.
Fixed Versions: 2.1.3, >= 2.2.0

Impact

If certain directories exist in a director that is managed by
Rack::Directory, an attacker could, using this vulnerability, read the
contents of files on the server that were outside of the root specified in the
Rack::Directory initializer.

Workarounds

Until such time as the patch is applied or their Rack version is upgraded,
we recommend that developers do not use Rack::Directory in their
applications.

Release Notes

2.2.2 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

2.2.1 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

2.2.0 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

2.1.2 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

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↗️ railties (indirect, 5.2.3 → 5.2.4.5) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

5.2.4.4 (from changelog)

More info than we can show here.

5.2.4.3 (from changelog)

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5.2.4.1 (from changelog)

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5.2.4 (from changelog)

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↗️ rake (indirect, 13.0.0 → 13.0.3) · Repo · Changelog

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13.0.3 (from changelog)

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13.0.1 (from changelog)

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↗️ sprockets-rails (indirect, 3.2.1 → 3.2.2) · Repo · Changelog

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3.2.2

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↗️ thor (indirect, 0.20.3 → 1.1.0) · Repo · Changelog

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1.1.0 (from changelog)

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1.0.1 (from changelog)

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1.0.0 (from changelog)

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↗️ tzinfo (indirect, 1.2.5 → 1.2.9) · Repo · Changelog

Release Notes

1.2.9

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1.2.8

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1.2.7

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↗️ websocket-driver (indirect, 0.7.1 → 0.7.3) · Repo · Changelog

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0.7.3 (from changelog)

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↗️ websocket-extensions (indirect, 0.1.4 → 0.1.5) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Regular Expression Denial of Service in websocket-extensions (RubyGem)

Impact

The ReDoS flaw allows an attacker to exhaust the server's capacity to process
incoming requests by sending a WebSocket handshake request containing a header
of the following form:

Sec-WebSocket-Extensions: a; b="\c\c\c\c\c\c\c\c\c\c ...

That is, a header containing an unclosed string parameter value whose content is
a repeating two-byte sequence of a backslash and some other character. The
parser takes exponential time to reject this header as invalid, and this will
block the processing of any other work on the same thread. Thus if you are
running a single-threaded server, such a request can render your service
completely unavailable.

Workarounds

There are no known work-arounds other than disabling any public-facing WebSocket functionality you are operating.

Release Notes

0.1.5 (from changelog)

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🆕 racc (added, 1.5.2)


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depfu[bot] commented 3 years ago

Closed in favor of #112.