relate the deliberative subjectivities to other axiomatical/ontological theories

[maxheld83]

• [ ] cultural theory Mary Douglas
• [ ] Moral tribes Jonathan Haidt

The overlap between the two is also interesting, that's http://joshuarbruce.com

[maxheld83]

also see #307

[maxheld83]

maybe, Douglas/Haidt (but even inequality of outcomes vs opportunity) and other fundamental, agreements are a level too deep for policy, and it's not clear how they might map to policy choices and beliefs on them. It's also not clear how this would work for deliberation, because, almost by definition, there's little need for mutual understanding here, it's not about reasons, these are a typology OF last reasons. Notice also how Jonathan Haidt seems to be quite pessimistic about whether different people can actually understand one another if they are from different moral tribes. Lastly, these seem to be all values, not preferences or beliefs, or even just the parameters for a value utility function (Douglas is dimensions, so yeah, it might be parameters of a function).

THis is pretty darn loose thinking.

[maxheld83]

another fundamental question might be: what is the value of these exercises, and how do they relate to people sharing the planet?

[maxheld83]

Ulrich Kühnen pointed to a very important distinction in the discussion on 19-05-2015 talk (there's a wiki on that):

Jonathan Haidt suggests that moral intuitions are a matter of affect, not of speech/thinking (as opposed to moral reasoning. (not a direct quote from Kühnen)

That's the problem here. Think about that. Also, how does that relate to Habermas? (Not well, I guess - speech is the telos of human understanding).

[maxheld83]

actually, Aenne just mentioned that items for testing cultural theory should always be domain-specific Uh-ok – that means we should expect them in tax choices (or not, if so, why not?)