preferences over beliefs in deliberative theory

[maxheld83]

preferences, beliefs and values aren't as neatly separate in deliberative politics as in game theory (careful here, values is the wrong term to begin with).

Caplan scorns some of this confusion as preferences over beliefs, which arguably, he would like to "price out" of existence, or which markets supposedly would be better at disciplining.

In deliberative democracy, preferences over beliefs are less frivolous digression and more necessity: because beliefs over human motivation, at least when you're designing institutions, are a self-fulfilling prophecy. As such, the question of the correct belief unfolds into another strategic game.

Of course, we might need to start from something in terms of beliefs of human motivation if we want to get anywhere, so we need pragmatism both for epistemological and ethical reasons, here again Note, however, that, again, neither implies that such provisionally acceptable beliefs would enjoy normative qualities and or would be inalienable, and or that some digression from such beleifs might not be justifiable in institutional design.

[maxheld83]

REALLY REALLY remember to write about the circular reasoning of institution,s values, beliefs.