Open maltfield opened 1 year ago
Fixing this would also be an important prerequisite for package maintainers to securely obtain the authentic MEGAsync and MEGAcmd releases before adding them to the official repos.
For example, to satisfy this Debian RFP:
Doing so would make this software much more accessible to thousands (millions?) of Debian, Ubuntu, Mint, etc users
Feature Request
Description
Currently it is not possible to verify the authenticity or cryptographic integrity of the desktop app downloads from mega.io or github.com because the releases are not cryptographically signed.
This makes it hard for Mega users to safely obtain the Mega software, and it introduces them to supply chain attacks.
Steps to Reproduce
Expected Behavior
A few things are expected:
SHA256SUMS.asc
file) along with the release itselfActual behavior
There's just literally no information on verifying downloads, and it appears that it is not possible to do so.
Versions Affected
Everything, all versions.
Use case
Installing the software securely
Suggested implementation
Cryptographic signing of all software releases with PGP