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meshtastic / firmware

Meshtastic device firmware
https://meshtastic.org
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[Feature Request]: Don't uplink decrypted precise location to MQTT #5404

Open juliatuttle opened 2 days ago

juliatuttle commented 2 days ago

Platform

Cross-Platform

Description

As part of tightening handling of precise location as PII, when uplinking a position packet to MQTT:

It's worth considering whether this behavior should differ when uplinking to private brokers; my instinct is that it should apply to private brokers as well, since part of the concern that inspired this bug was that data can be relayed between (some) brokers.

thebentern commented 1 day ago

We already do this on the official broker. I think the better approach here is to hard enforce the firmware not uplinking of MQTT packets without the OkToMQTT bit flag, under explicit consent. This will both give users the choice to opt-in and the freedom to continue to uplink precise data to private brokers as desired. Removing this functionality entirely would be a very controversial change.

juliatuttle commented 1 day ago

My understanding from chatting with Garth was that relying on "OK to MQTT" as consent for the app/node to transmit precise location on default keys and for any other user to relay that precise location to MQTT was insufficient, for two reasons:

  1. Practically, users are apparently "shocked" to see their precise location visible to anyone on the Internet and collected by third-party maps. This isn't surprising, as users have to build a mental model of how the GPS, channel, precision, and MQTT settings interact before they can understand the impact of their choices!
  2. Legally, Meshtastic is responsible for safeguarding the PII they collect in their app, and for ensuring anyone they send that data to will safeguard it in turn. Part of that safeguarding is allowing users to delete collected Pii, which is entirely infeasible when it's visible in plaintext to anyone nearby. This is unfortunate given Meshtastic's open nature, but to many users, it's a discrete product that should follow their privacy rights/expectations.
thebentern commented 1 day ago

Legally, Meshtastic is responsible for safeguarding the PII they collect in their app, and for ensuring anyone they send that data to will safeguard it in turn.

We do not collect any PII. Any parties doing so are responsible for this data, not Meshtastic. Furthermore, implementing your change as described, given the open-source nature of the project, someone only needs to comment out a few lines of code restoring the uplink of this data, and based on the popularity of the feature, I fully expect this to occur. All of these efforts to try to prevent inadvertent uplink need a line drawn in the sand somewhere. My opinion is throwing the whole feature out is unacceptable. The firmware level enforcement of this relies entirely on good faith acting by uplink nodes.

Practically, users are apparently "shocked" to see their precise location visible to anyone on the Internet and collected by third-party maps. This isn't surprising, as users have to build a mental model of how the GPS, channel, precision, and MQTT settings interact before they can understand the impact of their choices!

While I agree about the uplink of this information to 3rd party brokers being a surprise (which we will close with this flag enforcement), you have to explicitly turn on precise position. The default configuration does not lead you down this path, so it shouldn't entirely be a surprise if you know that you're sending locations with full precision, and you know that the ecosystem of MQTT uplink exists. Perhaps the apps have more explicit warnings here about the information being broadcasted, but that is not the responsibility of the firmware.

juliatuttle commented 1 day ago

Legally, Meshtastic is responsible for safeguarding the PII they collect in their app, and for ensuring anyone they send that data to will safeguard it in turn.

We do not collect any PII. Any parties doing so are responsible for this data, not Meshtastic.

This is very much not what Garth seemed to believe in Discord yesterday, but I don't know who's right.

Furthermore, implementing your change as described, given the open-source nature of the project, someone only needs to comment out a few lines of code restoring the uplink of this data, and based on the popularity of the feature, I fully expect this to occur.

This wouldn't be the only line of defense; it would work alongside changes to the client apps that Garth already made in iOS and was seemingly planning for Android.

All of these efforts to try to prevent inadvertent uplink need a line drawn in the sand somewhere. My opinion is throwing the whole feature out is unacceptable.

To be clear, this isn't throwing the whole feature out; it's specifically removing just enough data that the location isn't considered sensitive data.

While I agree about the uplink of this information to 3rd party brokers being a surprise (which we will close with this flag enforcement), ...

To be fair, that flag enforcement code could be removed just as easily as my suggested location blurring code.

...you have to explicitly turn on precise position.

True, but...

...and you know that the ecosystem of MQTT uplink exists.

...it's entirely possible for someone to not know about the ecosystem of MQTT uplink.

Fundamentally, I think the ethical requirement here is to make it very clear to users when they're about to share their location publicly, that anyone at all can see it, whether it's precise or imprecise, whether they're granting permission for others to uplink it, and what that all means.

Right now, a sufficiently motivated and technical user can figure this all out, but there's not a single, clear, meaningful choice for users who just want to get things working and/or aren't as technical.

I'd be happy to try to write some copy explaining the impact of a user's settings clearly, whether or not precise location on default keys sticks around.