This is the initial run of implementing minimal tamper detection via cryptographic commitments. There is still more work to-do (hence the draft status), but it's in a place where people can probably start digging in and offering some feedback.
No benchmarking has been done yet, but the most likely potential cause of slow-down comes from the size of the data that now needs to be transmitted. In particular, each output has an “uncompressed” rangeproof (around 4KiB). There's already a path available to reduce that size dramatically (seems like it should be possible to get the rangeproofs down to <1k total for effectively all transactions), but I haven't yet looked into tackling that problem.
This is the initial run of implementing minimal tamper detection via cryptographic commitments. There is still more work to-do (hence the draft status), but it's in a place where people can probably start digging in and offering some feedback.
No benchmarking has been done yet, but the most likely potential cause of slow-down comes from the size of the data that now needs to be transmitted. In particular, each output has an “uncompressed” rangeproof (around 4KiB). There's already a path available to reduce that size dramatically (seems like it should be possible to get the rangeproofs down to <1k total for effectively all transactions), but I haven't yet looked into tackling that problem.
Closes #101