When a user downloads this python module using pip, there is no cryptographic authenticity or integrity validation to protect the user from a MITM attack.
Therefore, this project is making any other projects that obtain the mitogen module via pip in their build process vulnerable to a watering hole attack.
Expected behavior
A developer should have a mechanism to cryptographically verify the integrity and authenticity of mitogen when obtaining it through pip.
To Reproduce
pip install mitogen
Additional context
Possible solutions include:
Using the --sign argument of twine when uploading packages to PyPI
Publishing a cryptographically signed document (ideally using gpg) listing the hashes for all packages uploaded to PyPI, which users can then pass into pip using the --hash argument
Describe the bug
When a user downloads this python module using
pip
, there is no cryptographic authenticity or integrity validation to protect the user from a MITM attack.Therefore, this project is making any other projects that obtain the
mitogen
module viapip
in their build process vulnerable to a watering hole attack.Expected behavior
A developer should have a mechanism to cryptographically verify the integrity and authenticity of mitogen when obtaining it through
pip
.To Reproduce
pip install mitogen
Additional context
Possible solutions include:
Using the
--sign
argument oftwine
when uploading packages to PyPIPublishing a cryptographically signed document (ideally using
gpg
) listing the hashes for all packages uploaded to PyPI, which users can then pass intopip
using the--hash
argument