🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨
This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!
Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.
This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.
Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).
If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
18.0.0-beta.6
17.2.0
16.2.6
15.5.5
Workarounds
Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.
Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
18.0.0-beta.6
17.2.0
16.2.0
15.5.0
Workarounds
There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.
Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).
If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
18.0.0-beta.6
17.2.0
16.2.6
15.5.5
Workarounds
Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.
Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
18.0.0-beta.6
17.2.0
16.2.0
15.5.0
Workarounds
There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.
Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).
If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
18.0.0-beta.6
17.2.0
16.2.6
15.5.5
Workarounds
Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.
Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
18.0.0-beta.6
17.2.0
16.2.0
15.5.0
Workarounds
There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with nodeIntegrationInSubFrames enabled which in turn allows effective access to ipcRenderer.
Please note the misleadingly named nodeIntegrationInSubFrames option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If your application is sandboxed then nodeIntegrationInSubFrames just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes ipcRenderer).
If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC senderFrame validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to ipcRenderer can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
18.0.0-beta.6
17.2.0
16.2.6
15.5.5
Workarounds
Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate senderFrame as per our security tutorial here.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows attackers who have control over a given apps update server / update storage to serve maliciously crafted update packages that pass the code signing validation check but contain malicious code in some components.
Please note that this kind of attack would require significant privileges in your own auto updating infrastructure and the ease of that attack entirely depends on your infrastructure security.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
18.0.0-beta.6
17.2.0
16.2.0
15.5.0
Workarounds
There are no workarounds for this issue, please update to a patched version of Electron.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.
All current stable versions of Electron are affected.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
17.0.0-alpha.6
16.0.6
15.3.5
14.2.4
13.6.6
Workarounds
Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.
app.on('web-contents-created',(event,webContents)=>{webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device',(event,devices,callback)=>{// Prevent default behaviorevent.preventDefault();// Cancel the requestcallback('');});});
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.
All current stable versions of Electron are affected.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
17.0.0-alpha.6
16.0.6
15.3.5
14.2.4
13.6.6
Workarounds
Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.
app.on('web-contents-created',(event,webContents)=>{webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device',(event,devices,callback)=>{// Prevent default behaviorevent.preventDefault();// Cancel the requestcallback('');});});
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.
All current stable versions of Electron are affected.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
17.0.0-alpha.6
16.0.6
15.3.5
14.2.4
13.6.6
Workarounds
Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.
app.on('web-contents-created',(event,webContents)=>{webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device',(event,devices,callback)=>{// Prevent default behaviorevent.preventDefault();// Cancel the requestcallback('');});});
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.
All current stable versions of Electron are affected.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
17.0.0-alpha.6
16.0.6
15.3.5
14.2.4
13.6.6
Workarounds
Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.
app.on('web-contents-created',(event,webContents)=>{webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device',(event,devices,callback)=>{// Prevent default behaviorevent.preventDefault();// Cancel the requestcallback('');});});
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows renderers to obtain access to a random bluetooth device via the web bluetooth API if the app has not configured a custom select-bluetooth-device event handler. The device that is accessed is random and the attacker would have no way of selecting a specific device.
All current stable versions of Electron are affected.
Patches
This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
17.0.0-alpha.6
16.0.6
15.3.5
14.2.4
13.6.6
Workarounds
Adding this code to your app can workaround the issue.
app.on('web-contents-created',(event,webContents)=>{webContents.on('select-bluetooth-device',(event,devices,callback)=>{// Prevent default behaviorevent.preventDefault();// Cancel the requestcallback('');});});
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
This vulnerability allows a sandboxed renderer to request a "thumbnail" image of an arbitrary file on the user's system. The thumbnail can potentially include significant parts of the original file, including textual data in many cases.
All current stable versions of Electron are affected.
Patches
This was fixed with #30728, and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
15.0.0-alpha.10
14.0.0
13.3.0
12.1.0
11.5.0
Workarounds
If your app enables contextIsolation, this vulnerability is significantly more difficult for an attacker to exploit.
Further, if your app does not depend on the createThumbnailFromPath API, then you can simply disable the functionality. In the main process, before the 'ready' event:
This vulnerability allows a sandboxed renderer to request a "thumbnail" image of an arbitrary file on the user's system. The thumbnail can potentially include significant parts of the original file, including textual data in many cases.
All current stable versions of Electron are affected.
Patches
This was fixed with #30728, and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
15.0.0-alpha.10
14.0.0
13.3.0
12.1.0
11.5.0
Workarounds
If your app enables contextIsolation, this vulnerability is significantly more difficult for an attacker to exploit.
Further, if your app does not depend on the createThumbnailFromPath API, then you can simply disable the functionality. In the main process, before the 'ready' event:
This vulnerability allows a sandboxed renderer to request a "thumbnail" image of an arbitrary file on the user's system. The thumbnail can potentially include significant parts of the original file, including textual data in many cases.
All current stable versions of Electron are affected.
Patches
This was fixed with #30728, and the following Electron versions contain the fix:
15.0.0-alpha.10
14.0.0
13.3.0
12.1.0
11.5.0
Workarounds
If your app enables contextIsolation, this vulnerability is significantly more difficult for an attacker to exploit.
Further, if your app does not depend on the createThumbnailFromPath API, then you can simply disable the functionality. In the main process, before the 'ready' event:
IPC messages sent from the main process to a subframe in the renderer process, through webContents.sendToFrame, event.reply or when using the remote module, can in some cases be delivered to the wrong frame.
If your app does ANY of the following, then it is impacted by this issue:
Uses remote
Calls webContents.sendToFrame
Calls event.reply in an IPC message handler
Patches
This has been fixed in the following versions:
9.4.0
10.2.0
11.1.0
12.0.0-beta.9
Workarounds
There are no workarounds for this issue.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
IPC messages sent from the main process to a subframe in the renderer process, through webContents.sendToFrame, event.reply or when using the remote module, can in some cases be delivered to the wrong frame.
If your app does ANY of the following, then it is impacted by this issue:
Uses remote
Calls webContents.sendToFrame
Calls event.reply in an IPC message handler
Patches
This has been fixed in the following versions:
9.4.0
10.2.0
11.1.0
12.0.0-beta.9
Workarounds
There are no workarounds for this issue.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
IPC messages sent from the main process to a subframe in the renderer process, through webContents.sendToFrame, event.reply or when using the remote module, can in some cases be delivered to the wrong frame.
If your app does ANY of the following, then it is impacted by this issue:
Uses remote
Calls webContents.sendToFrame
Calls event.reply in an IPC message handler
Patches
This has been fixed in the following versions:
9.4.0
10.2.0
11.1.0
12.0.0-beta.9
Workarounds
There are no workarounds for this issue.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org.
Apps using both contextIsolation and sandbox: true are affected.
Apps using both contextIsolation and nativeWindowOpen: true are affected.
This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.
Workarounds
There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.
Fixed Versions
11.0.0-beta.6
10.1.2
9.3.1
8.5.2
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Apps using both contextIsolation and sandbox: true are affected.
Apps using both contextIsolation and nativeWindowOpen: true are affected.
This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.
Workarounds
There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.
Fixed Versions
11.0.0-beta.6
10.1.2
9.3.1
8.5.2
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
The will-navigate event that apps use to prevent navigations to unexpected destinations as per our security recommendations can be bypassed when a sub-frame performs a top-frame navigation across sites.
Patches
11.0.0-beta.1
10.0.1
9.3.0
8.5.1
Workarounds
Sandbox all your iframes using the sandbox attribute. This will prevent them creating top-frame navigations and is good practice anyway.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
The will-navigate event that apps use to prevent navigations to unexpected destinations as per our security recommendations can be bypassed when a sub-frame performs a top-frame navigation across sites.
Patches
11.0.0-beta.1
10.0.1
9.3.0
8.5.1
Workarounds
Sandbox all your iframes using the sandbox attribute. This will prevent them creating top-frame navigations and is good practice anyway.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Apps using both contextIsolation and sandbox: true are affected.
Apps using both contextIsolation and nativeWindowOpen: true are affected.
This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.
Workarounds
There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.
Fixed Versions
11.0.0-beta.6
10.1.2
9.3.1
8.5.2
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
The will-navigate event that apps use to prevent navigations to unexpected destinations as per our security recommendations can be bypassed when a sub-frame performs a top-frame navigation across sites.
Patches
11.0.0-beta.1
10.0.1
9.3.0
8.5.1
Workarounds
Sandbox all your iframes using the sandbox attribute. This will prevent them creating top-frame navigations and is good practice anyway.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Apps using both contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.
This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.
Workarounds
There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.
Fixed Versions
9.0.0-beta.21
8.2.4
7.2.4
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.
Workarounds
There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.
Fixed Versions
9.0.0-beta.21
8.2.4
7.2.4
6.1.11
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.
Workarounds
There are no app-side workarounds, you must update your Electron version to be protected.
Fixed Versions
9.0.0-beta.21
8.2.4
7.2.4
Non-Impacted Versions
9.0.0-beta.*
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨
This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!
Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.
What changed?
✳️ electron (7.3.2 → 19.0.4) · Repo
Security Advisories 🚨
🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled
🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle
🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled
🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle
🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled
🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle
🚨 Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled
🚨 AutoUpdater module fails to validate certain nested components of the bundle
🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron
🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron
🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron
🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron
🚨 Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission in Electron
🚨 Sandboxed renderers can obtain thumbnails of arbitrary files through the nativeImage API
🚨 Sandboxed renderers can obtain thumbnails of arbitrary files through the nativeImage API
🚨 Sandboxed renderers can obtain thumbnails of arbitrary files through the nativeImage API
🚨 IPC messages delivered to the wrong frame in Electron
🚨 IPC messages delivered to the wrong frame in Electron
🚨 IPC messages delivered to the wrong frame in Electron
🚨 Context isolation bypass in Electron
🚨 Context isolation bypass in Electron
🚨 Unpreventable top-level navigation
🚨 Unpreventable top-level navigation
🚨 Context isolation bypass in Electron
🚨 Unpreventable top-level navigation
🚨 Context isolation bypass via contextBridge in Electron
🚨 Context isolation bypass via Promise in Electron
🚨 Context isolation bypass via leaked cross-context objects in Electron
🚨 Arbitrary file read via window-open IPC in Electron
Release Notes
Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.
Commits
See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 6 commits:
Bump v19.0.4chore: fix nan spec runner on macOS (#34463)test: fix for flaky renderer crash test (#34455)test: skip flaky test on 32-bit Windows (#34449)docs: fix `did-frame-navigate` example in webFrameMain docs (#34444)fix: on macOS show BrowserWindow on maximize if not currently shown (#34365)Depfu will automatically keep this PR conflict-free, as long as you don't add any commits to this branch yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting with
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