The build files indicate that this project is resolving dependencies over HTTP instead of HTTPS. Any of these artifacts could have been MITM to maliciously compromise them and infect the build artifacts that were produced. Additionally, if any of these JARs or other dependencies were compromised, any developers using these could continue to be infected past updating to fix this.
A project maintainer for this project should probably file for a CVE number to inform the public about this vulnerability in the build for this project. The goal is to inform the public that there was a potential for published build artifacts to have been maliciously compromised in earlier releases.
If a maintainer on this project works for or is associated with a CNA, please have them file it with them:
cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html
Otherwise, an open source CVE should be filed for here:
iwantacve.org
Option 2: Manually validate the release artifacts
If this project's build is fully reproducible. An alternative to filing for a CVE is to go back and build the earlier releases (with the HTTPS patch applied) to confirm the artifacts were not tampered when they were built. This can be done by comparing the hashes of the artifacts built locally with the ones published. If the hashes of all previous artifacts match those that are published, you can safely assume that the releases were not tampered with.
Again, this assumes that the build if fully reproducible and will require significantly more work.
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
The build files indicate that this project is resolving dependencies over HTTP instead of HTTPS. Any of these artifacts could have been MITM to maliciously compromise them and infect the build artifacts that were produced. Additionally, if any of these JARs or other dependencies were compromised, any developers using these could continue to be infected past updating to fix this.
This vulnerability has a CVSS v3.0 Base Score of 8.1/10 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
This isn't just theoretical
POC code has existed since 2014 to maliciously compromise a JAR file inflight. See:
MITM Attacks Increasingly Common
See:
Source Locations
Nebula-Kotlin-Plugin
Nebula-Closure-Plugin
Nebula-Grails-Plugin
Nebula-Test
Aside
I originally reported this to the Netflix Bug Bounty program but it was marked as "Not applicable". That report can be found here: https://bugcrowd.com/submissions/ffe701c31fa7f2a54a9b63b69e48c6b165dedd91df72a8d0d0c088e6d6518687
Public Disclosure
Option 1: File for a CVE
A project maintainer for this project should probably file for a CVE number to inform the public about this vulnerability in the build for this project. The goal is to inform the public that there was a potential for published build artifacts to have been maliciously compromised in earlier releases.
If a maintainer on this project works for or is associated with a CNA, please have them file it with them: cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html
Otherwise, an open source CVE should be filed for here: iwantacve.org
Option 2: Manually validate the release artifacts
If this project's build is fully reproducible. An alternative to filing for a CVE is to go back and build the earlier releases (with the HTTPS patch applied) to confirm the artifacts were not tampered when they were built. This can be done by comparing the hashes of the artifacts built locally with the ones published. If the hashes of all previous artifacts match those that are published, you can safely assume that the releases were not tampered with.
Again, this assumes that the build if fully reproducible and will require significantly more work.