net4people / bbs

Forum for discussing Internet censorship circumvention
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Error: Forbidden, Your client does not have permission #237

Open shokolatha opened 1 year ago

shokolatha commented 1 year ago

Hi, I've bought a private VPS and ran some censorship circumvention tools on it (SSH, V2Ray, Softether, Trojan). The problem is that on certain websites like Spotify or Soundiiz, my VPS's static IP is blocked by a message stating "Error: forbidden, your client does not have permission to get URL / from this server." I think the message is related to google captcha service or firebase, but I don't know any support emails to unblock the IP or ask for the blockage reasons. Any help would be appreciated.

wkrp commented 1 year ago

I don't have any advice to help with unblocking. It may help to have the VPS service change your IP address, if they can do that.

There has been some research on this phenomenon of servers denying access based on the client IP address.

"Do You See What I See? Differential Treatment of Anonymous Users"

The utility of anonymous communication is undermined by a growing number of websites treating users of such services in a degraded fashion. The second-class treatment of anonymous users ranges from outright rejection to limiting their access to a subset of the service’s functionality or imposing hurdles such as CAPTCHA-solving. To date, the observation of such practices has relied upon anecdotal reports catalogued by frustrated anonymity users. We conduct the first study to methodically enumerate and characterize the treatment of anonymous users as second-class Web citizens in the context of Tor.

We focus on first-line blocking: at the transport layer, through reset or dropped connections; and at the application layer, through explicit blocks served from website home pages. Our study draws upon several data sources: comparisons of Internet- wide port scans from Tor exit nodes versus from control hosts; longitudinal scans of home pages of top-1,000 Alexa websites through every Tor exit; and analysis of nearly a year of historic HTTP crawls from Tor network and control hosts. We develop a methodology to distinguish censorship events from incidental failures such as those caused by packet loss or network outages, and incorporate consideration of the churn in web-accessible services over both time and geographic diversity. We find clear evidence of Tor blocking on the Web, including 3% of the Alexa sites. Some blocks specifically target Tor, while others result from fate-sharing when abuse-based automated blockers trigger due to misbehaving Web sessions sharing the same exit node.

"403 Forbidden: A Global View of CDN Geoblocking"

We report the first wide-scale measurement study of server-side geographic restriction, or geoblocking, a phenomenon in which server operators intentionally deny access to users from particular countries or regions. Many sites practice geoblocking due to legal requirements or other business reasons, but excessive blocking can needlessly deny valuable content and services to entire national populations.

To help researchers and policymakers understand this phenomenon, we develop a semi-automated system to detect instances where whole websites were rendered inaccessible due to geoblocking. By focusing on detecting geoblocking capabilities offered by large CDNs and cloud providers, we can reliably distinguish the practice from dynamic anti-abuse mechanisms and network-based censorship. We apply our techniques to test for geoblocking across the Alexa Top 10K sites from thousands of vantage points in 177 countries. We then expand our measurement to a sample of CDN customers in the Alexa Top 1M.

We find that geoblocking occurs across a broad set of countries and sites. We observe geoblocking in nearly all countries we study, with Iran, Syria, Sudan, Cuba, and Russia experiencing the highest rates. These countries experience particularly high rates of geoblocking for finance and banking sites, likely as a result of U.S. economic sanctions. We also verify our measurements with data provided by Cloudflare, and find our observations to be accurate.

There is also the old list of services blocking Tor that is no longer maintained.

DanyTPG commented 1 year ago

if you are using xray core you can try routing all or some of your traffic (based on website list) through cloudflare warp using wireguard. here's the example: https://github.com/fscarmen/warp#%E9%80%9A%E8%BF%87-warp-%E8%A7%A3%E9%94%81-chatgpt-%E7%9A%84%E6%96%B9%E6%B3%95

if you want to route all of the traffic you can just delete the freedom protocol from outbounds list in the configuration