Currently, the signaling protocol specifies initial authentication as a mandatory register message when opening the websocket. This forces a signaling server to accept unauthenticated websockets and leave them open for some time to receive the actual authentication information which open us to some DoS/resource exhaustion attacks.
Since we have a precedent in the Uplink specification of authenticating a WebSocket connection via the header or query parameter (to accomodate browser websockets, which can't provide headers). This ensures we use a common way of authenticating these kind of cloud connections in both specs, and allow us to validate that the request is legitimate before accepting any websocket session.
Currently, the signaling protocol specifies initial authentication as a mandatory register message when opening the websocket. This forces a signaling server to accept unauthenticated websockets and leave them open for some time to receive the actual authentication information which open us to some DoS/resource exhaustion attacks.
Since we have a precedent in the Uplink specification of authenticating a WebSocket connection via the header or query parameter (to accomodate browser websockets, which can't provide headers). This ensures we use a common way of authenticating these kind of cloud connections in both specs, and allow us to validate that the request is legitimate before accepting any websocket session.