Open Sytten opened 2 years ago
I agree with this, there should be a way to require password to update any of the user details. If this feature is enabled, you can have a self-service page that lets the customer update their info but only be able to save the changes if the password is correct. It could even be implemented in one of a couple ways...
This feature should be completely optional as it would not really be needed if going the passwordless route.
You can change the Authenticator Assurance Level required for settings/profile updates.
So if you set the aal level to strict
, users dont get a privileged session from login automatically - they have to use a second factor.
client side vulnerability can still trigger a password change and an account take over.
This is prevented when you use a second factor - as are many other attack vectors.
If security is the motivation for this feature, I don't really see how entering the password (again) would be an improvement over using a second factor - but open to have my mind changed :)
it sounds like the ability to change the aal level to prevent the automatic privileged session could solve the issue. The scenario @Sytten mentioned of someone maliciously hacking your account trough the use of a connected social login method, can also be solved by including a second factor for authentication.
But this brings up two questions.
If you don't want to require a second factor for login, is it possible to only require the second factor when the user does actions that need privileged sessions (like when modifying account info or adding/removing login methods)?
if the user has multiple login methods assigned to their account, is it possible to require them to use a different method than the one they used to sign-in to grant a privileged session?
here is an example scenario... A company requires email/password sign-up and doesn't want to bother the user to use a second factor to login. Instead, the user is prompted to connect their social providers as additional options to login and as a security precaution to prevent account takeover.
In this scenario, if the user setup an additional login method and someone hacked their account by way of stealing their password. is it possible for the system to know what login method was used for the session and require an alternative method before granting a privileged session?
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Not stale
@vinckr While I agree that in theory the aal
is code without https://github.com/ory/kratos/issues/3668 I don't see how we would use it. Because we don't want to mandate all users to setup a 2FA.
Preflight checklist
Describe your problem
This is a follow-up to https://github.com/ory/kratos/discussions/1971 since I don't think the solution is enough for certain uses cases (including regulated industries). The privileged session is a good idea, but since it's not a manual operation from the user (aka they get a privileged session automatically on login), this means that a client side vulnerability can still trigger a password change and an account take over.
Further more, since you get a privilege session from a social login (most of which won't ask for a password on login if the user is already logged-in with the provider), it is possible to change the password of a user without ever knowing any password of the targeted user.
Describe your ideal solution
Adding a setting to require the current password for this password change flow mitigates the issue entirely.
Workarounds or alternatives
None at the moment.
Version
0.10.1
Additional Context
No response