Closed 751361787 closed 6 years ago
Hi @751361787,
By sending your POST request this is what I get with default installation of libModSecurity 3.0.2 and CRS3:
ModSecurity: Warning. detected XSS using libinjection. [file "/home/vhora/owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf"] [line "17"] [id "941100"] [rev "2"] [msg "XSS Attack Detected via libinjection"] [data "Matched Data: found within ARGS:json.status: "] [severity "2"] [ver "OWASP_CRS/3.0.0"] [maturity "1"] [accuracy "9"] [tag "application-multi"] [tag "language-multi"] [tag "platform-multi"] [tag "attack-xss"] [tag "OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-8"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-22"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A3"] [tag "OWASP_AppSensor/IE1"] [tag "CAPEC-242"] [hostname "192.168.37.1"] [uri "/odatd/api/xxxxx"] [unique_id "152397120155.687803"] [ref "v12,25t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls"]
ModSecurity: Warning. Matched "Operator `Rx' with parameter (?i)([<\xef\xbc\x9c]script[^>\xef\xbc\x9e]*[>\xef\xbc\x9e][\s\S]*?)' against variable **
ARGS:json.status' (Value: `'** ) [file "/home/vhora/owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf"] [line "63"] [id "941110"] [rev "2"] [msg "XSS Filter - Category 1: Script Tag Vector"] [data "Matched Data: "] [severity "2"] [ver "OWASP_CRS/3.0.0"] [maturity "4"] [accuracy "9"] [tag "application-multi"] [tag "language-multi"] [tag "platform-multi"] [tag "attack-xss"] [tag "OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-8"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-22"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A3"] [tag "OWASP_AppSensor/IE1"] [tag "CAPEC-242"] [hostname "192.168.37.1"] [uri "/odatd/api/xxxxx"] [unique_id "152397120155.687803"] [ref "o0,8o0,8v12,25t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls"]
ModSecurity: Warning. Matched "Operator `Rx' with parameter (?i)<[^\w<>]*(?:[^<>\"'\s]*:)?[^\w<>]*(?:\W*?s\W*?c\W*?r\W*?i\W*?p\W*?t|\W*?f\W*?o\W*?r\W*?m|\W*?s\W*?t\W*?y\W*?l\W*?e|\W*?s\W*?v\W*?g|\W*?m\W*?a\W*?r\W*?q\W*?u\W*?e\W*?e|(?:\W*?l\W*?i\W*?n\W*?k|\W*?o (3246 characters omitted)' against variable **
ARGS:json.status' (Value: `' ) [file "/home/vhora/owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf"] [line "195"] [id "941160"] [rev "2"] [msg "NoScript XSS InjectionChecker: HTML Injection"] [data "Matched Data: <script found within ARGS:json.status: "]** [severity "2"] [ver "OWASP_CRS/3.0.0"] [maturity "1"] [accuracy "8"] [tag "application-multi"] [tag "language-multi"] [tag "platform-multi"] [tag "attack-xss"] [tag "OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-8"] [tag "WASCTC/WASC-22"] [tag "OWASP_TOP_10/A3"] [tag "OWASP_AppSensor/IE1"] [tag "CAPEC-242"] [hostname "192.168.37.1"] [uri "/odatd/api/xxxxx"] [unique_id "152397120155.687803"] [ref "o0,7o16,8v12,25t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls"]
ModSecurity: Access denied with code 403 (phase 2). Matched "Operator Ge' with parameter
5' against variable TX:ANOMALY_SCORE' (Value:
15' ) [file "/home/vhora/owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf"] [line "36"] [id "949110"] [rev ""] [msg "Inbound Anomaly Score Exceeded (Total Score: 15)"] [data ""] [severity "2"] [ver ""] [maturity "0"] [accuracy "0"] [tag "application-multi"] [tag "language-multi"] [tag "platform-multi"] [tag "attack-generic"] [hostname "192.168.37.1"] [uri "/odatd/api/xxxxx"] [unique_id "152397120155.687803"] [ref ""]
ModSecurity: Warning. Matched "Operator Ge' with parameter
5' against variable TX:INBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE' (Value:
15' ) [file "/home/vhora/owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION.conf"] [line "61"] [id "980130"] [rev ""] [msg "Inbound Anomaly Score Exceeded (Total Inbound Score: 15 - SQLI=0,XSS=15,RFI=0,LFI=0,RCE=0,PHPI=0,HTTP=0,SESS=0): NoScript XSS InjectionChecker: HTML Injection"] [data ""] [severity "0"] [ver ""] [maturity "0"] [accuracy "0"] [tag "event-correlation"] [hostname "192.168.37.1"] [uri "/odatd/api/xxxxx"] [unique_id "152397120155.687803"] [ref ""]
Can you recheck your CRS configuration and ModSecurity configuration?
Hi @victorhora,
Here is my modsecurity.conf
and crs-setup.conf
:
# -- Rule engine initialization ----------------------------------------------
# Enable ModSecurity, attaching it to every transaction. Use detection
# only to start with, because that minimises the chances of post-installation
# disruption.
#
SecRuleEngine On
# -- Request body handling ---------------------------------------------------
# Allow ModSecurity to access request bodies. If you don't, ModSecurity
# won't be able to see any POST parameters, which opens a large security
# hole for attackers to exploit.
#
SecRequestBodyAccess On
# Enable XML request body parser.
# Initiate XML Processor in case of xml content-type
#
#SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "(?:application(?:/soap\+|/)|text/)xml" \
# "id:'200000',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML"
# Enable JSON request body parser.
# Initiate JSON Processor in case of JSON content-type; change accordingly
# if your application does not use 'application/json'
#
#SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "application/json" \
# "id:'200001',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx (?:text/xml|application/xml|application/soap+xml)" \
"id:914300,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
log,\
noauditlog,\
msg:'Enabling XML body processor for Content-Type %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-file-upload',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/MALICIOUS_FILE',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.0.2'"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx (?:application/json)" \
"id:914310,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
log,\
noauditlog,\
msg:'Enabling JSON body processor for Content-Type %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-file-upload',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/MALICIOUS_FILE',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.0.2'"
# Maximum request body size we will accept for buffering. If you support
# file uploads then the value given on the first line has to be as large
# as the largest file you are willing to accept. The second value refers
# to the size of data, with files excluded. You want to keep that value as
# low as practical.
#
SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit 131072
SecRequestBodyLimit 13107200
# Store up to 128 KB of request body data in memory. When the multipart
# parser reachers this limit, it will start using your hard disk for
# storage. That is slow, but unavoidable.
#
# What do do if the request body size is above our configured limit.
# Keep in mind that this setting will automatically be set to ProcessPartial
# when SecRuleEngine is set to DetectionOnly mode in order to minimize
# disruptions when initially deploying ModSecurity.
#
SecRequestBodyLimitAction Reject
# Verify that we've correctly processed the request body.
# As a rule of thumb, when failing to process a request body
# you should reject the request (when deployed in blocking mode)
# or log a high-severity alert (when deployed in detection-only mode).
#
SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:'200002', phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Failed to parse request body.',logdata:'%{reqbody_error_msg}',severity:2"
# By default be strict with what we accept in the multipart/form-data
# request body. If the rule below proves to be too strict for your
# environment consider changing it to detection-only. You are encouraged
# _not_ to remove it altogether.
#
SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:'200003',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400, \
msg:'Multipart request body failed strict validation: \
PE %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR}, \
BQ %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED}, \
BW %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE}, \
DB %{MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE}, \
DA %{MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER}, \
HF %{MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
LF %{MULTIPART_LF_LINE}, \
SM %{MULTIPART_MISSING_SEMICOLON}, \
IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING}, \
IP %{MULTIPART_INVALID_PART}, \
IH %{MULTIPART_INVALID_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
FL %{MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED}'"
# Did we see anything that might be a boundary?
#
SecRule MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY "!@eq 0" \
"id:'200004',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Multipart parser detected a possible unmatched boundary.'"
# PCRE Tuning
# We want to avoid a potential RegEx DoS condition
#
SecPcreMatchLimit 1000
SecPcreMatchLimitRecursion 1000
# Some internal errors will set flags in TX and we will need to look for these.
# All of these are prefixed with "MSC_". The following flags currently exist:
#
# MSC_PCRE_LIMITS_EXCEEDED: PCRE match limits were exceeded.
#
SecRule TX:/^MSC_/ "!@streq 0" \
"id:'200005',phase:2,t:none,deny,msg:'ModSecurity internal error flagged: %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}'"
# -- Response body handling --------------------------------------------------
# Allow ModSecurity to access response bodies.
# You should have this directive enabled in order to identify errors
# and data leakage issues.
#
# Do keep in mind that enabling this directive does increases both
# memory consumption and response latency.
#
SecResponseBodyAccess On
# Which response MIME types do you want to inspect? You should adjust the
# configuration below to catch documents but avoid static files
# (e.g., images and archives).
#
SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain text/html text/xml
# Buffer response bodies of up to 512 KB in length.
SecResponseBodyLimit 524288
# What happens when we encounter a response body larger than the configured
# limit? By default, we process what we have and let the rest through.
# That's somewhat less secure, but does not break any legitimate pages.
#
SecResponseBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial
# -- Filesystem configuration ------------------------------------------------
# The location where ModSecurity stores temporary files (for example, when
# it needs to handle a file upload that is larger than the configured limit).
#
# This default setting is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however,
# this is less than ideal. It is recommended that you specify a location that's private.
#
SecTmpDir /tmp/
# The location where ModSecurity will keep its persistent data. This default setting
# is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however, it
# too should be updated to a place that other users can't access.
#
SecDataDir /tmp/
# -- File uploads handling configuration -------------------------------------
# The location where ModSecurity stores intercepted uploaded files. This
# location must be private to ModSecurity. You don't want other users on
# the server to access the files, do you?
#
#SecUploadDir /opt/modsecurity/var/upload/
# By default, only keep the files that were determined to be unusual
# in some way (by an external inspection script). For this to work you
# will also need at least one file inspection rule.
#
#SecUploadKeepFiles RelevantOnly
# Uploaded files are by default created with permissions that do not allow
# any other user to access them. You may need to relax that if you want to
# interface ModSecurity to an external program (e.g., an anti-virus).
#
#SecUploadFileMode 0600
# -- Debug log configuration -------------------------------------------------
# The default debug log configuration is to duplicate the error, warning
# and notice messages from the error log.
#
#SecDebugLog /opt/modsecurity/var/log/debug.log
#SecDebugLogLevel 3
# -- Audit log configuration -------------------------------------------------
# Log the transactions that are marked by a rule, as well as those that
# trigger a server error (determined by a 5xx or 4xx, excluding 404,
# level response status codes).
#
SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly
SecAuditLogRelevantStatus "^(?:5|4(?!04))"
# Log everything we know about a transaction.
SecAuditLogParts ABIJDEFHZ
# Use a single file for logging. This is much easier to look at, but
# assumes that you will use the audit log only ocassionally.
#
SecAuditLogType Serial
SecAuditLog /var/log/modsec_audit.log
# Specify the path for concurrent audit logging.
#SecAuditLogStorageDir /opt/modsecurity/var/audit/
# -- Miscellaneous -----------------------------------------------------------
# Use the most commonly used application/x-www-form-urlencoded parameter
# separator. There's probably only one application somewhere that uses
# something else so don't expect to change this value.
#
SecArgumentSeparator &
# Settle on version 0 (zero) cookies, as that is what most applications
# use. Using an incorrect cookie version may open your installation to
# evasion attacks (against the rules that examine named cookies).
#
SecCookieFormat 0
# Specify your Unicode Code Point.
# This mapping is used by the t:urlDecodeUni transformation function
# to properly map encoded data to your language. Properly setting
# these directives helps to reduce false positives and negatives.
#
SecUnicodeMapFile unicode.mapping 20127
# Improve the quality of ModSecurity by sharing information about your
# current ModSecurity version and dependencies versions.
# The following information will be shared: ModSecurity version,
# Web Server version, APR version, PCRE version, Lua version, Libxml2
# version, Anonymous unique id for host.
SecStatusEngine On
######################## OWAPS Core Rules Set ###################################
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/crs-setup.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-901-INITIALIZATION.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-903.9001-DRUPAL-EXCLUSION-RULES.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-903.9002-WORDPRESS-EXCLUSION-RULES.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-905-COMMON-EXCEPTIONS.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-932-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RCE.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-942-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SQLI.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION.conf
Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf
#Include owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION.conf
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.0.2
# Copyright (c) 2006-2016 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -- [[ Introduction ]] --------------------------------------------------------
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) is a set of generic attack
# detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web
# application. They are written for the open source, cross-platform
# ModSecurity Web Application Firewall.
#
# See also:
# https://modsecurity.org/crs/
# https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project
#
#
# -- [[ System Requirements ]] -------------------------------------------------
#
# CRS requires ModSecurity version 2.8.0 or above.
# We recommend to always use the newest ModSecurity version.
#
# The configuration directives/settings in this file are used to control
# the OWASP ModSecurity CRS. These settings do **NOT** configure the main
# ModSecurity settings (modsecurity.conf) such as SecRuleEngine,
# SecRequestBodyAccess, SecAuditEngine, SecDebugLog, and XML processing.
#
# The CRS assumes that modsecurity.conf has been loaded. If you don't have this
# file, you can get it from:
# https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/blob/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
#
# The order of file inclusion in your webserver configuration should always be:
# 1. modsecurity.conf
# 2. crs-setup.conf (this file)
# 3. rules/*.conf (the CRS rule files)
#
# Please refer to the INSTALL file for detailed installation instructions.
#
#
# -- [[ Mode of Operation: Anomaly Scoring vs. Self-Contained ]] ---------------
#
# The CRS can run in two modes:
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode (default) ]] --
# In CRS3, anomaly mode is the default and recommended mode, since it gives the
# most accurate log information and offers the most flexibility in setting your
# blocking policies. It is also called "collaborative detection mode".
# In this mode, each matching rule increases an 'anomaly score'.
# At the conclusion of the inbound rules, and again at the conclusion of the
# outbound rules, the anomaly score is checked, and the blocking evaluation
# rules apply a disruptive action, by default returning an error 403.
#
# -- [[ Self-Contained Mode ]] --
# In this mode, rules apply an action instantly. This was the CRS2 default.
# It can lower resource usage, at the cost of less flexibility in blocking policy
# and less informative audit logs (only the first detected threat is logged).
# Rules inherit the disruptive action that you specify (i.e. deny, drop, etc).
# The first rule that matches will execute this action. In most cases this will
# cause evaluation to stop after the first rule has matched, similar to how many
# IDSs function.
#
# -- [[ Alert Logging Control ]] --
# In the mode configuration, you must also adjust the desired logging options.
# There are three common options for dealing with logging. By default CRS enables
# logging to the webserver error log (or Event viewer) plus detailed logging to
# the ModSecurity audit log (configured under SecAuditLog in modsecurity.conf).
#
# - To log to both error log and ModSecurity audit log file, use: "log,auditlog"
# - To log *only* to the ModSecurity audit log file, use: "nolog,auditlog"
# - To log *only* to the error log file, use: "log,noauditlog"
#
# Examples for the various modes follow.
# You must leave one of the following options enabled.
# Note that you must specify the same line for phase:1 and phase:2.
#
# Default: Anomaly Scoring mode, log to error log, log to ModSecurity audit log
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf.example
# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,pass"
SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,pass"
# Example: Anomaly Scoring mode, log only to ModSecurity audit log
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf.example
# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,nolog,auditlog,pass"
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,nolog,auditlog,pass"
# Example: Self-contained mode, return error 403 on blocking
# - In this configuration the default disruptive action becomes 'deny'. After a
# rule triggers, it will stop processing the request and return an error 403.
# - You can also use a different error status, such as 404, 406, et cetera.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
# Example: Self-contained mode, redirect back to homepage on blocking
# - In this configuration the 'tag' action includes the Host header data in the
# log. This helps to identify which virtual host triggered the rule (if any).
# - Note that this might cause redirect loops in some situations; for example
# if a Cookie or User-Agent header is blocked, it will also be blocked when
# the client subsequently tries to access the homepage. You can also redirect
# to another custom URL.
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
#
# -- [[ Paranoia Level Initialization ]] ---------------------------------------
#
# The Paranoia Level (PL) setting allows you to choose the desired level
# of rule checks.
#
# With each paranoia level increase, the CRS enables additional rules
# giving you a higher level of security. However, higher paranoia levels
# also increase the possibility of blocking some legitimate traffic due to
# false alarms (also named false positives or FPs). If you use higher
# paranoia levels, it is likely that you will need to add some exclusion
# rules for certain requests and applications receiving complex input.
#
# - A paranoia level of 1 is default. In this level, most core rules
# are enabled. PL1 is advised for beginners, installations
# covering many different sites and applications, and for setups
# with standard security requirements.
# At PL1 you should face FPs rarely. If you encounter FPs, please
# open an issue on the CRS GitHub site and don't forget to attach your
# complete Audit Log record for the request with the issue.
# - Paranoia level 2 includes many extra rules, for instance enabling
# many regexp-based SQL and XSS injection protections, and adding
# extra keywords checked for code injections. PL2 is advised
# for moderate to experienced users desiring more complete coverage
# and for installations with elevated security requirements.
# PL2 comes with some FPs which you need to handle.
# - Paranoia level 3 enables more rules and keyword lists, and tweaks
# limits on special characters used. PL3 is aimed at users experienced
# at the handling of FPs and at installations with a high security
# requirement.
# - Paranoia level 4 further restricts special characters.
# The highest level is advised for experienced users protecting
# installations with very high security requirements. Running PL4 will
# likely produce a very high number of FPs which have to be
# treated before the site can go productive.
#
# Rules in paranoia level 2 or higher will log their PL to the audit log;
# example: [tag "paranoia-level/2"]. This allows you to deduct from the
# audit log how the WAF behavior is affected by paranoia level.
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
#
SecAction \
"id:900000,\
phase:1,\
nolog,\
pass,\
t:none,\
setvar:tx.paranoia_level=3"
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Severity Levels ]] ----------------------------------------
#
# Each rule in the CRS has an associated severity level.
# These are the default scoring points for each severity level.
# These settings will be used to increment the anomaly score if a rule matches.
# You may adjust these points to your liking, but this is usually not needed.
#
# - CRITICAL severity: Anomaly Score of 5.
# Mostly generated by the application attack rules (93x and 94x files).
# - ERROR severity: Anomaly Score of 4.
# Generated mostly from outbound leakage rules (95x files).
# - WARNING severity: Anomaly Score of 3.
# Generated mostly by malicious client rules (91x files).
# - NOTICE severity: Anomaly Score of 2.
# Generated mostly by the protocol rules (92x files).
#
# In anomaly mode, these scores are cumulative.
# So it's possible for a request to hit multiple rules.
#
# (Note: In this file, we use 'phase:1' to set CRS configuration variables.
# In general, 'phase:request' is used. However, we want to make absolutely sure
# that all configuration variables are set before the CRS rules are processed.)
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900100,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5,\
# setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4,\
# setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3,\
# setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2"
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Blocking Threshold Levels ]] ------------------------------
#
# Here, you can specify at which cumulative anomaly score an inbound request,
# or outbound response, gets blocked.
#
# Most detected inbound threats will give a critical score of 5.
# Smaller violations, like violations of protocol/standards, carry lower scores.
#
# [ At default value ]
# If you keep the blocking thresholds at the defaults, the CRS will work
# similarly to previous CRS versions: a single critical rule match will cause
# the request to be blocked and logged.
#
# [ Using higher values ]
# If you want to make the CRS less sensitive, you can increase the blocking
# thresholds, for instance to 7 (which would require multiple rule matches
# before blocking) or 10 (which would require at least two critical alerts - or
# a combination of many lesser alerts), or even higher. However, increasing the
# thresholds might cause some attacks to bypass the CRS rules or your policies.
#
# [ New deployment strategy: Starting high and decreasing ]
# It is a common practice to start a fresh CRS installation with elevated
# anomaly scoring thresholds (>100) and then lower the limits as your
# confidence in the setup grows. You may also look into the Sampling
# Percentage section below for a different strategy to ease into a new
# CRS installation.
#
# [ Anomaly Threshold / Paranoia Level Quadrant ]
#
# High Anomaly Limit | High Anomaly Limit
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
# -> Fresh Site | -> Experimental Site
# ------------------------------------------------------
# Low Anomaly Limit | Low Anomaly Limit
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
# -> Standard Site | -> High Security Site
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the defaults:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900110,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5,\
# setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4"
#
# -- [[ Application Specific Rule Exclusions ]] ----------------------------------------
#
# Some well-known applications may undertake actions that appear to be
# malicious. This includes actions such as allowing HTML or Javascript within
# parameters. In such cases the CRS aims to prevent false positives by allowing
# administrators to enable prebuilt, application specific exclusions on an
# application by application basis.
# These application specific exclusions are distinct from the rules that would
# be placed in the REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS configuration file as
# they are prebuilt for specific applications. The 'REQUEST-900' file is
# designed for users to add their own custom exclusions. Note, using these
# application specific exclusions may loosen restrictions of the CRS,
# especially if used with an application they weren't designed for. As a result
# they should be applied with care.
# To use this functionality you must specify a supported application. To do so
# uncomment rule 900130. In addition to uncommenting the rule you will need to
# specify which application(s) you'd like to enable exclusions for. Only a
# (very) limited set of applications are currently supported, please use the
# filenames prefixed with 'REQUEST-903' to guide you in your selection.
# Such filenames use the following convention:
# REQUEST-903.9XXX-{APPNAME}-EXCLUSIONS-RULES.conf
#
# It is recommended if you run multiple web applications on your site to limit
# the effects of the exclusion to only the path where the excluded webapp
# resides using a rule similar to the following example:
# SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /wordpress/" setvar:crs_exclusions_wordpress=1
#
# Modify and uncomment this rule to select which application:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900130,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_drupal=1,\
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_wordpress=1"
#
# -- [[ HTTP Policy Settings ]] ------------------------------------------------
#
# This section defines your policies for the HTTP protocol, such as:
# - allowed HTTP versions, HTTP methods, allowed request Content-Types
# - forbidden file extensions (e.g. .bak, .sql) and request headers (e.g. Proxy)
#
# These variables are used in the following rule files:
# - REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf
# - REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf
# - REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf
# HTTP methods that a client is allowed to use.
# Default: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
# Example: for RESTful APIs, add the following methods: PUT PATCH DELETE
# Example: for WebDAV, add the following methods: CHECKOUT COPY DELETE LOCK
# MERGE MKACTIVITY MKCOL MOVE PROPFIND PROPPATCH PUT UNLOCK
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900200,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS'"
# Content-Types that a client is allowed to send in a request.
# Default: application/x-www-form-urlencoded|multipart/form-data|text/xml|\
# application/xml|application/soap+xml|application/x-amf|application/json|\
# application/octet-stream|text/plain
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900220,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=application/x-www-form-urlencoded|multipart/form-data|text/xml|application/xml|application/soap+xml|application/x-amf|application/json|application/octet-stream|text/plain'"
# Allowed HTTP versions.
# Default: HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
# Example for legacy clients: HTTP/0.9 HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
# Note that some web server versions use 'HTTP/2', some 'HTTP/2.0', so
# we include both version strings by default.
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900230,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'"
# Forbidden file extensions.
# Guards against unintended exposure of development/configuration files.
# Default: .asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/
# Example: .bak/ .config/ .conf/ .db/ .ini/ .log/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .sql/
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900240,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'"
# Forbidden request headers.
# Header names should be lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
# Blocking Proxy header prevents 'httpoxy' vulnerability: https://httpoxy.org
# Default: /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /translate/ /if/
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900250,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /translate/ /if/'"
# File extensions considered static files.
# Extensions include the dot, lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
# Used in DoS protection rule. See section "Anti-Automation / DoS Protection".
# Default: /.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900260,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:'tx.static_extensions=/.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/'"
#
# -- [[ HTTP Argument/Upload Limits ]] -----------------------------------------
#
# Here you can define optional limits on HTTP get/post parameters and uploads.
# This can help to prevent application specific DoS attacks.
#
# These values are checked in REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf.
# Beware of blocking legitimate traffic when enabling these limits.
#
# Block request if number of arguments is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 255
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900300,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.max_num_args=255"
# Block request if the length of any argument name is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 100
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900310,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.arg_name_length=100"
# Block request if the length of any argument value is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 400
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900320,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.arg_length=400"
# Block request if the total length of all combined arguments is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 64000
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900330,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.total_arg_length=64000"
# Block request if the file size of any individual uploaded file is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 1048576
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900340,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.max_file_size=1048576"
# Block request if the total size of all combined uploaded files is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 1048576
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900350,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.combined_file_sizes=1048576"
#
# -- [[ Easing In / Sampling Percentage ]] -------------------------------------
#
# Adding the Core Rule Set to an existing productive site can lead to false
# positives, unexpected performance issues and other undesired side effects.
#
# It can be beneficial to test the water first by enabling the CRS for a
# limited number of requests only and then, when you have solved the issues (if
# any) and you have confidence in the setup, to raise the ratio of requests
# being sent into the ruleset.
#
# Adjust the percentage of requests that are funnelled into the Core Rules by
# setting TX.sampling_percentage below. The default is 100, meaning that every
# request gets checked by the CRS. The selection of requests, which are going
# to be checked, is based on a pseudo random number generated by ModSecurity.
#
# If a request is allowed to pass without being checked by the CRS, there is no
# entry in the audit log (for performance reasons), but an error log entry is
# written. If you want to disable the error log entry, then issue the
# following directive somewhere after the inclusion of the CRS
# (E.g., RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf).
#
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 901150 "nolog"
#
# ATTENTION: If this TX.sampling_percentage is below 100, then some of the
# requests will bypass the Core Rules completely and you lose the ability to
# protect your service with ModSecurity.
#
# Uncomment this rule to enable this feature:
#
#SecAction "id:900400,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.sampling_percentage=100"
#
# -- [[ Project Honey Pot HTTP Blacklist ]] ------------------------------------
#
# Optionally, you can check the client IP address against the Project Honey Pot
# HTTPBL (dnsbl.httpbl.org). In order to use this, you need to register to get a
# free API key. Set it here with SecHttpBlKey.
#
# Project Honeypot returns multiple different malicious IP types.
# You may specify which you want to block by enabling or disabling them below.
#
# Ref: https://www.projecthoneypot.org/httpbl.php
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecHttpBlKey
#
# Uncomment these rules to use this feature:
#
#SecHttpBlKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
#SecAction "id:900500,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.block_search_ip=1,\
# setvar:tx.block_suspicious_ip=1,\
# setvar:tx.block_harvester_ip=1,\
# setvar:tx.block_spammer_ip=1"
#
# -- [[ GeoIP Database ]] ------------------------------------------------------
#
# There are some rulesets that inspect geolocation data of the client IP address
# (geoLookup). The CRS uses geoLookup to implement optional country blocking.
#
# To use geolocation, we make use of the MaxMind GeoIP database.
# This database is not included with the CRS and must be downloaded.
# You should also update the database regularly, for instance every month.
# The CRS contains a tool to download it to util/geo-location/GeoIP.dat:
# util/upgrade.py --geoip
#
# This product includes GeoLite data created by MaxMind, available from:
# http://www.maxmind.com.
#
# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/10/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-geolocation-data.html
# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/11/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-ip-forensics.html
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecGeoLookupDB util/geo-location/GeoIP.dat
#
# -=[ Block Countries ]=-
#
# Rules in the IP Reputation file can check the client against a list of high
# risk country codes. These countries have to be defined in the variable
# tx.high_risk_country_codes via their ISO 3166 two-letter country code:
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2#Officially_assigned_code_elements
#
# If you are sure that you are not getting any legitimate requests from a given
# country, then you can disable all access from that country via this variable.
# The rule performing the test has the rule id 910100.
#
# This rule requires SecGeoLookupDB to be enabled and the GeoIP database to be
# downloaded (see the section "GeoIP Database" above.)
#
# By default, the list is empty. A list used by some sites was the following:
# setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes=UA ID YU LT EG RO BG TR RU PK MY CN'"
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900600,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes='"
#
# -- [[ Anti-Automation / DoS Protection ]] ------------------------------------
#
# Optional DoS protection against clients making requests too quickly.
#
# When a client is making more than 100 requests (excluding static files) within
# 60 seconds, this is considered a 'burst'. After two bursts, the client is
# blocked for 600 seconds.
#
# Requests to static files are not counted towards DoS; they are listed in the
# 'tx.static_extensions' setting, which you can change in this file (see
# section "HTTP Policy Settings").
#
# For a detailed description, see rule file REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf.
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900700,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:'tx.dos_burst_time_slice=60',\
# setvar:'tx.dos_counter_threshold=100',\
# setvar:'tx.dos_block_timeout=600'"
#
# -- [[ Check UTF-8 encoding ]] ------------------------------------------------
#
# The CRS can optionally check request contents for invalid UTF-8 encoding.
# We only want to apply this check if UTF-8 encoding is actually used by the
# site; otherwise it will result in false positives.
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900950,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=1"
#
# -- [[ Blocking Based on IP Reputation ]] ------------------------------------
#
# Blocking based on reputation is permanent in the CRS. Unlike other rules,
# which look at the indvidual request, the blocking of IPs is based on
# a persistent record in the IP collection, which remains active for a
# certain amount of time.
#
# There are two ways an individual client can become flagged for blocking:
# - External information (RBL, GeoIP, etc.)
# - Internal information (Core Rules)
#
# The record in the IP collection carries a flag, which tags requests from
# individual clients with a flag named IP.reput_block_flag.
# But the flag alone is not enough to have a client blocked. There is also
# a global switch named tx.do_reput_block. This is off by default. If you set
# it to 1 (=On), requests from clients with the IP.reput_block_flag will
# be blocked for a certain duration.
#
# Variables
# ip.reput_block_flag Blocking flag for the IP collection record
# ip.reput_block_reason Reason (= rule message) that caused to blocking flag
# tx.do_reput_block Switch deciding if we really block based on flag
# tx.reput_block_duration Setting to define the duration of a block
#
# It may be important to know, that all the other core rules are skipped for
# requests, when it is clear that they carry the blocking flag in question.
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900960,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.do_reput_block=1"
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the blocking time:
# Default: 300 (5 minutes)
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900970,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# setvar:tx.reput_block_duration=300"
#
# -- [[ Collection timeout ]] --------------------------------------------------
#
# Set the SecCollectionTimeout directive from the ModSecurity default (1 hour)
# to a lower setting which is appropriate to most sites.
# This increases performance by cleaning out stale collection (block) entries.
#
# This value should be greater than or equal to:
# tx.reput_block_duration (see section "Blocking Based on IP Reputation") and
# tx.dos_block_timeout (see section "Anti-Automation / DoS Protection").
#
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecCollectionTimeout
# Please keep this directive uncommented.
# Default: 600 (10 minutes)
SecCollectionTimeout 600
#
# -- [[ Debug Mode ]] ----------------------------------------------------------
#
# To enable rule development and debugging, CRS has an optional debug mode
# that does not block a request, but instead sends detection information
# back to the HTTP client.
#
# This functionality is currently only supported with the Apache web server.
# The Apache mod_headers module is required.
#
# In debug mode, the webserver inserts "X-WAF-Events" / "X-WAF-Score"
# response headers whenever a debug client makes a request. Example:
#
# # curl -v 'http://192.168.1.100/?foo=../etc/passwd'
# X-WAF-Events: TX:930110-OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/DIR_TRAVERSAL-REQUEST_URI,
# TX:930120-OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/FILE_INJECTION-ARGS:foo,
# TX:932160-OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/RCE-ARGS:foo
# X-WAF-Score: Total=15; sqli=0; xss=0; rfi=0; lfi=10; rce=5; php=0; http=0; ses=0
#
# To enable debug mode, include the RESPONSE-981-DEBUG.conf file.
# This file resides in a separate folder, as it is not compatible with
# nginx and IIS.
#
# You must specify the source IP address/network where you will be running the
# tests from. The source IP will BYPASS all CRS blocking, and will be sent the
# response headers as specified above. Be careful to only list your private
# IP addresses/networks here.
#
# Tip: for regression testing of CRS or your own ModSecurity rules, you may
# be interested in using the OWASP CRS regression testing suite instead.
# View the file util/regression-tests/README for more information.
#
# Uncomment these rules, filling in your CRS path and the source IP address,
# to enable debug mode:
#
#Include /path/to/crs/util/debug/RESPONSE-981-DEBUG.conf
#SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.1.100" \
# "id:900980,\
# phase:1,\
# nolog,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# ctl:ruleEngine=DetectionOnly,\
# setvar:tx.crs_debug_mode=1"
#
# -- [[ End of setup ]] --------------------------------------------------------
#
# The CRS checks the tx.crs_setup_version variable to ensure that the setup
# has been loaded. If you are not planning to use this setup template,
# you must manually set the tx.crs_setup_version variable before including
# the CRS rules/* files.
#
# The variable is a numerical representation of the CRS version number.
# E.g., v3.0.0 is represented as 300.
#
SecAction \
"id:900990,\
phase:1,\
nolog,\
pass,\
t:none,\
setvar:tx.crs_setup_version=302"
Any log files I can check?
Regards! Jack Yao
Hi,
I have encountered an issue with modsecurity v3.0.2 that the JSON request body processor is not working for "application/json" request. The JSON arguments are not parsed and the security rules didn't work.
i.e. `POST /odatd/api/xxxxx HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.58.93.242 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0 Accept: application/json Accept-Language: en-US Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br MaxDataServiceVersion: 2.0 DataServiceVersion: 2.0 x-http-method: MERGE Content-Type: application/json
{"status":""} `
The status argument is not inspected.
I enabled it in my modsecurity.conf:
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx (?:application/json)" \ "id:914310,\ phase:1,\ pass,\ log,\ noauditlog,\ msg:'Enabling JSON body processor for Content-Type %{MATCHED_VAR}',\ tag:'application-multi',\ tag:'platform-multi',\ tag:'attack-file-upload',\ tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/MALICIOUS_FILE',\ tag:'paranoia-level/3',\ ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON,\ ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.0.2'"
However, the OWASP CRS is not blocking the requet for ARG status.Regard! Jack Yao