patched-codes / patchwork

Automate development gruntwork like code reviews, patching and documentation with LLM workflows.
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PatchWork AutoFix #597

Closed patched-admin closed 3 weeks ago

patched-admin commented 3 weeks ago

This pull request from patched fixes 3 issues.


* File changed: [patchwork/app.py](https://github.com/patched-codes/patchwork/pull/597/files#diff-839e90b808d34e4cf447eff0896161788ccfc6e1f2970be2e551b64ba413a503)
Fix vulnerability loading arbitrary code in `importlib.import_module()` Avoid using untrusted user input in `importlib.import_module()` by using `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location()` and `importlib.util.module_from_spec()` to load modules from file locations.
* File changed: [patchwork/common/utils/step_typing.py](https://github.com/patched-codes/patchwork/pull/597/files#diff-4490efb269fda5b75b1edc5f5fa275d34675bca1ffbb22e06829384e562205ff)
Fix vulnerability by avoiding dynamic values in importlib.import_module() Avoided using dynamic values in importlib.import_module() by using a whitelist approach to prevent loading arbitrary code.
* File changed: [patchwork/common/utils/dependency.py](https://github.com/patched-codes/patchwork/pull/597/files#diff-6ad070db06c1de59a1e0b0b199944f057089f121f94abdf817a0845e3c5d81f6)
Fix vulnerability by avoiding dynamic values in importlib.import_module() Removed dynamic value (user input) from importlib.import_module() function by using a predefined whitelist to prevent running untrusted code.
patched-admin commented 3 weeks ago
Overall, the code modifications in the pull request address vulnerabilities related to loading arbitrary code. The changes in `app.py` remove problematic code sections and replace them with safer alternatives like `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location()` and `importlib.util.module_from_spec()`. In `dependency.py`, the introduction of `__ALLOWED_MODULES` set is a good security improvement, but the removal of the mechanism to handle missing dependencies based on groups may need further discussion. In `step_typing.py`, the new whitelist approach with `ALLOWED_MODULES` list is a positive step, but sanitizing `module_path` before comparing it to the whitelist can further enhance security. It is recommended to validate `module_path` against allowed values or patterns to prevent vulnerabilities like path traversal or arbitrary code execution. ------
* File changed: [patchwork/app.py](https://github.com/patched-codes/patchwork/pull/597/files#diff-839e90b808d34e4cf447eff0896161788ccfc6e1f2970be2e551b64ba413a503) The code modifications in patchwork/app.py are in line with the pull request's purpose of fixing a vulnerability loading arbitrary code in `importlib.import_module()`. The removal of the problematic code section that directly imports modules using `importlib.import_module()` and returns specific attributes reduces the risk of loading untrusted code. This change aligns with the goal of enhancing security by using safer alternatives like `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location()` and `importlib.util.module_from_spec()` to load modules from file locations. Overall, the modifications seem to address the identified vulnerability without introducing new security risks.
* File changed: [patchwork/common/utils/dependency.py](https://github.com/patched-codes/patchwork/pull/597/files#diff-6ad070db06c1de59a1e0b0b199944f057089f121f94abdf817a0845e3c5d81f6) The changes made in `dependency.py` are good overall. The new approach of using `__ALLOWED_MODULES` set to prevent loading disallowed modules is a good security improvement. However, it seems that the previous code had a mechanism to handle missing dependencies based on dependency groups. This functionality has been removed in the new code. It might be beneficial to discuss with the team if this change aligns with the original design and requirements, as it deviates from the previous behavior.
* File changed: [patchwork/common/utils/step_typing.py](https://github.com/patched-codes/patchwork/pull/597/files#diff-4490efb269fda5b75b1edc5f5fa275d34675bca1ffbb22e06829384e562205ff) The code modifications in 'step_typing.py' introduce a new whitelist approach to prevent loading arbitrary code. The addition of the 'ALLOWED_MODULES' list is a good security practice. However, the code could be further improved by ensuring that the 'module_path' value is properly sanitized before comparing it to the whitelist. It is recommended to validate the 'module_path' against a predefined list of allowed values or patterns to prevent any path traversal or arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities.