Open paul-crowe opened 1 year ago
Summary: Not enough work has gone into analyzing the case for prioritizing AI. Existing published arguments may be less convincing than people assume.
Date: 9th Feb 2019
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Summary: "I would like to see more humility from people involved in effective altruism regarding metaethics, or at least better explanations for why EAs' metaethical positions are what they are. [...] More broadly, I think that rather than having a 'lying problem,' EA has an 'epistemic humility problem' -- both around philosophical questions and around empirical ones, and on both the community level and the individual level."
Date: 2nd Jul 2017
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Public responses: Overlaps with "Over-confident".
Summary: Current ways of talking about existential risk and longterm goals focuses far too much on transhumanism, utilitarianism, and strong longtermism; and thus does not take into account that most people do not subscribe to the full forms of those beliefs. Thus we should, roughly, (1) separate the study of existential risks from moral theory about what to do about it (see page 12/13), and (2) We should have democratic ways of discussing these problems (existential risk, and longterm goals) and how to approach them in order to avoid it being controlled primarily by those that hold those sets of beliefs.
Date: 28th Dec 2021
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Summary: As listed
Date: 2nd Dec 2013
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Summary: "Above all, don’t ask what to believe—ask what to anticipate. Every question of belief should flow from a question of anticipation, and that question of anticipation should be the center of the inquiry. " Ensuring you have a complete mental model of your beliefs by testing what you would expect to see happen, or develop from a given situation. Where do those anticipations come from and what are they based on?
Date: 29th Jul 2007
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Summary: "According to the public writing I found, value-alignment could mean any of the following: supporting and spreading EA, having shared worldviews, focussing on the most important problems or doing the most high-value thing. Importantly, not being value-aligned is seen as having downsides: it can dilute, simplify or lead to wrong prioritisation. It is probably in the interest of EA to have a more concise definition of value-alignment. "
Date: 7th Feb 2017
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