Founding members should have no special for-life voting privileges

[ripper234]

I believe founding members should either have:

1. A limited term, and the board should have the ability to remove them.
2. Or, they title should be honorary but shouldn't come with any special voting privileges.

Founding members, while honored, are not 'benevolent dictators for life', and any special power they have over the Foundation's decisions should be up for a normal voting process.

If there is consensus on the idea, I can work on a pull request that codifies this.

[ripper234]

To expand: IMO it is not right that founding members have lifetime membership, and that membership actually has power over board decisions. E.g. Mt. Gox / Mark Karpeles had a membership and there was nothing the board could do to remove him. Thankfully he willfully resigned.

The governance of the Foundation should be democratic. If anyone is given a position for life, that position should be a purely honorary one with no voting / decision power.

[bg002h]

They gotta pay yearly at 4x the annual member rate. The idea behind why founding directors can't oust each other is to prevent a tontine style power grab.

I'm not in favor of giving industry or individual members, as a class, control over the board. I think the current arrangement minimizes founding member "power" but maximizes the ability of the board to avoid deadlock.

Do recall that we added two board seats (to expand the board from 5 to 7 by electing Micky and Elizabeth) primarily to make it easier to achieve quorum. Being a board member is sort of like being elected to jury duty...except you don't have to show up.

[ripper234]

What is the reasoning behind giving any privileges 'for life' to founding members?

[vessenes]

Just a note, any board member can be removed without cause by a 2/3 board vote. With cause 50%. So, Mark was definitely removable as a board member by a simple vote, as is any board member, including me. I believe the same could be done by 2/3 vote of the board inre: any founding member by rewriting the bylaws, but I'm not certain.

The intended dynamic is that if the board can't or won't work with someone they can essentially send them back to the member class and say "send us another". I think this helps preserve the voice of the different member classes at the same time as giving the board some flexibility as to choosing a good working group.

We have been talking at length about how to adjust the founding member status, for a variety of reasons. My thinking in creating it at launch is that I consider organizations to do better if there is a way to guarantee some continuity of vision and perspective with the founders. (See this article for some thoughts on this matter: http://www.bhorowitz.com/why_we_prefer_founding_ceos).

As an example now, if Gavin and I leave, there will be nobody on the board who has been with the Foundation even through its brief history. There are always reasons, mistakes, opportunities missed and taken, and I think it's best for an organization to be able to capture that knowledge as it grows and changes. Giving the founding members a chance to nominate someone they feel can hold and carry forward the vision and intent of the Foundation is one way to try and capture that benefit in a non-profit structure.

Anyway, I would love some constructive feedback on how to achieve this goal in a way that makes for good governance at the same time. As always, I'm just talking for me here, I don't really think anyone knows where the board as a whole is at inre: founding members, but we are definitely in conversation on it. For myself, I haven't heard a concrete proposal that's definitely better than what we've got.

[ripper234]

I get what you're saying about the founders keeping the original ethos. Still, I think that the current status where Founding Members are privileged for life is too unhealthy.

So, my suggestion is to abolish board seats for Founding Members, and have you and Gavin run for the same board seats as other Individual Members run for. If you do a good job, you will be re-elected ... it's as simple as that. Would love to hear feedback about this from other board members and especially @gavinandresen.

[gavinandresen]

My current favorite idea is to replace the Founding Member seat with somebody appointed by the Individual and Industry Board members.

I don't really care about the details (appointed by outgoing Board or incoming Board? Term? etc); as Peter said, bad board members can pretty easily be voted out by the rest of the Board.

But why do you care what I think? I'm not an expert on effective non-profit international organizational structure...

[ripper234]

Heh, I care what you think just because of the respect I have for you, and you being the other Founding board member...

So, what are the next steps? Will you discuss this at your next board meeting? Should I/the community formalize a pull request that follows what Gavin proposed here?

[pmlaw]

Two ideas that have been proposed to the Board thus far are:

1) I proposed weighted voting between Industry and Individual classes. 2) Jon proposed making this a Local Chapter seat. The local chapters would each get one vote to elect their own representative to the Board.

I'm open to any new thoughts but those are the two best proposals in my mind. I actually slightly prefer Jon's proposal to give the Local Chapter's a seat on the Board.

As to process. Someone needs to issue a pull request - I can do that, or Peter or you. Happy to help draft the language if we settle in on a specific proposal that makes sense.

[ripper234]

I think this makes a lot of sense, and see you have put a lot of thought into this. I'd love to see a pull request from you on this.

Just to refocus on this specific issue - so while adding voting rights / board seats for local chapters, do you plan to remove the voting rights / board seats of founding members?

Again the gist of this issue is my assertion that nobody should receive actual voting power "for life", but rather everybody and anybody should be up for re-election in some format.

[pmlaw]

Thanks, my suggestion is that either of those two options would replace the Founding Members seat.

Having a Founding Members seat made sense when we started and things were small and uncertain, I don't think it makes sense today - my personal opinion.

I'd like to get some more community input on whether option 1 or 2 is best before we pick one and start drafting.

[bg002h]

I like option 2 for now. Local chapters eventually should have a non-ceremonial board representation, though, don't you think?

[ripper234]

It's a bit hard for me to make an intelligent comment on chapters, as I'm not privy to all the information (See also #11 and #12 ). I am hoping this will change in the near future and am looking forward to establishing a dialog about this.

[exiledsurfer]

I've posted this thread to the foundation's forums, where this issue has also had some discussion. https://bitcoinfoundation.org/forum/index.php?/topic/988-what-should-founding-members-voting-privileges-be/

[jonmatonis]

If the founding member voting rights are going to be altered at all, two proposals that I could endorse are:

1. International affiliate chapters would nominate and elect someone from an existing nonprofit affiliate board to represent them on the Bitcoin Foundation board (as international affiliate chapters become a larger part of the overall foundation, this number could be increased over time);
2. The existing board would nominate, vet, and appoint anyone from the private or public sector to serve on the Bitcoin Foundation board (this could give rise to superstar appointments from outside the traditional bitcoin community).

[ripper234]

The second proposal is interesting. Do you have some candidates in mind?

On Thu, Jun 5, 2014 at 10:52 AM, jonmatonis notifications@github.com wrote:

If the founding member voting rights are going to be altered at all, two proposals that I could endorse are:

1.

International affiliate chapters would nominate and elect someone from an existing nonprofit affiliate board to represent them on the Bitcoin Foundation board (as international affiliate chapters become a larger part of the overall foundation, this number could be increased over time); 2.

The existing board would nominate, vet, and appoint anyone from the private or public sector to serve on the Bitcoin Foundation board (this could give rise to superstar appointments from outside the traditional bitcoin community).

— Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub https://github.com/pmlaw/The-Bitcoin-Foundation-Legal-Repo/issues/10#issuecomment-45190705 .

Ron Gross Executive Director, Mastercoin Foundation mastercoin.org | ripper234.com | ripper234 on skype (Inbox non Zero http://ripper234.com/p/how-i-learned-to-let-go-of-inbox-zero/) Schedule my time at meetme.so/RonGross

[exiledsurfer]

I think that expanding the current US centric makeup of the board to include a board position representing the global affiliate chapters (we currently have five, and the goal is to expand that to 18 by the end of 2014) Is the far more interesting and useful proposal of Jon Matonis' ... being more inclusive and representative of the foundation's expanding, GLOBAL constituency.

[ripper234]

Oh don't get me wrong, I like option one as well! (Especially as someone representing the Israeli Bitocin Association who are interested in the possibility of joining in 2014).

[ABISprotocol]

There is no sanity in processes where person intend or propose to implement systems of voting and representation as somehow embedded in or tied to a completely decentralized protocol or framework. The portion of the original proposal by @ripper234 which suggested that founding members have no voting privileges was a good one, but I would go a step further. Remove the concept of voting entirely from the system under review, which in this case is the Bitcoin Foundation Legal repo showing bylaws of the Foundation. It should be painfully obvious that the distinctions currently evident in the Foundation, such as the voting preferences given to Industry members in exchange for their payment of high membership sums, are antithetical to the decentralized nature of the Bitcoin network, and thus, it would be my preference to see no voting whatsoever (rather, roles and decisions about where to direct funds would be determined equally by all members). I wish to emphasize this would not be voting, but ideally I envision this as a greater form of decentralized participation that does not imply that one is using a "vote" to delegate or imbue a certain type of agency (let us say, "representation") with a small number of persons. Rather, any number of forms of participation could potentially aid the network as well as determine what resources are used for, in a dynamic and constantly changing manner. This would then result in other questions about what the purpose of the Foundation is (and what it should be), and that is well and good.

I realize this may be a bit much for the Foundation Board to absorb, and it is unlikely that Industry members will change as a group and decide that their voices should be considered as equal along with all other members of the Foundation. Therefore, I propose a three-step process.

1) Implement at least part of what @ripper234 has proposed, in particular: Founding members will have no special voting privileges, nothing distinct from any individual member. Make that a pull request or part of it.

2) After this pull request has been approved, another should be submitted that would level the playing field for all voters, such that regardless of one's membership, no special voting privileges exist for anyone in the Foundation. To the extent votes are held, all members would be able to vote just as any other member would.

3) Once these pull requests have been made and approved along with whatever Board action and member discussions ensue, another pull request should be made to remove all voting processes involved with the Foundation and to decentralize functions of the Board, which could be done by anyone making a pull request within the context of this repository. Such a pull request should come with suggestions for how members would make funding decisions in a decentralized framework, perhaps with discussion of concepts such as: lighthouse, WhisperSystems/bithub, sx tools, and similar concepts. Similarly, additional ideas for decentralized participation could be added to the pull request.

brief edit, note: see also issue relating to some forms of decentralized participation in bitcoin repository.

[mwbitcoin]

As we expand the International Affiliate program over the next 18 months, it's important that "they" as a group have a voice on the board. I strongly suggest the recommendation from Jon Matonis #1 "International affiliate chapters would nominate and elect someone from an existing nonprofit affiliate board to represent them on the Bitcoin Foundation board" as the first move.

[pmlaw]

I'm going to leave this issue open for another week from Monday and will then draft some language for a pull request based on the consensus here. I'll submit the pull request and we can debate the merits of the specific proposed language for 1-2 weeks before going to the Board for a vote in July.

[ABISprotocol]

@pmlaw ~ I don't believe there is a clear consensus here at all. However, I did observe that the author of the issue, @ripper234, stated, "If there is consensus on the idea, I can work on a pull request that codifies this." This statement was made in reference to the following concept as elucidated in open issue as follows: (@ripper234:) "I believe founding members should either have:

A limited term, and the board should have the ability to remove them.
Or, they title should be honorary but shouldn't come with any special voting privileges.

Founding members, while honored, are not 'benevolent dictators for life', and any special power they have over the Foundation's decisions should be up for a normal voting process."

Clearly, there is not consensus on this idea.

It is my feeling that this issue should be left open for longer than a week from Monday to allow for a greater breadth of community input on the subject, since this seems like a significant move that needs more than just a few people here weighing in.

Furthermore, the opinions on the subject here seem to have been varied as follows:

@bg002h: "not in favor of giving industry or individual members, as a class, control over the board." @vessenes: "I haven't heard a concrete proposal that's definitely better than what we've got." @ripper234: "abolish board seats for Founding Members" @gavinandresen: "replace the Founding Member seat with somebody appointed by the Individual and Industry Board members." @pmlaw: "weighted voting between Industry and Individual classes." (...) "(or) Local Chapter" @jonmatonis: "(International affiliate chapters would) nominate and elect someone from an existing nonprofit affiliate board" (or) "existing board would nominate, vet, and appoint anyone from the private or public sector to serve on the Bitcoin Foundation board" @exiledsurfer: "board position representing the global affiliate chapters" @mwbitcoin: "International Affiliate(s)...as a group have a voice on the board" (....) "International affiliate chapters would nominate and elect someone from an existing nonprofit affiliate board to represent them on the Bitcoin Foundation board" @ABISprotocol (myself): "Implement at least part of what @ripper234 has proposed, in particular: Founding members will have no special voting privileges, nothing distinct from any individual member. Make that a pull request or part of it." (and other steps as shown above)

There is no clear consensus. this should be floated to various fora including bitcointalk and various other fora, I'd like to see more time and other github users' opinions on the various options floated above... thank you.

Final note: I should point out that this really has to do with "equal rights" in the bitcoin sphere. Those of you who are still arguing for a separate form of rights for industry members or founding members or anyone who pays more would do well to remember the civil rights movement of the mid-1950s through the 1960s in the United States of America, the Campaign for Social Justice and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in the mid-1960s in the Northern Ireland, and other similar movements. I firmly feel that eventually the bitcoin and decentralized movements will transcend the antiquated notions of representation, but initially a struggle observed here will be for one of equality in terms of how people are able to have their voices heard, and that appears to be a first step in this process. Frankly I think that decentralized technologies will (rather soon) overcome the limitations inherent in cultures which rely upon voting and representation (without a great deal of organized human effort). Many who are reading these remarks already are aware of the significance of this, in any event, decentralization has already made any efforts to create distinct classes of persons (whether in terms of voting or in other fora or arenas) largely pointless, as the mechanisms already exist to provide methods for equalization through exponentially increasing forms of participation, and as time goes on such methods and opportunities will grow.

                                                                   ~~~

[ripper234]

+1 for leaving the issue open until it is resolved. Thanks @ABISprotocol

[nwfella]

1 membership = 1 vote

Lifetime membership for founding members...no way!!

[sosojni]

There is nothing for lifetime except BTC in your wallet. I 100% agree with OP

[mdhaze]

Although on first glance, expanding the board to include "an international member" looks and sounds good, I believe it has significant and fatal flaws.

Here is why. Recently, chapters have set up in various other countries, this is a trend that will continue as people seek to "join something" or "do something" regarding bitcoin. These will become quite diverse.

The argument for a seat and thus a voice for international is that TBF is US Centric. In fact, placing one seat there for "International" solidifies and fossilizes US Centricity, making it reality, instead of opinion, and making it at least semi permanent, instead of transitory. Members could easily vote the "token foreigner" into that board seat, then relapse to voting US citizens into all others. Seems a bit weird, right?

Obviously the international usage community grows without regard to that one seat, and if and when it reaches a significant voting fraction it can install board members without any need for special status. And international chapters of sufficient size could not care less about one seat on the board of a group in another country.

In summary, the idea of a special designated seat for "International" or "Local chapters" may be said to have purpose. But no meaning.

[mdhaze]

Here I comment on founders, industry and individual members. Experience with other non profits, some in trades and industry, indicates to me that industry members do tend over time to wind up on the boards, as they have economic interests in guiding the industry. Thus it is simply not necessary to fractionate a board into industry and individual.

Regarding "Founding members", there is a valid argument for their being around in some capacity (advisory, continuity of historical purpose and so forth) with one exception, Satoshi. Any actual position capable of voting and influencing direction comes with benefits and liabilities, and no person should be designated in such position without his explicit consent. That may even lean in the direction of evidence for a "mal formed board". Need to clarify explicitly Satoshi's honorary status.

Personally I am of the opinion that one class of board member would serve satisfactorily. Further that an executive director of the Foundation should be by virtual of that status a board member, but should vote only in the case of a tie.

There is no solution to the "problem of a tie" in voting except to have a designated member of the Board, either the Chairman, or as mentioned an Executive Director, who votes only in the case of a tie.

[mwbitcoin]

@mdhaze. This is the first logical step, a board seat representing local chapters. I agree with you, the trend will continue to encourage individuals and businesses to "join something" which will continue to create a diverse group. As we bring on more partners "local chapters" the need for greater representation will be necessary and the program will evolve naturally. It can only get more diverse and less US centric, so I disagree.

I hope to see "local chapters" create a strong independent voice, so it absolutely has meaning and purpose.

[pmlaw]

Since some people on here expressed concern about closing this issue prematurely, let's keep this open for at least another week.

[mdhaze]

@mwbitcoin. Thank you for your response. No question that decades ago, the introduction of "token blacks" or "token women" into boards and/or executive position had social benefits, and was viewed as a solution, rather than evidence of the problem.

I can make a convincing argument against fractionating the board into subgroups, one variety of which is the token member for local/international chapters. Just as convincingly, you can make an argument for the benefits of such an action.

In such a case, one of the two paths may be better, but one does not know and cannot predict when or to what degree....that is the nature of a decision for which the simplest possible action should be considered the best, instead of the more complex.

For this reason I advocate one class of board member only, no industry or founder, doing away with special privileges for any board member, and limited terms. I also believe in constructing some method of retaining the vision and continuity of the founders. Several options on that are plausible.

[mwbitcoin]

And the worse decision is no decision. As we move to strengthen the organization, improve structure, process and reputation, action is what we need, knowing that things are evolving at warp speed and that we focus on the continuous improvement.

[mdhaze]

@mwbitcoin My position, note, doesn't exactly exclude yours. Here it is:

Best - one class of members, all exactly the same. Better - eliminate industry Good - eliminate founders

Can you summarize yours?

[ABISprotocol]

My position, shortened and truncated:

Support the positions (as expressed above) of @nwfella and @ripper234.
Support the position (as expressed above) of @mdhaze within the context of proposed 'Best' as shown above.

Best initial step is equality of voice irrespective of current notions of classes (as described above). My additional recommendation shown above as Item No. 3 of my initial comment would be a different pull request for another time.

[David-R-Allen]

Best - one class of members, all exactly the same.

I have been suggesting this for months as ALL board members are individuals representing all other individuals, not corporate interests, which in the case of Bitcoin related businesses cannot be segregated outside of "I am my own bank" regardless of pressure to conform from the historical failed banking model.

[bg002h]

If we do go to one membership class, that will effectively disenfranchise the industry members. That is, the roughly 100 industry votes will get lumped in the with roughly 1000 individual votes; we might as well eliminate the industry members entirely and give them their money back (despite the fact they provide most of the funds to run the organization).

Simple numbers and finances aside, the interests of industry members and individual members are different but both very important to increased adoption of Bitcoin. I take as an axiom that one of the Foundation's goals is to increase user adoption, but, that's up for debate. Anyhow, I think a compromise between industry and individual interests is the best path forward.

In my mind, the only question is: "How do we break a dead-lock between the individual and industry members?" The founding member class serves that function, but a lot of solutions to deadlock resolution could be implemented (ie flip a coin, additional board member, etc)

[ripper234]

I think that this discussion has spun off and is quite interesting. However, please all note the title of this issue - "Founding members should have no special for-life voting privileges".

Let's KISS and focus on that issue first. There were some proposal given in the above log, I suggest we discuss them in isolation - we can take the larger question to the forums / another issue.

On Tue, Jun 24, 2014 at 3:47 PM, Brian Goss notifications@github.com wrote:

If we do go to one membership class, that will effectively disenfranchise the industry members. That is, the roughly 100 industry votes will get lumped in the with roughly 1000 individual votes; we might as well eliminate the industry members entirely and give them their money back (despite the fact they provide most of the funds to run the organization).

Simple numbers and finances aside, the interests of industry members and individual members are different but both very important to increased adoption of Bitcoin. I take as an axiom that one of the Foundation's goals is to increase user adoption, but, that's up for debate. Anyhow, I think a compromise between industry and individual interests is the best path forward.

In

— Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub https://github.com/pmlaw/The-Bitcoin-Foundation-Legal-Repo/issues/10#issuecomment-46966068 .

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[David-R-Allen]

In respect to Ripper234 comment... "Founding members should have no special for-life voting privileges". I am in total agreement.

And further to Brian Goss...(please show me where this thread could be spun so it continues in debate)

It is very difficult to understand where a deadlock could even take place with the current board. The recently posted minutes do not give any insight into where conflict might arise.

The question is not the categories, but the voting value of each.

As for the BF finances, those that pay a higher premium choose to, and their additional benefits are minimal. If an industry membership category makes industry members happy, then continue as is but separating the voting for the two classes doses not add value to the organization.

1 class. 1 vote.

[mdhaze]

@bg002h

Brian I suggest phrasing of comments here in such manner as reflects a view on the OP topic.

RE the issue of tie votes, all parlimentary procedure shows that all that is needed is one tie breaker vote which ONLY votes to break a tie. This can be shown mathematically to be true quite easily. There is no justification for a Founders class based on this issue. Since the OP is concerned with "Doing away with founders" I think what you are saying...

SUGGEST including a subparagraph addressing who would be the tie breaking voter.

I'd suggest someone attending the board but not voting. The Executive Director is an obvious choice. In many boards the Chairman of the board only votes to break a tie. Etc.

RE ratios of industry and individual, this is also a non issue. It can easily be shown in trade associations that industry members spontaneously rise to leadership positions on the boards. I guess maybe this might not be immediately obvious, but a little exploration and asking questions will definitely show it. I have been in some and seen this occur.

[bg002h]

@mdhaze and @David-R-Allen See link to the new thread between your two posts above.

[pmlaw]

@bg002h Thanks you for opening issue #15 as this thread has been largely off topic of late. As a reminder, @ripper234 OP asked whether founding members should have:

1) A limited term, and the board should have the ability to remove them. 2) Or, they title should be honorary but shouldn't come with any special voting privileges.

To date the leading proposals (both here and on the BTCF members forum) have been in order:

1) Local Chapter voting to replace the Founder's seat 2) Weighted cross-class voting for the Founder's seat 3) Current board appointing someone to the Founder's seat 4) Do nothing

In any of the first three above proposals, the Founding members would be honorary and not carry special voting privileges.

Let's please keep this thread on topic and responsive to these specific issues and proposed solutions.

[ripper234]

Thsnks Patrick for this summary.

I think that a Founding Member of the Foundation, as an honorary title, is something that can't really be taken away ... Founders Founded the Foundation (no pun intended), and that's a fact. So out of the first two option, my preference would be for:

2) They title should be honorary but shouldn't come with any special voting privileges.

Regarding the choice of implementing this: One additional thing we can do is:

5) Turn all founder board seats into observer roles, and remove any voting privilages, without replacing it with another type of voting/seat. Founding members would be able to run for private/industry seats as usual.

On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 7:55 AM, Patrick Murck notifications@github.com wrote:

@bg002h https://github.com/bg002h Thanks you for opening issue #15 https://github.com/pmlaw/The-Bitcoin-Foundation-Legal-Repo/issues/15 as this thread has been largely off topic of late. As a reminder, @ripper234 https://github.com/ripper234 OP asked whether founding members should have:

1) A limited term, and the board should have the ability to remove them. 2) Or, they title should be honorary but shouldn't come with any special voting privileges.

To date the leading proposals (both here and on the BTCF members forum) have been in order:

1) Local Chapter voting to replace the Founder's seat 2) Weighted cross-class voting for the Founder's seat 3) Current board appointing someone to the Founder's seat 4) Do nothing

In any of the first three above proposals, the Founding members would be honorary and not carry special voting privileges.

Let's please keep this thread on topic and responsive to these specific issues and proposed solutions.

— Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub https://github.com/pmlaw/The-Bitcoin-Foundation-Legal-Repo/issues/10#issuecomment-47060547 .

Ron Gross Executive Director, Mastercoin Foundation mastercoin.org | ripper234.com | ripper234 on skype (Inbox != Zero http://ripper234.com/p/how-i-learned-to-let-go-of-inbox-zero/) | PGP http://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x7468729E28277264 Schedule my time at meetme.so/RonGross Chief Ninja Officer http://www.chiefninjaofficer.com/

[David-R-Allen]

There is something more complete about Option 5 now being presented. Founder respect is held by shifting to an observer role, however democratic equality is also implemented for those founders with more aspirations.

Board criteria would also be applied to Option 5, requiring the same standards for observers as elected board members, as I assume is already the case for the highest industry member category that has observation status.

[mdhaze]

@David-R-Allen I agree with a clarification, allow the founder to run only as an individual. Think about it - a founder is an individual. Also there should not be even a nonvoting founder position for Satoshi. Board positions cannot be simply rammed at someone, they have to agree. This is disrespect, not respect to do this.

[ripper234]

Also there should not be even a nonvoting founder position for Satoshi. Board positions cannot be simply rammed at someone, they have to agree. This is disrespect, not respect to do this.

I completely agree, see #9

[David-R-Allen]

Founder positions removed - Founder must run for individual or industrial board position.

This comment has been updated. June 25, 7:15 PM pst

[ripper234]

To "vote" on removing Satoshi, please do so on #9 and not here to help aggregate the feedback into the right channels.

[mdhaze]

@ripper234 @david-R-Allen I am reversing my prior position after some thinking about it. Founder have...

1. Honorary status for life or until they choose to resign
2. Upon resign from honorary, may run for the board as anyone else, either as industry or individual.

One or the other, not both.

[ripper234]

Well ... founders did found the Foundation. They can't resign from this fact ... it's part of their bio.

[mdhaze]

@ripper234 Maybe I didn't say it well. Here's the two philosophical viewpoints

1. I am here because I founded this and would like to guide the development of this technology (blah blah blah)
2. I am running a company, want to increase it's profits and market share and seek to do that through a board position.

I am not at all opposed to 2, just see it as opposed to 1.

[ABISprotocol]

@pmlaw There's nothing off-topic about the discussion here. It's good to see the twists, turns, and refinements it has taken. That said, I will note that my last comment here was approximately 9 days ago, in sum, "Support the positions (as expressed above) of @nwfella and @ripper234.

Support the position (as expressed above) of @mdhaze within the context of proposed 'Best' as shown above." ('Best' as shown by @mdhaze within the context of that remark was "one class of members, all exactly the same." The remark of @nwfella which I supported was "1 membership = 1 vote (...) Lifetime membership for founding members...no way!!" In particular, my concern was that all members would be treated equally.)

In light of the comments that have been added since then, I add the following additional remarks: As @ripper234 pointed out three days ago, ""Founding members should have no special for-life voting privileges" is the core issue here and should be focused on first. As I suggested in my initial comment here, which was posted 22 days ago, item 1 of my initial comment should be implemented via a pull request, specifically, "1) Implement at least part of what @ripper234 has proposed, in particular: Founding members will have no special voting privileges, nothing distinct from any individual member. Make that a pull request or part of it." My other items, 2 and 3, from my own perspective: made much more sense to defer to another time to open as distinct issues later on.

In other words, focus on @ripper234's core issue here, with my preference also being an inclination or 'languaging' in whatever pull request is developed to favor equality, or at the very least, begin the process of equalization of how members are treated.

I do disagree fundamentally with @bg002h in terms of his statements that "If we do go to one membership class, that will effectively disenfranchise the industry members" and where he adds, "a compromise between industry and individual interests is the best path forward." Such statements are, to put it mildly, unimaginative (in consideration of the many possible outcomes that could emanate from restructuring membership, separation of industry contribution from voting preferences, and so on) and disrespectful of the interests of the many (in light of the obvious bias which seems to flare up here in favor of using income to purchase representation at the expense of many). I am glad to see this discussion appears to be shaking some members of the Foundation loose from the highly problematic position of supporting a 'minicongress' stance. It should go without saying that such position(s) have nothing do do with decentralization or equality, and have much to do with income-based favoritism.

In any event, the fundamental issue is that of @ripper234 which I support and would like to see in a pull request with emphasis on equality in any 'languaging.' Thank you.

[mdhaze]

@jonmatonis

Earlier you wrote....

If the founding member voting rights are going to be altered at all, two proposals that I could endorse are: ......The existing board would nominate, vet, and appoint anyone from the private or public sector to serve on the Bitcoin Foundation board....

I am moderately opposed to the concept of board members picking other board members, this seems rather strange. If so why have voting from individual or industry AT ALL?

I am totally in opposition to the phrase "from the public sector" and request that you clarify this comment if you can. It brings to mind representatives of governments on TBF board and the road to perdition implied therein. Yes there are some who will actually argue otherwise, and likely the only way anyone could make it happen would be by the "board voting them in".

Neither industry nor individual members are in any open election going to vote into the board Government representatives.