Open soatok opened 2 months ago
So the issue is that an attacker could gain information about the real hmac because of the non-constant time comparison, right? I'd guess that this isn't realistic when triggering this remotely via network, but still of course this could be improved.
I didn't find a commonly used constant-time string comparison function in the standard library or QCA. Do you have any recommendations?
And have you considered making a proposal to update the spec?
I didn't find a commonly used constant-time string comparison function in the standard library or QCA. Do you have any recommendations?
And have you considered making a proposal to update the spec?
After the misconduct of one of the spec authors, I'm avoiding talking to them at all. Feel free to suggest it if you think it's a good use of your time.
Originally disclosed here.
https://github.com/qxmpp-project/qxmpp/blob/94232e798de18099322bee71400f246c9193047a/src/omemo/QXmppOmemoManager_p.cpp#L1766
Explainers:
This defect is a problem with the OMEMO specification. It should have called out the specific steps that implementors follow to prevent this sort of side-channel attack.