Thesis: reelection encourages mayors to focus more on policies with the highest “electoral yield”—namely, no delegation of public security provision. Why? No delegation creates a credible signal of a strong type.
-tie to electoral security
-if true what should we expect?
On delegation of public goods:
-why delegate?
Cons:
-cuts autonomy
-cuts credit claiming
-imposes monitoring (so less rents from crime and other things)
-do I see an increase in rents from crime to politicians?
-heterogeneous preferences cannot be addressed
-responsiveness
Pros
-face a high sum cost challenge
Delegation vs responsiveness
Examples
-international delegation: grant authority to international actors
-environment and regulation
-firms to other firms
Electoral delegation leads to provision of public goods
-see page 6 and 7 of milners book delegation and agency in international
-why multilateralism
-delegation to international organizations
-this paper studies delegation and agency within the state. Specifically how reelection incentives affect delegation choices.
-delegation is the granting of authority to other actors, either independent above or below.
**so the big thing is that it increases electoral survival
A. Closer to citizens and follow their mistrust of upper levels of government
B. Control of budget
C. Decrease agency problems
D. Can pursue own interests
E. Credit clame to signal a credible strong hand
Why not delegate: mistrust from upper level governments
Why not delegate: to signal a credible strong hand promise
-non delegation is more likely to enhance credibility
-need municipal measure of trust in mayor
-I can analyze the change in security preferences after the reform: how they change their safety or something
-so variation pretreatment and effect post treatment
-I can also analyze the change in trust for the mayor
-so playing face to seem strong
Delegation and agency within the state
Thesis: reelection encourages mayors to focus more on policies with the highest “electoral yield”—namely, no delegation of public security provision. Why? No delegation creates a credible signal of a strong type.
-tie to electoral security -if true what should we expect?
On delegation of public goods: -why delegate? Cons: -cuts autonomy -cuts credit claiming -imposes monitoring (so less rents from crime and other things) -do I see an increase in rents from crime to politicians? -heterogeneous preferences cannot be addressed -responsiveness
Pros -face a high sum cost challenge
Delegation vs responsiveness
Examples -international delegation: grant authority to international actors -environment and regulation -firms to other firms
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00531.x?casa_token=u09rJsCceH4AAAAA:nOD56YH8VIFaW9s2-8D2xyEi23-sUjD4t6YtMB2RpXdLbFIAthuKSSrANR5wKNAZw8-wNoOFqMExGwU
Public pressure and responsiveness
Centralization
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004727270200141X?casa_token=KVAGXW8dH0kAAAAA:Y64XflIdgpFiEN3clYGqfCqeBW5Hw4zZyJ8L6SSkqkdKl1LMQEE2uYu9M_e1_jZ-xWT48Pin
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2677906.pdf?casa_token=suwT6z5qRZ0AAAAA:7uLB30xlnO_PHWVDxwwUjxsFXDUfXBDYPBZuJQRRjrjCnALJd3UAWh4K8oyw9pfrDmC7Jb_XbEsN0kgupGP5q583pkDYS5EzjL8VNSnkIjwZWQGDS4S1
Electoral security. Explore this mentioned by Mi-Son
Parroquial interests
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272703000641?casa_token=ytHgHSwZ_MEAAAAA:dvsLxujwv6g0Zs2XzrJ1AjLTZuagBUFwQqJyjnJOEh205JetGMyee9YcW3hWEVngbqjWNuU2
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272707000230?casa_token=SOjdW8PaK3IAAAAA:oYJ2kNMIzpmBAAw1Xjyl-5LS16HMM0yOm95-_OOosNPnW0Rrm7HDTG6rPZPEjDgazBu3tIbs
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.235
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387806000381?casa_token=-OUdjBcykf8AAAAA:EMMkUPPX4xY1h5Ufk6BWBfRFMSsO0eRU7yEf9AOjj-IstnoMqE6DTAuBULILe7D2dp1TdMXx
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2601297.pdf?casa_token=bwbKibCTLvAAAAAA:6XOMCIrO2Zp0qonIBlcMxeHEA2t6OnJBQexyO2LWXXGXSRYQslTS-BxPQNOSG-oWMm2VgJEsKKqfU7Kj_-WycUG7qqaayefEPtW1BfHgXgVJ0qmnWLSB -see Milner book page 6. A) information -there shouldn’t be a difference and I don’t see that in the data B) all the things listed in my services list C) distributional concerns: policies reflect major state interests D) resource concerns -but this should be orthogonal to reelection incentives
http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9422.pdf
http://danielnielson.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Lyne-et-al.2006.Who-Delegates.CambridgeUP.pdf
-see page 6 and 7 of milners book delegation and agency in international -why multilateralism -delegation to international organizations -this paper studies delegation and agency within the state. Specifically how reelection incentives affect delegation choices. -delegation is the granting of authority to other actors, either independent above or below.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KTIbxACnMgYC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=info:as-s7f-YuWMJ:scholar.google.com/&ots=BqGCQHQ06b&sig=EWLrdgUNZsxbeqYpv4u7G5gL29M#v=onepage&q&f=false
**so the big thing is that it increases electoral survival A. Closer to citizens and follow their mistrust of upper levels of government B. Control of budget C. Decrease agency problems D. Can pursue own interests E. Credit clame to signal a credible strong hand
http://danielnielson.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Hawkins-et-al.2006.Delegation-Under-Anarchy.pdf
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3117617.pdf?casa_token=Nhar81MqE4YAAAAA:_Hp5TwvKu2KkHQ9Q0lMcMtJvHRspPY0mNqKUQQC393-sBmDUYHLr96soW38-lWiybSClisZ35k_0M9gBh6Lh-R7DjehFDPiaDZZnh6P5TP39pDujxG8Z
-I can analyze the change in security preferences after the reform: how they change their safety or something -so variation pretreatment and effect post treatment -I can also analyze the change in trust for the mayor -so playing face to seem strong
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19842/multi_page.pdf?sequence=1
**delegation is a political choice
Why not delegate? Cannot monitor the agent (agency costs) -this shouldn’t change between those facing reelection and not
Delegation under anarchy states. David Lake
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KTIbxACnMgYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=info:o1P0jvdaqDUJ:scholar.google.com/&ots=BqGCQHR07e&sig=MZajNf2k5aB2yyVfhcn52iNXLCI#v=onepage&q&f=false
**the logic of delegation by mccubbins
Literature on reelection incentives
https://watermark.silverchair.com/rest_a_00182.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAApMwggKPBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKAMIICfAIBADCCAnUGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMEvixVBSUzRlWOSpIAgEQgIICRjMiaBiX-mEbiC1Ir2cHjOyx1tb_mUYSRsucSevHt3ZeBn7CFRdT-Y_cDWHq4r4_J3XJ7IVHlAQMEym3OB_PipJOmBFWXIjOeaiUTG9_Qgs3lP3F7mO0dWtCJzGfjig2xsbYWb6sdwRASMBz2lrMbp-nQvWk2V-_HzTzSI7y__fiSaiFKMVg7oixSRyJa1CgYqcillhDBhj3hHOzaVwXJWXmINFzUWu7oTr1WucPJUf9hFCF7ZK0FoZpoyg6p3cmoBqeLybCCWNl_CqBgSqnmfKw_XVIg6QO_u3GJF9dCACD-ESie0n8IBjTnS2JSqXXqtTnMUh-Hyk8o5UktqW5ibbmWhs2AlEU7ZYebjLobK0bZZ7rQ8_wPV7LaIXAUPOQY5_GRWOEkQzn-DbpPMcrV63P4G-GLSdg1ZHeTzHOpKfnVKqzqxjQWa9rV0K1wqabvOcvgpGWwf072SHa1BCr39LBIWoFEZ41HLqOPmRXesSVuYd4GKUaaEJwBnWQE4l1VNev7actq4zBE1W6hO2bIWbbdEXQlhkmo9W7PNg1YJb4raHsDNhI7zZ5IuVt-1u4dWj4om91i8A8R84oqb7P6vOd5sKzi2SFOQ7Ab_WvLw3ERmX0k4i2rrW7B4ZPrWOq6C7j9ry_jNh_NK8EyPl8wMWzBjnZbMMn9Fofe73lCbVmv3lnvaiLt_CtFB9MnZGMn7VFADww1wcl4Yo1uytWliTu_cbMpCHdP3XyNtoePtoUL5JmIImrEK2tlQo97KFuk0IlHAHkvw
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23469621.pdf?casa_token=9M6OHrpYFnIAAAAA:_-6DAiFZY06Bjf3HPTjBsCOP2xHMK0e1sdCafg9TghtmX05ykc3ICKKO0HhQMwHfuaCOYK0rs_v0f6mhXCl0YuzoAWrkjZ4XoSrLLi0eZzbEy2FCHqkp
Reelection and corruption: ferraz and finan
Reelection incentives and deforestation
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.691.5792&rep=rep1&type=pdf
http://www.andrewbenjaminhall.com/Fouirnaies_Hall_Electoral_Incentives.pdf
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268014001013?casa_token=j9ssr1hkzpgAAAAA:dHjqVp3d6hXT4h6qvXd5R7UdLlWduM-uVH4g0PgDI_ABjjduPoTH724xsY54Qjnm5jrYSeuk
https://watermark.silverchair.com/jvaa055.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAscwggLDBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggK0MIICsAIBADCCAqkGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQM1t7S_YBm7aNpcbAhAgEQgIICek4gy9MBV2lWwHFW2HHNEJzD7GdsQbdscfnI4VkciRho-k4S04rA3lTqJlTt7lf_p_zdXlacnuKGFUUnifjXEJsOKMoOeacKow1Uw2R4bTd1OFi-FyrHui5qoVXhCm5R4sShXj4wddRlmfJ_V-f3gmUy-4kgMD_g1WYM6lImYp0k5Vz5RYDM8ywpvE9LZUfU6qtYHEyPnIdSWyVnbvwxc376jnK7t4VyS33Zcblk1ZKIa90x0tuKrHJKPN8CawgtTKC7r13GT_mt502DZvpGxg680-hsTUBirmGsL-iEFWXwrdOto6zsVWvgLJTXTsF8J6SpfH_Yg64bUoXgQ9hfa2q4E2fZdJzVGJYIfQ22uEroi74ag2MZqyY-PLLL8Xdex9-1MjeHLdiiPGClfIqBMeKM7zQvhkVleAtWF4SAiv0Zvc6boE-at2rQkPCe-xvd3LSZO2J5mufkgLxX7rZZbSGEpLfRpFNOu5YkKa1XI59AhYjY9hFyAQ0MtDpVzW7a7vUHrlYEj-ZTU62daUBe2TiGBQ2-eDsxO3QD67qYsKvpc1dmCMNGNUvCLdY9BZOVIVpajogQMLWdETwy9hECtcThav-0NElrMJu82mTuRxm6_3A1ThV3YTMMlBDLw6k9oFKFGEekYgv5HCj8oyTwPyrAX4RIrMo4WRzzi3zXj-wyYunB7P9BB9skj8i4UjvEG4_ywclFQmFUIw_3IdS2K1tVo5oFnZSRZROaYT6Uie9X0RJoTcZQF8bCkhRVC8PsX0pBPP4zTG5OaJtk1ti_LN7B1yaHd5CRIn-EhICYu-IyimG01GK2gOiuF2VG9-cHyu2AL88zuQjQlHg
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/lsq.12068?casa_token=qNQnY_inNn8AAAAA:dwak7A0dJV2w-M51Hb4Ul0XKWJ8Heo7Sm3pG-gvZYKeiV_HLd-vu1P7VzVKXpTjaSDcsZGbWKOc4IPk -basically the notion that reelection incentives leads to pork barrel
https://watermark.silverchair.com/121-4-1249.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAArcwggKzBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKkMIICoAIBADCCApkGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMnwgRH9Rzb5qVieaWAgEQgIICarkzpq63ceSEKwi3O4BrrES5VLYhso6ooP2lgbyYZlnPZFEi1SkK-DN0fkfMb5OGEhOt5OHkcwzPi4p8hSkKS_dmPNKTPXGu9a-Pp4w9nzS7uEowEopf0sy86ycIeG-t8YVpjRKXcO7ayo62UXNV1S0EAOHWLVerHkAdAG8J0sGMqIWDMa9EzuOov4kMxeAGPOZFwSKHQCZq7NYBuQ8zBPYTIdSkRG-n3YsJvv_gz35oeKVKcu-px_CpLtqNYsW-gf4qPPTyvf4eWffPS6_NognsyjPwVeydXoL6nHqSTIBx11pzY59nqHyksjjwLzY9ckFNi2T_twj2BcZ4HdXTrWUk21AMmfep2gvYO1K-vZ9elnojD4UF5uSNtSZSZwxDniNxJfgFhScpGutA9zhC1uAfX7JQLFRcTSnanBn9lKseevkXrwF1tpKIG4Eb8gE7ALCaUmcFSANgEc_5fCIM9qPoiGc16HFsKQQLrV0ZXeIevvbFSFIWjwhxW1JIcq40BgeI57qx3M8XiDrrm8VmfJOmbKND7gG4tKM36Sa2afEM_iwr3FS2zGAne698vKv771JKL1j3n7_xKdnebbD-tuq9w5Mi7jRrRvpcZ2PRDF8BwdPYXCzLipoAZEqg4aAoUDrj6pXh5g__aauONOCLFpCP6Cyh6WpsFDFPK3a0HQuvRSG7BwXgD7nIsJXhgQP09OZx-NmqOgn36RbpJ5KAGzHAHC1G7fbfAQ2rkshTuTj4ak_mWfX9TVAdWyDiN3g3_Ii-ohwC0rTEtTRktXs7KhBmQrqLsUc5KW5C5YUNWRG7QR6OeA9PP_D6tw
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27498/w27498.pdf
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0010414016635198?casa_token=Y_3fvDe9N8YAAAAA:0p8Zm_K_jfguzdd74zGgtedBt6-DXp63HwDhYBiDeQhq_VjM0ck6dvMQhk5NYgsoBL5LKaeyDJ0TiQ
https://watermark.silverchair.com/117-4-1415.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAArswggK3BgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKoMIICpAIBADCCAp0GCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMznvPII3VJGDMdSzWAgEQgIICbiaSxHV-O3iP0ItFW454ui72Z7mY4eAepjjv-8EHfEzIZ6POKeAYCuDEoKT6qycudeybbIMYAQBbS7caltSvQcb7eoWOpQwB-WJyKgQucy-FDAIKX4r9ouKD3PKozUjXqOPZN0-VIEjR_1lBWLbjshx_wskXdwKkBuAYzNdbpSOhXOZDnYmW161PoaaF77FeH141Dp_j_XCaBfs-dsm-uZIlzSKEAFS6GaKfywL9HJTG23IfsMp2qWvouwpTHuRd4fnyvlrJC8E6g_puDJIkEeTNEYnycMiX9iV0F9blwoPB2HLc0icTLZQFBRQ2cc6AvAE4VoNOxLXd_fKsTVjTZBmx8zxmXn_QZUOIVBoSxLCWFeszxvQYZpgsdxkXjatN2P9CgPbO4lj4M21Pj4hVVOHU7_SCHjDpgUi-crvbhM1KyVC5GzpMy0PpFUrvHogN9nPuERIvYrpRGNO905c4tyVmrdfO_dYC9xAwXExpAXfpL_AoGqQyvosbXwDGTJvuOZ9wH_8PPCtvAC-qGtMw05-2Z0pyX6tLXsiA0cY6wgmduE3TEaQI2MrrqraonMSQHmZZjhQshb5rT4dpTTrvd8wvvNV8mJQcg3ndAZngEwpA2KEoSQKlpbIDznt-zp2EUGI8pVYTYi1kuQZRFe2DJCKyPDpiyf4nbV4jXvuLFZtfSy8SuVFQgdUij01mDyukfthyVGvxowDCzt-VgYUhxc_1WNUhKq34iJLv9WdXNdylb50l5tJr7FwzHsgM5z3xpum_n80X5hYi9XLAWnoSAbbpYuACTw5-KM76LovkQFdSawYS8SeeVIFzdIm02Zs
Literature on electoral security (party vs constituency votes)
Appeal to