discussion of why the interactions.
Afterthought: paradoxically worsening of violence. Implication
only signaling but no policy:
they try to do policy but takes time, and is still worse to it having been delegating.
-before and after the delegation decision within the same municipality on effort of police. If effort doesn't change, it was just to signal responsiveness.
-if increment they tried but not good enough relative to a delegation decision.
-have a similar motivation of centralization on delegation;
-leave aside the vertical competition.
-Start short.
-writing.
Irrationaity of voters: regarding a mayor that increased insecurity and stop delegating to people they trust.
On incumbency paper:
This could be another paper on the difference between personal and party incumbency disadvantage.
Fake personal + partisan. Show that there is no personal and as placebo.
Replicate Fowler and Hall (2014) structure. I can leverage the introduction at some point in time.
Fowler and Hall (2014) just a cross-section.
Previous paper find an incumbency disadvantage. You don't know, maybe people love the mayor but hate the party.
It turns out that when they can reelect the individual the personal incumbency advantage is positive.
Not the case that incumbency disadvantage was almost smaller. It only become smaller once reelection kicks in (pretrends).
Show that those than run in 2015 there is no difference.
When allow the personal incumbency advantage... lets explore why.
with reelection you elect incumbents of different types. No selection
Behave better: performance or effort.
Resources. Party could send more resources.
Information:
Leer: Ferraz and Finan. Audits and corruption.
different municipal characteristics. No problem: I have parallel trends and fixed effects. Not something about special about the states. Prior to that there is no difference.
Experience:
Ability:
Worries
-the advantage is that most of the literature. Comparan sitios distintos y main concern is confounders of places. With the reform we can look for pretrens.
Other thing is that they compare politicians that served 2 terms with those up for reeletion in their first term. So they have confounders of experience and ability. Mechanically have more experience and potentially more able. But in my case everyone is in the first term.
In delegation chapter I reference this one.
discussion of why the interactions. Afterthought: paradoxically worsening of violence. Implication
Irrationaity of voters: regarding a mayor that increased insecurity and stop delegating to people they trust.
On incumbency paper:
This could be another paper on the difference between personal and party incumbency disadvantage. Fake personal + partisan. Show that there is no personal and as placebo. Replicate Fowler and Hall (2014) structure. I can leverage the introduction at some point in time. Fowler and Hall (2014) just a cross-section. Previous paper find an incumbency disadvantage. You don't know, maybe people love the mayor but hate the party. It turns out that when they can reelect the individual the personal incumbency advantage is positive. Not the case that incumbency disadvantage was almost smaller. It only become smaller once reelection kicks in (pretrends). Show that those than run in 2015 there is no difference. When allow the personal incumbency advantage... lets explore why.
Leer: Ferraz and Finan. Audits and corruption.
In delegation chapter I reference this one.