gRPC contains a vulnerability that allows hpack table accounting errors could lead to unwanted disconnects between clients and servers in exceptional cases/ Three vectors were found that allow the following DOS attacks:
- Unbounded memory buffering in the HPACK parser
- Unbounded CPU consumption in the HPACK parser
The unbounded CPU consumption is down to a copy that occurred per-input-block in the parser, and because that could be unbounded due to the memory copy bug we end up with an O(n^2) parsing loop, with n selected by the client.
The unbounded memory buffering bugs:
- The header size limit check was behind the string reading code, so we needed to first buffer up to a 4 gigabyte string before rejecting it as longer than 8 or 16kb.
- HPACK varints have an encoding quirk whereby an infinite number of 0’s can be added at the start of an integer. gRPC’s hpack parser needed to read all of them before concluding a parse.
- gRPC’s metadata overflow check was performed per frame, so that the following sequence of frames could cause infinite buffering: HEADERS: containing a: 1 CONTINUATION: containing a: 2 CONTINUATION: containing a: 3 etc…
CVE-2023-33953 - High Severity Vulnerability
Vulnerable Library - grpcv1.19.0
The C based gRPC (C++, Python, Ruby, Objective-C, PHP, C#)
Library home page: https://github.com/grpc/grpc.git
Found in base branch: master
Vulnerable Source Files (4)
/node_modules/grpc/deps/grpc/src/core/lib/iomgr/tcp_server_utils_posix.h /node_modules/grpc/deps/grpc/src/core/lib/iomgr/tcp_server_posix.cc /node_modules/grpc/deps/grpc/src/core/lib/iomgr/tcp_server_utils_posix_common.cc /node_modules/grpc/deps/grpc/src/core/lib/iomgr/tcp_server_utils_posix_common.cc
Vulnerability Details
gRPC contains a vulnerability that allows hpack table accounting errors could lead to unwanted disconnects between clients and servers in exceptional cases/ Three vectors were found that allow the following DOS attacks: - Unbounded memory buffering in the HPACK parser - Unbounded CPU consumption in the HPACK parser The unbounded CPU consumption is down to a copy that occurred per-input-block in the parser, and because that could be unbounded due to the memory copy bug we end up with an O(n^2) parsing loop, with n selected by the client. The unbounded memory buffering bugs: - The header size limit check was behind the string reading code, so we needed to first buffer up to a 4 gigabyte string before rejecting it as longer than 8 or 16kb. - HPACK varints have an encoding quirk whereby an infinite number of 0’s can be added at the start of an integer. gRPC’s hpack parser needed to read all of them before concluding a parse. - gRPC’s metadata overflow check was performed per frame, so that the following sequence of frames could cause infinite buffering: HEADERS: containing a: 1 CONTINUATION: containing a: 2 CONTINUATION: containing a: 3 etc…
Publish Date: 2023-08-09
URL: CVE-2023-33953
CVSS 3 Score Details (7.5)
Base Score Metrics: - Exploitability Metrics: - Attack Vector: Network - Attack Complexity: Low - Privileges Required: None - User Interaction: None - Scope: Unchanged - Impact Metrics: - Confidentiality Impact: None - Integrity Impact: None - Availability Impact: High
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: https://cloud.google.com/support/bulletins#gcp-2023-022
Release Date: 2023-08-09
Fix Resolution: 1.53.2,1.54.3,1.55.3,1.56.2
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