Open dckc opened 4 years ago
@kennyrowe notes urbit does confidential communication nicely.
I've played with it just a tiny bit: ~bolhet-dacdyr
The nice thing is it can also do groups well. I've created a group on Urbit for this group so folks can play around with it as they'd like. And course if anyone needs help getting into Urbit I'm here to help.
Me: ~sicdev-pilnup Urbit group: ~sicdev-pilnup/rchain-community
In RChain Voting Dapp - Google Docs, Theo notes https://github.com/fentec-project/CiFEr as an interesting technique.
He also pointed out https://github.com/momalab/e3
This morning, @Bill-Kunj and I looked briefly at dynamic access control in nucypher. I maintain that ocaps are necessary and sufficient for dynamic access control, but the specific example struck a chord with @Bill-Kunj w.r.t. severability. And yes, it's open source: https://github.com/nucypher/
I also wondered if Nym was a relevant source of good ideas. The Nym | The Team is led by my colleague from W3C days, Harry Halpin.
Some recent research into a closely related topic. It's a different approach from homomorphic encryption.
Reference material.
"This paper assumes there is more than one authority and atleast one of them is honest all the time."
Not sure about other algorithms.
A Secure Verifiable Ranked Choice Online Voting System Based on Homomorphic Encryption
I haven't worked through the details, but this implements a voting protocol where if all participants work honestly. I believe it can work for small groups.
Anonymous Voting by 2-Round Public Discussion
"There are however some limitations with our protocol. One is the potential subjection to the Denial of Service (DoS) attack. For a fully decentralized voting scheme, it naturally requires collaborative efforts from all voters otherwise it will not work. For example, if some voters refuse to send data in round 2, the tallying process will fail. This kind of attack is overt; everyone will know who the attackers are. To rectify this, voters need to expel the disrupters and restart the protocol; their privacy remains intact. However the voting process would be delayed, which may prove costly for large-scale (countrywide) elections."
From the looks of it, it seems like an implementable algorithm(did not go into it deeply)
A more recent development on the above algorithm.(don't follow what are doing though)
Blockchain voting: Publicly verifiable online voting protocol without trusted tallying authorities
I haven't worked through the details, but this implements a voting protocol where if all participants work honestly. I believe it can work for small groups.
Anonymous Voting by 2-Round Public Discussion
"There are however some limitations with our protocol. One is the potential subjection to the Denial of Service (DoS) attack. For a fully decentralized voting scheme, it naturally requires collaborative efforts from all voters otherwise it will not work. For example, if some voters refuse to send data in round 2, the tallying process will fail. This kind of attack is overt; everyone will know who the attackers are. To rectify this, voters need to expel the disrupters and restart the protocol; their privacy remains intact. However the voting process would be delayed, which may prove costly for large-scale (countrywide) elections."
From the looks of it, it seems like an implementable algorithm(did not go into it deeply)
A more recent development on the above algorithm.(don't follow what are doing though)
Blockchain voting: Publicly verifiable online voting protocol without trusted tallying authorities
I think governance and voting ideas require input from RGOV and, most notably, @jimscarver.
@jimscarver when we made the rstake keybase group, you said this was just the sort of organisation we should be building, but we should do it on RChain. But how do we do confidential stuff in RChain?
The alternative I know of are: