Open kdrobnyh opened 1 year ago
Ugh, -force_owner
looks like a mess right now. I guess https://github.com/rfjakob/gocryptfs/pull/340 made it inconsistent, because that only affected the code paths that create new files.
I'm not sure what behavoir we want, though.
@kdrobnyh what do you want to do with -force_owner
/ why do you use it?
@charles-dyfis-net same question for you. Would it be OK that -force_owner
implies read-only? Or should the files be created as root-owned?
I no longer own the project that was making use of gocryptfs here. To my recollection this would be a no-go; but I've pinged my successor so he can jump in here.
Thanks for your reply!
I have several programs running under different users inside rootless docker containers, so I give those programs access by mounting with -force_owner
. I can't really mount each of the folders separately from under the corresponding users, because those users do not formally exist in the host system (they exist only as subuid/subgid).
Hey - I'm @charles-dyfis-net's successor.
We use gocryptfs in a similar way to @kdrobnyh above, where a handful of programs (under different users) are given access to directories through gocryptfs which starts as root, but drops privileges and runs as a specific (non-root) user which accesses the underlying storage as that uid. The reason to have a specific storage-access user is to simplify deployment while maintaining isolation between users(/services) - this is on NFS where the NFS server is being managed by end users.
Hope this helps explain our usage, & thanks for taking us into account.
Note: updated description to be more clear. thanks Charles.
(To expand a little from my increasingly-outdated memory, the goal was not just simplifying deployment -- a lot of this in the original design was about sandboxing; subtree A, using gocryptfs key A, and exporting content from a specific subtree of the shared for use only by account A, was also used as a security control, ensuring that a compromise of service account A couldn't be used to read data associated with service accounts B, C or D, despite only requiring the customer/user to set up one account on their NFS server; because all these services are creating new data, mkdir
is of course essential)
Hello, on my end, the crypted folder is owned by user1. I decrypted and mounted the folder using root and force_owner as user2. What I experience is the following (as user2):
My version of gocryptfs is v2.4.0.
Edit: As a temporary solution, one could use bindfs to first mount the crypted folder as user2.
I guess the only sane thing to do here is to create the new files as 1001:1001 (or whatever -force_owner is set to).
Creating new files as root seems dangerous as it allows to create root suid binaries.
I mount an encrypted folder under the root user, but try to access decrypted content via a separate user (1001:1001). I specify
-allow_other
flag as well as-force_owner 1001:1001
. When I access the decrypted content using the specified user, the access seems to be limited: I can modify the existing files (e.g., created by root before), but can't create any new files or folders, even though the owner of the content is 1001:1001. Any ideas what is wrong? It looks like a bug to me.Steps to reproduce:
# gocryptfs -init -xchacha -config ~/crypt.conf crypt
# gocryptfs -openssl true -config ~/crypt.conf -allow_other -force_owner 1001:1001 crypt plain
# cd plain
# mkdir new
# touch foo
$ mkdir new2
gives a permission denied error$ touch bar
gives a permission denied error$ mv new new2
is fine$ mv foo bar
is finebar
is fine