Ctrl IQ, Inc EL9 Shim 15.8 for x64

[jason-rodri]

Confirm the following are included in your repo, checking each box:

• [x] completed README.md file with the necessary information
• [x] shim.efi to be signed
• [x] public portion of your certificate(s) embedded in shim (the file passed to VENDOR_CERT_FILE)
• [x] binaries, for which hashes are added to vendor_db ( if you use vendor_db and have hashes allow-listed )
• [x] any extra patches to shim via your own git tree or as files
• [x] any extra patches to grub via your own git tree or as files
• [x] build logs
• [x] a Dockerfile to reproduce the build of the provided shim EFI binaries

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What is the link to your tag in a repo cloned from rhboot/shim-review?

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https://github.com/ctrliq/ciq-shim-build/releases/tag/ciqliq-shim-EL9-x64-20240705

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What is the SHA256 hash of your final SHIM binary?

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SHA256 (shimx64.efi) = f67bf3bb333d1e8ecfbb372f93ad7056e12c43c4eedc335e235c66b7af9fa940

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What is the link to your previous shim review request (if any, otherwise N/A)?

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Ctrl IQ, Inc Shim 15.8 for x64 & ia32 #366

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If no security contacts have changed since verification, what is the link to your request, where they've been verified (if any, otherwise N/A)?

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Jason Rodriguez Michael Young

[SherifNagy]

Can we get the UKI's SBAT, or you aren't providing UKI kernel?

[jason-rodri]

Can we get the UKI's SBAT, or you aren't providing UKI kernel?

We are not moving forward with signing UKI build at this time.

[jason-rodri]

@aronowski @SherifNagy Please let me know if I can provide additional information to help the review process.

[SherifNagy]

@jason-rodri nothing at the moment, we are working through the queue

[aronowski]

The application looks alright, apart from one minor nitpick:

*******************************************************************************
### Does your SHIM load any loaders that support loading unsigned kernels (e.g. GRUB2)?
*******************************************************************************
Grub2 will only load unsigned code if the secureboot feature is turned off  load unsigned kernels, but only with secureboot mode turned off on an end-user's system.

The duplicated explanation in the answer hasn't been fixed yet, just like in the EL8 application. ;-)

[SherifNagy]

Review of ciqliq-shim-EL9-x64-20240518

• Security contacts looks good, didn't change since last successful submission
• Keys are stored in FIPS HSM

Shim

• Uses upstream 15.8 and source hashes matches original hashes
• SBAT entries from shim looks fine
• No patches added on top of upstream shim
• Vendor SBAT entry is at 1
• Binaries are reproducible using the container image

  
  STEP 14/14: RUN chmod 0755 /root/shim-compare.sh;  /root/shim-compare.sh

Shim Comparison, original binary vs. freshly built binaries:

SHA256 sums :: f67bf3bb333d1e8ecfbb372f93ad7056e12c43c4eedc335e235c66b7af9fa940 /shimx64.efi f67bf3bb333d1e8ecfbb372f93ad7056e12c43c4eedc335e235c66b7af9fa940 /shim_result/usr/share/shim/15.8-0.el9/x64/shimx64.efi

* NX flag is not set, because the chain is not yet ready
* Self signed 4096 bit cert and valid for almost 24 years

## GRUB2
* SBAT looks fine (keeps upstream RHEL/rocky grub2)
* Version currently does not include NTFS patches, but the signed versions also not include the NTFS module so sbat `grub,3`
* Module list sound fine

## Kernel
* Ephemeral keys are used for signing kernel modules
* Lockdown patches are included (keeps upstream RHEL kernel)

## Notes

Along side the note from @aronowski 
* UKI kernel isn't signed, so keep an eye on the meta issue #397 
* grub2's SBAT note section  "version" isn't 100% accurate with upstream
* fwupd notes section as well needs fixing, below is what  Rocky currently has

sbat,1,UEFI shim,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md fwupd-efi,1,Firmware update daemon,fwupd-efi,1.4,https://github.com/fwupd/fwupd-efi fwupd-efi.rhel,1,Red Hat Enterprise Linux,fwupd,1.9.13,mail:secalert@redhat.com fwupd-efi.rocky,1,Rocky Linux,fwupd,1.9.13,mail:security@rockylinux.org

* You aren't keeping any upstream fwupd entries for sbat, I assume this is acceptable Cc: @steve-mcintyre for input

Other than those few notes, LGTM, we will need one more reviewer

[THS-on]

Review of ciqliq-shim-EL9-x64-20240705

• Contacts are already verified
• Linux vendor for support and products based on Rocky Linux
• Keys are stored in a HSM

Shim

• Based on upstream 15.8 without patches
• NX flag is disabled
• Embedded self-signed CA is valid till 2048 and uses 4096bit RSA, Digital Signature attribute is set
• SBAT looks fine
• Is reproducible using Dockerfile:

  #17 0.422 f67bf3bb333d1e8ecfbb372f93ad7056e12c43c4eedc335e235c66b7af9fa940  /shimx64.efi
  #17 0.422 f67bf3bb333d1e8ecfbb372f93ad7056e12c43c4eedc335e235c66b7af9fa940  /shim_result/usr/share/shim/15.8-0.el9/x64/shimx64.efi

GRUB2 and fwupd

• Based on Rocky 9
• SBAT level still on 3, because NTFS patches are not included (fine for now as NTFS modules were not signed)
• Module list looks fine
• upstream SBAT entries are preserved
• fwupd entries now look good

Kernel

• Lockdown patches from Rocky/RHEL are used
• ephemeral key signing is used
• Mainly 5.14, but also other LT version and latest kernel are build

LGTM! I'll raise the certmule/certwrapper question during today's call and will get back to you

[THS-on]

As discussed yesterday using certwrapper to import the Rocky Linux CA is likely fine. We just need confirmation that certwrapper is ready for production use and can be signed. @jsetje do you know the status of certwrapper?

[jason-rodri]

Signed binaries returned from MSFT.

I understand the that there is still a question around certwrapper. Do we still want to keep this open until @jsetje replies?

[THS-on]

I understand the that there is still a question around certwrapper. Do we still want to keep this open until @jsetje replies?

Yeah let's keep this open until there is a definite answer if you can sign certwrapper

[THS-on]

@jsetje is certwrapper now ready to sign for people or should they wait?

[THS-on]

As discussed with @steve-mcintyre, the certwrapper is ready to sign.