This repo holds the work area and revisions of the non-ISA specification created by the RISC-V AP-TEE TG. This specification defines the programming interfaces (ABI) to support the Confidential VM Extension (CoVE) confidential computing architecture for RISC-V application-processor platforms.
Does the architecture preclude other TEE instances? ie architecturally is there any reason why one can not create mutually distrusting TEEs for their own purpose/scope? either way we should have clarifying statements cause the underlying isolation mechanics does not distinguish one vs N supervisor domains.
More in general the figure needs updating to match the statement in the next page about the architecture supporting multiple confidential supervisory domains and multiple per-host TVMs
Isn't the TSM-driver, the rv cpu and everything below is also in Non-confidential VM TCB. ie certain entities provide tcb for both
Reference: link
Re: Figure 1
Does the architecture preclude other TEE instances? ie architecturally is there any reason why one can not create mutually distrusting TEEs for their own purpose/scope? either way we should have clarifying statements cause the underlying isolation mechanics does not distinguish one vs N supervisor domains.
More in general the figure needs updating to match the statement in the next page about the architecture supporting multiple confidential supervisory domains and multiple per-host TVMs
Isn't the TSM-driver, the rv cpu and everything below is also in Non-confidential VM TCB. ie certain entities provide tcb for both