security: Recovering from a GitHub account compromise

jsha commented 4 years ago

Right now, if an attacker compromises a crate author's GitHub account, they can use it to log into crates.io and get a session cookie. That cookie is signed by an HMAC key owned by crates.io, and contains the user ID. During authentication, crates.io verifies the HMAC on that cookie and then trusts the user ID inside. The problem is that, once the crate author regains control of their GitHub account, the attacker's session cookie is still valid, and as far as I can tell there is no way to revoke it. There are a few possible solutions:

Instead of a signed cookie, use a sessions table that has unique tokens in it. This has the added advantage that the sessions table can include the IP address and User-Agent from which the session was initiated, so the user can review extant sessions and revoke them if necessary.
Expire the signed cookie after a period of time (https://github.com/conduit-rust/conduit-cookie/issues/15). This is useful for defense-in-depth, but any reasonable expiration period would be too long to work for this purpose. When you want to revoke an attacker's access, you want to revoke it right away, not in a few days.
Add a generation number in the users table, and give the user an option to "sign out all other sessions," which would increment the generation number. The generation number would also be included in the signed cookie and required to match the current values in the table.

I think (1) is the best option but also the most work.

Another, closely related issue: If a user revokes the crates.io app on their GitHub account (for instance, as part of the cleanup after a compromise), it would be nice to temporarily disable all cookie sessions and tokens on their crates.io account until they reauthorize crates.io.

(Related: #815)

Turbo87 commented 3 years ago

@jsha FYI we shortly discussed this during our weekly team meeting and we're considering to implement the session table suggestion. would you be available for reviews once we have something that works?

jsha commented 3 years ago

Excellent! Yes, I'd definitely be happy to help with reviews.

jsha commented 2 years ago

Another item in this area: It might be good to re-verify the GitHub OAuth token at publish time. If the OAuth token has been revoked, the publish should fail.

Shnatsel commented 2 years ago

There technically is a way to recover: the HMAC key can be changed by crates.io. But that invalidates all the cookies for all users, and can only be performed by the crates.io team.

adsnaider commented 2 years ago

Hello! Jumping in as this issue is important to folks at Google (myself included). I've gone ahead and created a pull request (#4690) that addresses the issue.

Disclaimer: I used #3307 to help me get started, so thank you very much @Turbo87 for the help :)

The PR doesn't address some issues that I left opened as TODOs, here's he list of the next steps (assuming the PR gets merged)

[ ] We need to invalidate the old cookie based authentication.
[ ] We should probably clean up old/stale sessions. I remember reading a comment about using partitions to make this simpler?
[ ] We should make use of the timestamps, IP address, and user agent for authentication.

Feel free to add more and/or correct me if I'm wrong about any of the above items.

rust-lang / crates.io

security: Recovering from a GitHub account compromise #2630