Closed cesarbm03 closed 1 year ago
Of course, in our context one can prove that having a terminal object in the total space of a cartesian fibration identifies that fibration with the representable hom-fibration (side question: is this fact already formalized somewhere?); thus showing that both definitions are equivalent.
Not for the cartesian case, at least, but I'm currently working more on cocartesian fibrations in the Yoneda repository.
Of course, in our context one can prove that having a terminal object in the total space of a cartesian fibration identifies that fibration with the representable hom-fibration (side question: is this fact already formalized somewhere?); thus showing that both definitions are equivalent.
Not for the cartesian case, at least, but I'm currently working more on cocartesian fibrations in the Yoneda repository.
Yeah, I might have gotten cartesian and cocartesian confused :)
No worries, I wanted to make the point that the formalization of co-/cartesian (as opposed to discrete co-/contravariant) families isn't quite at that stage yet, but getting there. :)
I don't know if this is the right place to leave these comments, since the branch has already been merged.
Here is another possible definition of limit:
cocone
not as a single Sigma type, but as a type familycone : (f : A -> B) -> (b : B) -> U
.cone-precomp b x : cone f x -> hom B b x -> cone f b
.limit (f : A->B) := Sigma ( x: X, c : cone f x ), (b : B) -> is-equiv (cone-precomp b x c)
Alternatively, if one wants to avoid inputting the composition map (which would require a Segal type), one could directly ask for an equivalence of dependent types
(b:B) -> Equiv (hom B b x) (cone f b)
and then show that for a Segal type this equivalence needs to be given by composition.I would argue that this definition is the "morally correct one" because it generalizes well to enriched settings (when the homs of B are not groupoids). In general, it does not suffice to require the universal cone to be terminal; one really needs to insist that it really induces an equivalence between homs and cones.
Of course, in our context one can prove that having a terminal object in the total space of a cartesian fibration identifies that fibration with the representable hom-fibration (side question: is this fact already formalized somewhere?); thus showing that both definitions are equivalent.