Closed sander closed 4 months ago
To consider: apply KEM for seed instead. Ensures confidentiality during initial transport. Possibly also hedges against weak random number generation at either side?
Discussed 2024-07-01: the current approach where each root device key pair must be fresh (as proven using a key attestation to the solution provider) seems feasible, with subsequent WTE issuance. Need to check if this is well reflected in the spec.
As of e4ccc30, the Wallet Instance can seed any new HDK tree at will and convince its Wallet Provider to issue Issuer Trust Evidence about it. This enables a corrupt Wallet Instance to associate across HDK trees, dropping the potential to have each tree represent a single subject.
Instead, in HDK, each tree should be associated with a unique device key from the perspective of the Wallet Instance. Potentially, these device keys are diversified from a single key by the Wallet Provider. Potentially, the Wallet Provider delegates this diversification to the Wallet Instance using ARKG.
This may shift the application of Trust Evidence: