I’m a believer. It’s a good set of solutions. Using a PKI is a good solution. As is the current RPKI and ROA’s. It might also be helpful, in the scion control plan pki document, to at least acknowledge RPKI. RPKI is widely used now and it could be helpful to understand how scions use of PKI would be similar and different. In the long run it would give operators a more comfortable understanding since most now use RPKI.
We could add a couple of sentences about this. We have some text in the now expired draft-rustignoli-panrg-scion-components:
The above-mentioned decoupling also implies that SCION does not
provide, by design, IP prefix origin validation, which is currently
provided by RPKI [RFC8210]. As prefix origin validation is outside
of SCION's scope, IP-to-SCION's coexistence mechanisms (SIAM, SBAS)
later discussed in Section 3.1 build on top of RPKI for IP origin
attestation.
...
These properties would be lost if SCION were to rely on an existing
PKI (i.e., the web PKI, the RPKI, ...). For example, if SCION were
to use the RPKI instead of the CP-PKI, its control plane would lack
the trust model required to support Isolation Domains. This is
because RPKI's trust model follows the same structure as the IP
allocation hierarchy, where the five RIRs represent the trust roots.
Added reference to why RPKI isn't directly supported by SCION. Did not mention SIAM or SBAS as this appears to be experimental and would need to be further explained somewhere.
Add a couple of sentences to clarify relationship to RPKI
We have some text in the now expired draft-rustignoli-panrg-scion-components: