Inconsistent use of epochBegin could lock user funds

Summary

The epochBegin timestamp is used inconsistently and could lead to user funds being locked.

Vulnerability Detail

The function ControllerPeggedAssetV2.triggerNullEpoch checks for timestamp like this:

if (block.timestamp < uint256(epochStart)) revert EpochNotStarted();

The modifier epochHasNotStarted (used by Carousel.deposit) checks it like this:

if (block.timestamp > epochConfig[_id].epochBegin)
    revert EpochAlreadyStarted();

Both functions can be called when block.timestamp == epochBegin. This could lead to a scenario where a deposit happens after triggerNullEpoch is called (both in the same block). Because triggerNullEpoch sets the value for finalTVL, the TVL that comes from the deposit is not accounted for. If emissions have been distributed this epoch, this will lead to the incorrect distribution of emissions and once all emissions have been claimed the remaining assets will not be claimable, due to reversion in withdraw when trying to send emissions:

function previewEmissionsWithdraw(uint256 _id, uint256 _assets)
    public
    view
    returns (uint256 entitledAmount)
{
    entitledAmount = _assets.mulDivDown(emissions[_id], finalTVL[_id]);
}
...
//in withdraw:
uint256 entitledEmissions = previewEmissionsWithdraw(_id, _assets);
if (epochNull[_id] == false) {
    entitledShares = previewWithdraw(_id, _assets);
} else {
    entitledShares = _assets;
}
if (entitledShares > 0) {
    SemiFungibleVault.asset.safeTransfer(_receiver, entitledShares);
}
if (entitledEmissions > 0) {
    emissionsToken.safeTransfer(_receiver, entitledEmissions);
}

The above could also lead to revert through division by 0 if finalTVL is set to 0, even though the deposit after was successful.