Returned Price could be a stale price in getMarkPrice() & getAssetPrice()
Summary
No check on returned price could give a negetive value and No check for round completeness could lead to stale prices and wrong price return value, or outdated price. The functions rely on accurate price feed might not work as expected, sometimes can lead to fund loss.
Vulnerability Detail
The oracle wrapper getMarkPrice() and getAssetPrice() call out to an oracle with latestRoundData() to get the price of some token. Although the returned timestamp is checked, there is no check for round completeness and returned price.
According to Chainlink's documentation, this function does not error if no answer has been reached but returns 0 or outdated round data. The external Chainlink oracle, which provides index price information to the system, introduces risk inherent to any dependency on third-party data sources. For example, the oracle could fall behind or otherwise fail to be maintained, resulting in outdated data being fed to the index price calculations. Oracle reliance has historically resulted in crippled on-chain systems, and complications that lead to these outcomes can arise from things as simple as network congestion.
Impact
If there is a problem with chainlink starting a new round and finding consensus on the new value for the oracle (e.g. chainlink nodes abandon the oracle, chain congestion, vulnerability/attacks on the chainlink system) consumers of this contract may continue using outdated stale data (if oracles are unable to submit no new round is started).
This could lead to stale prices and wrong price return value, or outdated price.
0xhacksmithh
medium
Returned Price could be a stale price in
getMarkPrice()
&getAssetPrice()
Summary
No check on returned price could give a negetive value and No check for round completeness could lead to stale prices and wrong price return value, or outdated price. The functions rely on accurate price feed might not work as expected, sometimes can lead to fund loss.
Vulnerability Detail
The oracle wrapper getMarkPrice() and getAssetPrice() call out to an oracle with
latestRoundData()
to get the price of some token. Although the returned timestamp is checked, there is no check for round completeness and returned price.According to Chainlink's documentation, this function does not error if no answer has been reached but returns 0 or outdated round data. The external Chainlink oracle, which provides index price information to the system, introduces risk inherent to any dependency on third-party data sources. For example, the oracle could fall behind or otherwise fail to be maintained, resulting in outdated data being fed to the index price calculations. Oracle reliance has historically resulted in crippled on-chain systems, and complications that lead to these outcomes can arise from things as simple as network congestion.
Impact
If there is a problem with chainlink starting a new round and finding consensus on the new value for the oracle (e.g. chainlink nodes abandon the oracle, chain congestion, vulnerability/attacks on the chainlink system) consumers of this contract may continue using outdated stale data (if oracles are unable to submit no new round is started).
This could lead to stale prices and wrong price return value, or outdated price.
Code Snippet
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-04-jojo/blob/main/smart-contract-EVM/contracts/adaptor/chainlinkAdaptor.sol#L46-L47
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-04-jojo/blob/main/JUSDV1/src/oracle/JOJOOracleAdaptor.sol#L28-L29
Tool used
Manual Review
Recommendation
Make Proper Validations,
Duplicate of #173