The reserve ratio can be pushed even lower than a 100% by front-running "pause" EMC minting
Summary
The reserve ratio can be pushed even lower than a 100% by front-running "pause" EMC minting
Vulnerability Detail
When the Reserve ratio is below ≤ 100% the protocol is expected to pause all minting permanently (until the ratio is recovered).
As they have to stop all of the mintings from all the EMCs ( all the coins/stables at a time), you can front-run the pause method from any of these stables and decrease the reserve ratio even more.
1 -Reserve ratio reaches 100%
2- Protocol starts pausing the EMCs (stables)
3- Attacker front-runs the pause function from any of those stables and swaps usd1 for any stables
4- Attacker has increased liabilities and decreased more the ratio even if they reached the < 100% ratio beforehand
Impact
The reserve ratio can be pushed even lower than a 100% while pausing all the EMCs, causing more liabilities for the protocol
Add a specific function in the codebase to pause all the EMCs at the same time and use flashbots to trigger it once the reserve ratio threshlod is reached.
stopthecap
medium
The reserve ratio can be pushed even lower than a 100% by front-running "pause" EMC minting
Summary
The reserve ratio can be pushed even lower than a 100% by front-running "pause" EMC minting
Vulnerability Detail
When the Reserve ratio is below ≤ 100% the protocol is expected to pause all minting permanently (until the ratio is recovered).
As they have to stop all of the mintings from all the EMCs ( all the coins/stables at a time), you can front-run the pause method from any of these stables and decrease the reserve ratio even more.
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-04-unitasprotocol/blob/main/Unitas-Protocol/src/ERC20Token.sol#L152-L154
Attack:
1 -Reserve ratio reaches 100% 2- Protocol starts pausing the EMCs (stables) 3- Attacker front-runs the pause function from any of those stables and swaps
usd1for any stables 4- Attacker has increased liabilities and decreased more the ratio even if they reached the < 100% ratio beforehandImpact
The reserve ratio can be pushed even lower than a 100% while pausing all the EMCs, causing more liabilities for the protocol
Code Snippet
https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-04-unitasprotocol/blob/main/Unitas-Protocol/src/ERC20Token.sol#L152-L154
Tool used
Manual Review
Recommendation
Add a specific function in the codebase to pause all the EMCs at the same time and use flashbots to trigger it once the reserve ratio threshlod is reached.