jkoppel - AdvancedDistributorInitializable sets claim data to empty, making claims fail

[sherlock-admin3]

jkoppel

medium

AdvancedDistributorInitializable sets claim data to empty, making claims fail

Summary

AdvancedDistributorInitializable.claim overrides the passed-in data with new bytes(0). This data is needed by both PerAddressTrancheVestingMerkleDistributor and PerAddressContinuousVestingMerkleDistributor for claims to work. Therefore, claims do not work.

Vulnerability Detail

Impact

Claims do not work

Both PerAddressTrancheVestingMerkleDistributor and PerAddressContinuousVestingMerkleDistributor also pass in new bytes(0) to this argument, causing the same issue. However, this is a separate issue per my understanding of Sherlock rules; it is in separate code, and will stay broken if the others are fixed.

Code Snippet

AdvancedDistributorInitializable calls DistributorInitializable._executeClaim with data=new bytes(0)

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-05-tokensoft-distributor-contracts-update/blob/main/contracts/packages/hardhat/contracts/claim/factory/AdvancedDistributorInitializable.sol#L106-L113

    function _executeClaim(address beneficiary, uint256 totalAmount, bytes memory)
        internal
        virtual
        override
        returns (uint256 _claimed)
    {
        _claimed = super._executeClaim(beneficiary, totalAmount, new bytes(0));
        _reconcileVotingPower(beneficiary);
    }

DistributorInitializable._executeClaim forwards this data to getClaimableAmount, which forwards it to getVestedFraction

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-05-tokensoft-distributor-contracts-update/blob/main/contracts/packages/hardhat/contracts/claim/factory/DistributorInitializable.sol#L75 https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-05-tokensoft-distributor-contracts-update/blob/main/contracts/packages/hardhat/contracts/claim/factory/DistributorInitializable.sol#L113

Many implementations of getVestedFraction attempt to decode this data in ways that break if the data is empty.

E.g.:

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-05-tokensoft-distributor-contracts-update/blob/main/contracts/packages/hardhat/contracts/claim/factory/PerAddressContinuousVestingInitializable.sol#L30-L35

    function getVestedFraction(
        address beneficiary,
        uint256 time, // time is in seconds past the epoch (e.g. block.timestamp)
        bytes memory data
    ) public view override returns (uint256) {
        (uint256 start, uint256 cliff, uint256 end) = abi.decode(data, (uint256, uint256, uint256));

Putting these together, attempting to claim will be a lot like this Chisel section.

➜ bytes memory data = new bytes(0)
➜ (uint256 start, uint256 cliff, uint256 end) = abi.decode(data, (uint256, uint256, uint256));
Traces:
  [805] 0xBd770416a3345F91E4B34576cb804a576fa48EB1::run()
    └─ ← "EvmError: Revert"

⚒️ Chisel Error: Failed to execute REPL contract!

Tool used

Manual Review

Recommendation

Pass the data parameter along properly

[ArshaanB]

Yes, can confirm, this seems like an issue.

ContinuousVestingInitializable, TrancheVestingInitializable — the getVestedFraction() doesn't care about data PerAddressContinuousVestingInitializable, PerAddressTrancheVestingInitializable — the getVestedFraction() does care about data

[sherlock-admin2]

The protocol team fixed this issue in the following PRs/commits: https://github.com/SoftDAO/contracts/pull/47