Cuddly Gauze Mustang - User will use external accounts for bypassing check in programs

[sherlock-admin4]

Cuddly Gauze Mustang

High

User will use external accounts for bypassing check in programs

Summary

In the current implementation, multiple instructions make the assumption that accounts are owned by the current program (so are trusted) but they are not. This allows user to provide external accounts to bypass checks.

Root Cause

• Lack of seeds constraint every time wooconfig is used (for example: create_wooracle.rs#L44)

Other occurences in claim_fee.rs, create_pool.rs#L9, deposit_withdraw.rs#L9, and everywhere else in the codebase.

Internal pre-conditions

No response

External pre-conditions

No response

Attack Path

1. User creates a wooconfig account owned by himself
2. User uses this wooconfig account through the WooFi instructions to bypass checks

Impact

Multiple checks are bypassed, including access control checks.

PoC

No response

Mitigation

Every time wooconfig is expected, ensure that the account is the correct PDA.

For example, in the CreateWooracle structure, it gives:

#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct CreateWooracle<'info> {
    #[account(
        seeds = [
          WOOCONFIG_SEED.as_bytes(),
        ],
        bump)]
    pub wooconfig: Box<Account<'info, WooConfig>>,

[toprince]

Not valid. Cannot create wooconfig again.