A malicious user can withdrawals another user's money
Summary
A shared vault authority signing mechanism will cause unauthorized withdrawals for users, as User A can withdraw funds belonging to User B.
Root Cause
In the OAppLzReceive, the vault_authority_seeds are shared across all users, allowing any user with valid withdrawal parameters to use the same PDA signing authority. As a result, any valid withdrawal request can be signed by the vault without distinguishing which user is performing the withdrawal.
Also, there is no check that the wallet receiving the funds belongs to the same user for whom the withdrawal request was initiated. The system only checks that the withdrawal message comes from a valid sender (peer.address == params.sender), but does not verify that the user account corresponds to the sender.
Internal pre-conditions
No response
External pre-conditions
No response
Attack Path
User B initiates a withdrawal on the Ethereum side and a valid withdraw message is sent to the Solana.
User A accesses the valid withdrawal messages corresponding to User B's account and calls the function before User B.
Since there is no check to ensure the User A uses a withdrawal message corresponding to his account, the withdraw is successfully executed and User A steals User B's money.
Impact
The attacker steals the entire withdrawn amount from User B's account without any corresponding loss.
Orbiting Tweed Shell
High
A malicious user can withdrawals another user's money
Summary
A shared vault authority signing mechanism will cause unauthorized withdrawals for users, as User A can withdraw funds belonging to User B.
Root Cause
In the OAppLzReceive, the
vault_authority_seedsare shared across all users, allowing any user with valid withdrawal parameters to use the same PDA signing authority. As a result, any valid withdrawal request can be signed by the vault without distinguishing which user is performing the withdrawal.Also, there is no check that the wallet receiving the funds belongs to the same user for whom the withdrawal request was initiated. The system only checks that the withdrawal message comes from a valid sender (peer.address == params.sender), but does not verify that the user account corresponds to the sender.
Internal pre-conditions
No response
External pre-conditions
No response
Attack Path
Impact
The attacker steals the entire withdrawn amount from User B's account without any corresponding loss.
PoC
No response
Mitigation
No response