justAWanderKid - Malicious Actor Can Hijack Any Profile and Compromise Remaining Users Of the Same Profile, Preventing Them from Interacting with Ethos Network And Taking Advantage of Profile Reputation For Malicious Purposes #192
Malicious Actor Can Hijack Any Profile and Compromise Remaining Users Of the Same Profile, Preventing Them from Interacting with Ethos Network And Taking Advantage of Profile Reputation For Malicious Purposes
Description
The user registration mechanism in the EthosProfile::registerAddress() function is implemented in a way that allows a user to register an addressStr to any profile without their consent. This vulnerability allows a malicious actor to:
Register themselves to any profile by passing their address to the addressStr parameter and the profileId of the profile they wish to hijack to the EthosProfile::registerAddress() function.
Once registered to a profile, the malicious user can delete and compromise other users of the same profile by calling the EthosProfile::deleteAddressAtIndex() function.
After successfully hijacking a profile and banning(compromising) other users, the malicious actor can prevent them from interacting with the Ethos Network.
Once control is established, the malicious actor can leverage the profile's reputation for their own purposes.
Impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker to take control of any user profile in the Ethos Network, enabling them to exploit the profile’s reputation and credibility for malicious purposes.
By hijacking a trusted profile, the attacker could conduct scams, promote illicit activities, or spread harmful content across both Web3 and Web2 spaces. Additionally, they can impersonate the profile owner, misleading other users into interacting with fraudulent links or phishing schemes.
This compromises the network's integrity, erodes user trust, and could result in financial and reputational harm for both the Ethos Network and its users.
Recommended Mitigation
The user registration mechanism should be revised as follows:
If user1 with a valid profile wants to register user2, user1 must send a request to user2, notifying them of the intent to register. If user2 accepts, they will be registered to the profile. Otherwise, user2 can reject the offer.
If user2 wishes to be registered to a specific profile, such as user1’s profile, user2 must send a request to user1’s profileId, notifying them of the intent to join. user1 can then either accept the request and register user2 or reject it.
This approach ensures that users with valid profiles cannot register other users without their consent, and users without profiles cannot register themselves to any profile without prior approval.
justAWanderKid
High
Malicious Actor Can Hijack Any Profile and Compromise Remaining Users Of the Same Profile, Preventing Them from Interacting with Ethos Network And Taking Advantage of Profile Reputation For Malicious Purposes
Description
The user registration mechanism in the EthosProfile::registerAddress() function is implemented in a way that allows a user to register an addressStr to any profile without their consent. This vulnerability allows a malicious actor to:
Register themselves to any profile by passing their address to the addressStr parameter and the profileId of the profile they wish to hijack to the
EthosProfile::registerAddress()function.Once registered to a profile, the malicious user can delete and compromise other users of the same profile by calling the EthosProfile::deleteAddressAtIndex() function.
After successfully hijacking a profile and banning(compromising) other users, the malicious actor can prevent them from interacting with the Ethos Network.
Once control is established, the malicious actor can leverage the profile's reputation for their own purposes.
Impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker to take control of any user profile in the Ethos Network, enabling them to exploit the profile’s reputation and credibility for malicious purposes.
By hijacking a trusted profile, the attacker could conduct scams, promote illicit activities, or spread harmful content across both Web3 and Web2 spaces. Additionally, they can impersonate the profile owner, misleading other users into interacting with fraudulent links or phishing schemes.
This compromises the network's integrity, erodes user trust, and could result in financial and reputational harm for both the Ethos Network and its users.
Recommended Mitigation
The user registration mechanism should be revised as follows:
If
user1with a valid profile wants to registeruser2,user1must send a request touser2, notifying them of the intent to register. Ifuser2accepts, they will be registered to the profile. Otherwise,user2can reject the offer.If
user2wishes to be registered to a specific profile, such asuser1’s profile,user2must send a request touser1’sprofileId, notifying them of the intent to join.user1can then either accept the request and registeruser2or reject it.This approach ensures that users with valid profiles cannot register other users without their consent, and users without profiles cannot register themselves to any profile without prior approval.