Closed shohu closed 6 years ago
// Requires cs_main.
void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch)
{
if (howmuch == 0)
return;
CNodeState *state = State(pnode);
if (state == nullptr)
return;
state->nMisbehavior += howmuch;
int banscore = gArgs.GetArg("-banscore", DEFAULT_BANSCORE_THRESHOLD);
if (state->nMisbehavior >= banscore && state->nMisbehavior - howmuch < banscore)
{
LogPrintf("%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior);
state->fShouldBan = true;
} else
LogPrintf("%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d)\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior);
}
2018-03-27 05:18:45.434397 ERROR: ConnectBlock: CheckQueue failed
/** Apply the effects of this block (with given index) on the UTXO set represented by coins.
* Validity checks that depend on the UTXO set are also done; ConnectBlock()
* can fail if those validity checks fail (among other reasons). */
static bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindex,
CCoinsViewCache& view, const CChainParams& chainparams, bool fJustCheck = false)
{
:
:
if (!control.Wait())
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed");
bool fScriptChecks = true;
if (!hashAssumeValid.IsNull()) {
// We've been configured with the hash of a block which has been externally verified to have a valid history.
// A suitable default value is included with the software and updated from time to time. Because validity
// relative to a piece of software is an objective fact these defaults can be easily reviewed.
// This setting doesn't force the selection of any particular chain but makes validating some faster by
// effectively caching the result of part of the verification.
BlockMap::const_iterator it = mapBlockIndex.find(hashAssumeValid);
if (it != mapBlockIndex.end()) {
if (it->second->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex &&
pindexBestHeader->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex &&
pindexBestHeader->nChainWork >= nMinimumChainWork) {
// This block is a member of the assumed verified chain and an ancestor of the best header.
// The equivalent time check discourages hash power from extorting the network via DOS attack
// into accepting an invalid block through telling users they must manually set assumevalid.
// Requiring a software change or burying the invalid block, regardless of the setting, makes
// it hard to hide the implication of the demand. This also avoids having release candidates
// that are hardly doing any signature verification at all in testing without having to
// artificially set the default assumed verified block further back.
// The test against nMinimumChainWork prevents the skipping when denied access to any chain at
// least as good as the expected chain.
fScriptChecks = (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(*pindexBestHeader, *pindex, *pindexBestHeader, chainparams.GetConsensus()) <= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2);
}
}
}
testcode
We build a chain that includes and invalid signature for one of the
transactions:
0: genesis block
1: block 1 with coinbase transaction output.
2-101: bury that block with 100 blocks so the coinbase transaction
output can be spent
102: a block containing a transaction spending the coinbase
transaction output. The transaction has an invalid signature.
103-2202: bury the bad block with just over two weeks' worth of blocks
(2100 blocks)
# Bury the assumed valid block 2100 deep
for i in range(2100):
block = create_block(self.tip, create_coinbase(height), self.block_time)
block.nVersion = 4
block.solve()
self.blocks.append(block)
self.tip = block.sha256
self.block_time += 1
height += 1
2100 * 10å / 60 / 24 = 14.58 days. over two weeks
int64_t GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(const CBlockIndex& to, const CBlockIndex& from, const CBlockIndex& tip, const Consensus::Params& params)
{
arith_uint256 r;
int sign = 1;
if (to.nChainWork > from.nChainWork) {
r = to.nChainWork - from.nChainWork;
} else {
r = from.nChainWork - to.nChainWork;
sign = -1;
}
r = r * arith_uint256(params.nPowTargetSpacing) / GetBlockProof(tip);
if (r.bits() > 63) {
return sign * std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max();
}
return sign * r.GetLow64();
}
arith_uint256 GetBlockProof(const CBlockIndex& block)
{
arith_uint256 bnTarget;
bool fNegative;
bool fOverflow;
bnTarget.SetCompact(block.nBits, &fNegative, &fOverflow);
if (fNegative || fOverflow || bnTarget == 0)
return 0;
// We need to compute 2**256 / (bnTarget+1), but we can't represent 2**256
// as it's too large for an arith_uint256. However, as 2**256 is at least as large
// as bnTarget+1, it is equal to ((2**256 - bnTarget - 1) / (bnTarget+1)) + 1,
// or ~bnTarget / (nTarget+1) + 1.
return (~bnTarget / (bnTarget + 1)) + 1;
}
bitcoin
consensus.nPowTargetSpacing = 10 * 60;
c0ban
consensus.nPowTargetSpacing = 32;
Currently Threshold is "two weeks"
fScriptChecks = (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(*pindexBestHeader, *pindex, *pindexBestHeader, chainparams.GetConsensus()) <= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2);
This function use nPowTargetSpacing parameter. Bitcoin's this parameter is about 20 times c0ban's parameter. So I change following time (Threshold is about 17 hours.)
fScriptChecks = (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(*pindexBestHeader, *pindex, *pindexBestHeader, chainparams.GetConsensus()) <= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2 / 20);
I passed test after above chnaged ! š
# test/functional/assumevalid.py
2018-03-27 06:05:48.264000 TestFramework (INFO): Initializing test directory /tmp/test0mfzhvom
2018-03-27 06:05:48.546000 TestFramework.mininode (INFO): Connecting to Bitcoin Node: 127.0.0.1:13629
2018-03-27 06:05:49.126000 TestFramework.mininode (INFO): Connecting to Bitcoin Node: 127.0.0.1:13630
2018-03-27 06:05:49.440000 TestFramework.mininode (INFO): Connecting to Bitcoin Node: 127.0.0.1:13631
2018-03-27 06:05:56.414000 TestFramework (INFO): Stopping nodes
2018-03-27 06:05:58.679000 TestFramework (INFO): Cleaning up
2018-03-27 06:05:58.683000 TestFramework (INFO): Tests successful
Option explain
Output
c0band debug.log