[RFP]: Lower the Number of Active Validator Slots for Enhancing Decentralization

[Curu24]

Proposal Due Date

29/09/2023

Proposal Overview

Blockchain networks are built upon the principles of decentralization, immutability, and security. One crucial element of decentralization in proof-of-stake (PoS) and delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS) blockchain networks is the active validator set. This proposal addresses the issue of insufficient number of individual entities engaged in validation of the SORA blockchain, leading to a less-than-optimal active validator set, and aims to ensure a more distributed and secure ecosystem.

Proposal Goals

The goal of this proposal is to mitigate various risks and challenges associated with insufficiently decentralized validator set in the SORA blockchain. Here is a list of some of the key risks for the SORA community associated with a lack of decentralization in the validator set:

Centralization of Power: When a small group or entity controls a significant portion of the validator nodes, it centralizes power, which can lead to censorship, collusion, and decision-making that may not align with the broader community's interests.

Security Vulnerabilities: A centralized validator set can be a single point of failure. If a majority of validators are controlled by a single entity or group, it becomes a lucrative target for attacks, making the network less secure.

Immutability and Trust: Blockchain's immutability and trustworthiness rely on a decentralized network of validators. If validators are centralized, it undermines the trust users have in the network's integrity.

Economic Centralization: A centralized validator set can lead to economic centralization, where a few validators accumulate most of the rewards and power, creating wealth disparities and potentially reducing participation by smaller players.

Collusion: Centralized validator sets may be more susceptible to collusion among a few powerful validators, leading to unfair practices or market manipulation.

Resistance to Regulatory Pressure: A decentralized validator set is more resistant to regulatory pressure. If validators are concentrated in a few jurisdictions or under the control of specific entities, they may be more vulnerable to government regulation or coercion.

Innovation Stifling: Centralization can discourage new entrants and innovation in the validator ecosystem, as established validators may have a competitive advantage that newcomers find hard to overcome.

Reduced Network Resilience: A network with a centralized validator set may have reduced resilience to network disruptions, outages, or attacks, as a concentrated attack on a small number of validators can have a significant impact on the network.

Lack of Redundancy: Decentralization provides redundancy, ensuring that even if some validators fail or go offline, the network can continue to operate smoothly. A lack of decentralization can reduce this redundancy.

Community Dissatisfaction: A centralized validator set can lead to dissatisfaction among community members, as it may not reflect the principles of decentralization and fairness that many blockchain projects promote.

Stakeholder Alienation: Smaller stakeholders may feel alienated or disengaged from the network if validator operations are dominated by a few large players, potentially leading to decreased network participation.

Long-Term Sustainability: Centralized validator sets may pose a risk to the long-term sustainability of a blockchain network, as they may not adequately represent the interests of all participants, making it difficult to achieve consensus on important network upgrades or changes.

Scope of Work

Reducing the number of validators in the active set.

Current Roadblocks and Barriers to Success

Lack of individual entities engaged in validation on the SORA blockchain. Current active set with 51 slots has the following composition:

Ehrab - 8 slots - 15.7% Avatar - 7 slots - 13.7% Dozenodes - 6 slots - 11.8% Validog - 6 slots - 11.8% Madrafrec - 5 slots - 9.8% <Unknown/System validators> - 4 slots - 7.8% Parliament - 3 slots - 5.9% Curu - 2 slots - 3.9% Cocote Node - 2 slots - 3.9% Xor Degens - 1 slot - 2% Polkadotters - 1 slot - 2% Ringround - 1 slot - 2% Dominodes - 1 slot - 2% F33ro - 1 slot - 2% Kairos01 - 1 slot - 2% Web3-Space - 1 slot - 2% Monoceros - 1 slot - 2%

Waiting list composition: Validog - 5 nodes Dozenodes - 3 nodes <Unknown/Council> - 3 nodes Madrafrec - 2 nodes

From the numbers above is clear that just the first 4 entities own more than half of the network, which should be very alarming. There are also no new entities in the waiting list right now.

Evaluation Metrics and Criteria

I suggest to bring the active set slots down from 51 to 36 until enough individual entities appear in the waiting list.

Submission Requirements

Bring down the number of active slots either to suggested above or to a number chosen in community discussion.

Submission Method

Blockchain: Mainnet

Project Due Date

02/10/2023

Budget Amount

No response

[javitoarroba]

Agree with the Proposal goals, but don't think the solution is to reduce the limit set. This action can in fact increase concentration if the outgoing validators are the individuals.

[Curu24]

Agree with the Proposal goals, but don't think the solution is to reduce the limit set. This action can in fact increase concentration if the outgoing validators are the individuals.

my reasoning is this - if you reduce the number of slots, than a healthy competition can arise, but now there's simply too many slots for the 17 individual entities to fill. so it's natural the redundant slots will be taken by duplicates.