Summary
Disclosing db_name, Internal Paths and Ports vai agroapp-live GitHub on older Commits.
Scenario (Impact)
Note: This doesn't have any direct impact.
But of the attacker gain the privilege in the internal network. Then he does not have to do directory brutefore or ports scanning.
Also the database name no need to use Sub string query for guessing the Database name (agro_db)
Some of the paths are:
MONGODB_URI=mongodb+srv://rekpero:rekpero@migration-test.mbbk8.mongodb.net/
MONGODB_DB_MAIN=argo
Severity: Informative (Low)
Summary Disclosing db_name, Internal Paths and Ports vai agroapp-live GitHub on older Commits.
Scenario (Impact) Note: This doesn't have any direct impact. But of the attacker gain the privilege in the internal network. Then he does not have to do directory brutefore or ports scanning. Also the database name no need to use Sub string query for guessing the Database name (agro_db)
Some of the paths are: MONGODB_URI=mongodb+srv://rekpero:rekpero@migration-test.mbbk8.mongodb.net/ MONGODB_DB_MAIN=argo
Path: Deploy Port: 5000 DEPLOYER_API_HOST_ADDRESS=http://localhost:5000/deploy/
Path: Payments Port: 3001 PAYMENT_API_HOST_ADDRESS=http://localhost:3001/payments
MONGODB_URI: process.env.MONGODB_URI || "mongodb://localhost:27017/", MONGODB_DB_MAIN: process.env.MONGODB_DB_MAIN || "argo_db",
PORT: +process.env.REDIS_PORT || 6379,
process.env.DEPLOYER_API_HOST_ADDRESS || "http://localhost:5000",
process.env.PAYMENT_API_HOST_ADDRESS || "http://localhost:3001",
process.env.FRONTEND_APP_HOST_ADDRESS || "http://localhost:3000",
Links These are on the older commits. https://github.com/argoapp-live/argo-api/blob/28e79203299f5554eb866578681b052a5817a0cf/env.example https://github.com/argoapp-live/argo-api/blob/a6e128fc410549fe69d6b7115e26119fa4839e98/src/config/env/index.ts
Thanks