On Windows, attackers sometimes "live off the land" in order to accomplish their goals without introducing new executables to the filesystem, thus possible evading detection or blocking by process-monitoring and executable-whitelisting tools.
Windows-specific mitigations for this have included hardening/lockdown of the WMI subsystem and PowerShell tool, and restricting how msbuild can be invoked.
The corresponding attacker tactics on macOS are less well developed/known. Research what an attacker might do to evade process-monitoring and executable-whitelisting tools on macOS, and what Sinter (or a Sinter user) could do in order to mitigate those tactics.
On Windows, attackers sometimes "live off the land" in order to accomplish their goals without introducing new executables to the filesystem, thus possible evading detection or blocking by process-monitoring and executable-whitelisting tools.
Windows-specific mitigations for this have included hardening/lockdown of the WMI subsystem and PowerShell tool, and restricting how
msbuild
can be invoked.The corresponding attacker tactics on macOS are less well developed/known. Research what an attacker might do to evade process-monitoring and executable-whitelisting tools on macOS, and what Sinter (or a Sinter user) could do in order to mitigate those tactics.
References: