Open maltfield opened 1 year ago
Remember: monero's release infrastructure has already been comprimised once.
And here's a great list of historically relevant cases where this has happened to other open-source projects:
Monero is a good case study because they actually were cryptographically signing their releases with PGP. Because of this, their users had a means to detect that the software they downloaded was malicious. It was reported to the developers, and the issue was promptly resolved.
But without signing releases (as is currently the case with Trust Wallet), a user has no way to know if the software they downloaded is [a] authentic or [b] maliciously modified.
Feature Request
Currently it is not possible to verify the cryptographic authenticity after downloading the Trust Wallet software because the releases are not cryptographically signed.
This makes it hard for Trust Wallet users to safely obtain the Trust Wallet software, and it introduces them to supply chain attacks.
Steps to Reproduce
Expected Behavior
A few things are expected:
SHA256SUMS.asc
file) along with the release itselfActual behavior
There's just literally no information on verifying downloads, and it appears that it is not possible to do so.
Versions Affected
Everything, all versions.
Use case
Installing the software securely
Suggested implementation
Cryptographic signing of all software releases with PGP