search

uchicago-computation-workshop / steven_durlauf

Repository for Steven Durlauf's presentation at the CSS Workshop (2/28/2019)
0 stars 0 forks source link

social theories on the incomplete information game for individual choice #29

Open di-Tong opened 5 years ago

di-Tong commented 5 years ago

Thank you for presenting! Could you elaborate more on social theories underlying and abstracting the incomplete information game for individual choice, such as the bounded rationality, etc.?

sdurlauf commented 5 years ago

The models I present assume rational expectations, which means that the subjective beliefs of actors coincide with the actual probability structure of the environment. Bounded rationality can take two forms. First, limit information set. This is done in my models since agents cannot observe choices of others. The other form would break the assumption agents form beliefs based on mathematical structure of environment. This would require appending to the model a distinct model of belief formation.